UNDERSTANDING THE LEGACIES OF THE 2010 VANCOUVER / WHISTLER OLYMPICS FOR THE FOUR HOST FIRST NATIONS

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<td>BC</td>
<td>Province of British Columbia</td>
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<td>COC</td>
<td>Canadian Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>FHFN(S)</td>
<td>Four Host First Nations (Society)</td>
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<td>FNST</td>
<td>First Nations Snowboard Team</td>
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<td>GVRD</td>
<td>Greater Vancouver Regional District</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Calgary Olympic Committee</td>
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<td>PLPA</td>
<td>Project Lender Protection Agreement</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership</td>
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<td>SIDWIP</td>
<td>Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People</td>
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<td>UNCEERD</td>
<td>United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>UNDRIP</td>
<td>United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNPFII</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

This theoretical analysis of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics finds context in the growing body of literature addressing the changing physical, economic, and social processes of urban development in the era of globalization. As global inter-urban competition for resources and opportunities mounts, the ways in which cities seek to attract these opportunities are becoming increasingly diversified. This analysis focuses on one recent method of urban growth promotion within this academic discipline: mega-event-led urban development. Using the example of the Vancouver / Whistler 2010 Winter Olympic Games, this analysis will explore some of the facets of Vancouver’s urban entrepreneurial mega-event-led development strategy.

The rationale and scope behind this research project is to fit the case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics into a broader context of mega-event related research. Building on existing analyses, it will seek to bridge the theoretical void between the multilateral causes, local incentives, and developmental outcomes of mega-event based urban planning using the case of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. While in much of the existing literature outlined below, the economic, political, and social causes and effects of mega-events are analyzed individually, the case of the integration of local First Nations into the staging and hosting of the 2010 Olympics provides an almost interdisciplinary perspective from which to understand the multifaceted agenda of mega-event related urban development. Tracing the discourse from multilateral agendas through to local Games-related community development initiatives, this thesis posits that the 2010 Olympics contain complex process of both Olympic legacy planning and aboriginal reparation.

This analysis proposes that non-governmental international bodies such as the IOC can help entrench a new set of ethnics, norms and values by encouraging host cities to fulfill a certain set of social and infrastructural requirements. The resulting staging,
performances, and planned and unplanned legacies mirror these pressures. How this has taken place in Vancouver and British Columbia through the 2010 Vancouver Olympics will be outlined in more detail throughout the rest of this work.

A variety of distinct theoretical considerations exist within the discourse surrounding mega-event related development exist. Many focus on the infrastructural and economic causes and effects of event-led urban development strategies (Molotch, 1976; Harvey, 1989; Harvey, 1990; Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2001; McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005; Hall, 2006; Gold & Gold, 2007; Surborg, Wyly, & VanWynsberg, 2008). These analyses often frame mega-events as spectacular, symbolic harbingers of neoliberalism, in which local elites harness public resources to fast-track large-scale gentrification projects and privatize public space. Existing theoretical discussions of this phenomenon outline two dominant rationale for using mega-events as development initiatives: to prompt urban infrastructural and economic growth, on the one hand, and to re-imagine urban identities, on the other.

While the Games were promoted as a mechanism to prompt significant infrastructural and economic development, the case of the 2010 Olympics can be understood as much more than an example of a civic booster strategy to attract tourism and stimulate the local economy. Also underlying these initiatives are discourses of multiculturalism, civic cosmopolitanism, and aboriginal representation and reparation. A significant body of literature addressing the general socio-political, performative, and (re)constructive causes and effects of mega-events exists (Whitson, 2004; Henderson & McEwan, 2005; McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005; Black, 2007; Shaw, 2008; Boyle & Haggerty, 2009). Within this, a distinct stream of research specific to Canadian and other post-colonial mega-event hosts has emerged. This literature addresses the representation of indigenous populations by and for the Olympic Games, and how mega-events are used to construct discourses of reconciliation, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism in post-colonial settler
societies (Wamsley & Heine, 1996a, 1996b; Magdalinski, 2000; O'Bonsawin, 2006; O'Bonsawin, 2010, Winstanley, 2010).

Chapter 3 addressed research question number one: What were some of the underlying urban development incentives behind the Vancouver 2010 Olympics? It contextualizes how the arguments outlined above have been applied to Vancouver’s event-led development strategies, with special regard to the case of the 2010 Olympics and one of its most notable public-private partnership development projects. Section 3.2 discusses the use of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics as an infrastructural and economic development tool. In contrast, Section 3.3 highlights the socio-political rationale for hosting a mega-event, and how celebrations such as the Olympic Games construct communities and (re)imagine urban region. This section lays the foundations for understanding how and why VANOC sought to bring local First Nations groups on board to stage and host the 2010 Games, setting a context for the further exploration of indigenous representation, participation, and development strategies outlined in chapters 4 and 5.

The case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games also presents a new way of understanding aboriginal participation and integration into the staging, hosting, and legacy redistribution of a mega-event. This analysis proposes that the strategic partnership between the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) and the Four Host First Nations (FHFN) set a new precedent for the ways in which mega-events can foster growth and redistribute event-generated wealth amongst traditionally marginalized communities. Further, the Games constructed a narrative of aboriginal integration that was transmitted locally, nationally, and internationally, re-framing discourses of reparations and equality within and amongst First Nations communities.

Many of the existing analyses addressing indigenous participation and representation in large-scale public events such as the Olympics have focused on (mis)representations through art, ceremony, and staging (Wamsley & Heine, 1996b; Magdalinski,
debates are contextualized using the cases of Montreal, Calgary, and Sydney in Chapter 4. In these events, constructed versions of multiculturalism and equality were marketed to domestic and international audiences in efforts to promote visions of more equal, integrated communities. It will be argued here that, while the Vancouver 2010 Games also incorporated many performative and discursive practices to construct an image of First Nations people that could be understood both across Canada and around the world, the 2010 VANOC and FHFN partnership, and the development opportunities that resulted, cannot be simply understood as the symbolic efforts of a regional booster coalition inviting local indigenous groups to take part in a development opportunity. Rather, the partnership represents a set of three interwoven narratives: one, within the framework of a neo-liberal urban growth initiative, another, within an increasingly complex process of the international normatization of indigenous rights, and lastly, through the changing nature of First Nations integration in Canada.

As such, part of the journey to the 2010 Games is set in post-colonial narratives of reparations and recognition at both the multilateral and the federal level. Over the past decade, the United Nations has worked on institutionalizing the rights of indigenous people. Given that it is one of the world’s largest international norm-creating bodies, the United Nations’ addition of indigenous right is both symbolic and affective. While, at the time of writing, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) had not yet been ratified by Canada, it will be argued within the context of this research project that the increasing multilateral presence of the rights of indigenous peoples set the precursor for part of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic development trajectory.

While the UNDRIP is bringing the rights of indigenous people to multilateral discussion, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is also getting into the business of international norm development. In response to the acclaimed Agenda 21, a sustainable development
action plan developed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1992, the IOC developed its own Action Plan for Sustainable Development “in close consultation with the UNEP” (International Olympic Committee, 1999). While a large part of this action plan focuses on how the Olympic movement can actively promote the development of an environmentally sustainable international sporting culture, it also mandates the integration of indigenous peoples into the staging and hosting of Olympic Games, as well as illustrates how and why athletic capacity building amongst indigenous athletes can and should take place. Whether this initiative should be read as an effort by the IOC, itself a highly visible and influential international organization, to increase its international membership and cross-sector appeal, is beyond the scope of this project. What will be explored, however, is how the IOC’s adoption of international norms of indigenous integration and affirmation helped lay the groundwork for the 2010 VANOC and FHFN partnership, and for the development that First Nations communities experienced through the 2010 Olympic Games.

Chapter 4 discusses representations of indigenous people in the multilateral (public) and international (private) spheres. Section 4.2 seeks to answer research question 2: How does the IOC, through the mandated integration of indigenous peoples into the Olympic Games, act as a norm creation body? How were First Nations people represented by and for the 2010 Games? What are the implications of superseding Canadian legal processes though a privately backed development project such as the Olympics? In doing this, the chapter begins by outlining the multilateral inclusion of indigenous representation and restitution through the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). The International Olympic Committee’s corresponding commitment to aboriginal representation at the Olympic Games shows how norms can be transferred from the multilateral into the international sphere, and raises questions as to how private organizations such as the IOC
contribute to the international production and normatization of social values. In Section 4.3, representations of indigenous people in past Olympic Games are outlined. This provides a basis for the comparative contextualization of how the 2010 Games met unprecedented levels of integration of indigenous people. Finally, the nature of the VANOC and FHFN partnership protocol, aboriginal representation in the context of the 2010 Games, and some of the criticisms of the manipulation and selective integration of certain First Nations groups from both non-aboriginal and First Nations communities will be explored in greater detail.

The concept of legacy planning is one of fastest-growing areas of analysis in mega-event-led urban development discourses. Legacies are a motivational tool increasingly used by host cities to rally support amongst local constituents, who promise the redistribution of Olympic revenue into many areas of community and infrastructural development. The imperative for host cities to develop a strategic plan for sustainable and redistributive Olympic legacies spanning a variety of social, cultural, and infrastructural community needs has been mirrored by an increase in the related research into this phenomenon (Zimmerman, 2006; Reid, 2008). It should be noted, however, that host cities have only recently begun focusing their attention on the phenomenon of using thorough and targeted legacy planning as a strategic leveraging position and development tool. As such, a large proportion of the existing studies done on this branch of the mega-event planning process have been conducted by the International Olympic Committee, local organizing committees such as VANOC, and contracted consultants. This leaves notable room for the academic interrogation of this phenomenon.

While it is too early to be able to fully assess the long-term sustainability of the Vancouver 2010 planned legacies, the ways in which First Nations communities were integrated into the planning process and the post-Games redistribution of development revenue will be discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter will address research question 3: What are some of the legacies of the 2010 Olympic
Games for First Nations communities in the Lower Mainland and the Province of British Columbia? What is the outlook for the sustainability of 2010’s planned legacies? In answering these questions, this chapter will discuss how the legacies of the 2010 Games were planned and executed, and how, as a response to a variety of external factors, the 2010 Games have contributed to social and infrastructural development in some of British Columbia’s First Nations communities.

Chapter 6 will recapitulate the arguments outlined throughout this analysis by addressing research question 4: How can the VANOC and FHFN partnership be interpreted? What are the implications of promoting the selective development of certain First Nations groups? In doing this, the discussions of Vancouver’s strategic neo-liberal urban planning methods will be synthesized with the changing international discourses regarding the rights of indigenous peoples and the integration of select local First Nations groups into the staging and hosting of the 2010 Games. Planned legacies will be counterpoised with an analysis of the more subtextual legacies created for First Nations people through the Olympic Games, outlining the possible impacts of the mega-event driven transmission of multilateral agendas and the private-sector led overwriting of public policy on local First Nations people.

Finally, questions for further research will be posed.
Chapter 2: Analytical Framework

2.1: Definitions

In Canada, the term that is most widely used to describe the peoples that occupied North America before the arrival of colonial settlers is “aboriginal.” In the United States, the terms “Indians” or “Native Americans” are used. In the context of this research paper, the term “First Nations” will refer specifically to Canadian aboriginal peoples, and the term “indigenous” will be used to refer more generally to indigenous people in an international and multilateral context. The words “Nation” or “Band” will be used to refer to the specific First Nations communities (e.g. Musqueam Nation). These definitions are outlined by Calvin Helin, a British Columbian First Nations attorney and business leader, in “Dances with Dependency – Indigenous Success through Self-Reliance” (2006, p. 15).

Mega-events are defined as “major fairs, festivals, expositions, cultural and sporting events which are held on either a regular on a one-off basis” (Hall, 2006, p. 59). This definition encompasses first-order international events hosted by a single city, such as the Olympics or a World Exposition, first-order international events hosted by a larger region or country, such as the FIFA World Cup, and second-order regional or divisional events such as the Commonwealth Games or the UEFA Euro Cup (Black, 2007).

The IOC defines the terms “impact” and “legacy” as follows: Impact is commonly used to “describe the effects of a policy, programme, or project on ecosystems, society in general and / or on the economic system. It is more often used to imply an adverse effect or damaging or destructive result. Legacy is often used when presenting positive effects. It generally refers to phenomena that are of a longer, more permanent duration” (International Olympic Committee, 2010, p. 4). These definitions of mega-event related “impacts” and “legacies” will be used throughout this work.
2.2: Methodology

This analysis of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics was conducted using a variety of secondary literature sources and primary publications dealing with the bidding, staging and legacy planning of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

Secondary sources included published academic works analyzing the phenomenon of mega-event-led urban development. The more theoretical sources outline the underlying theoretical framework that contextualize the case of Vancouver and the 2010 Olympics. Molotch (1976) and Harvey’s (1989, 1990) theories of the city as an entrepreneurial, growth-stimulating entity foreshadow Sassen’s (2007) conception of a global system of interconnected, competing urban hubs.

Other secondary sources built on these underlying theories, citing specific examples of mega-event-led developments. Drawing on a number of North American cases, Burbank et. al. (2001), Hall (2006), Gold & Gold (2007) outline the political and economic rationale for using mega-events as development tools. In contrast, Wamsley & Heine (1994; 1996a; 1996b) and Magdalinski (2000) outline the place-promotional and urban re-imagining imperatives in the Calgary 1988 and Sydney 2000 Olympics. O’Bonsawin (2006; 2010) and Black (2007) address the socio-politically constructive nature of the 2010 Games, while McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly (2005), and Surborg, Wyly, & VanWynsberg (2008) argue that the Vancouver 2010 Olympics constructed particular images of Vancouver and British Columbia to further a development agenda led by local business and political elite. Reid (2008) outlines the changing scope of Olympic legacy planning, and cites ways in which integrative planning can be conducted to maximize event-related benefit to local communities. Published non-academic works from a First Nations business leader and the leader of the No Games 2010 anti-Olympic activist group contextualize some of opposing arguments within the Olympic debate (Helin, 2006; Shaw, 2008).
Secondary documentary sources included: protocol agreements between the Squamish and Lil’wat Nations and the Province of British Columbia (Squamish Lil’Wat Cultural Centre, 2008); Vancouver Bid Committee business plan (2007); Vancouver Organizing Committee planning documents including Games budgets, sustainability reports, aboriginal integration plans, bid book (2007, 2010a, 2010b); the Multi-Party Agreement dividing up the hosting commitments of the 2010 Games (2002); International Olympic Committee reports including Vancouver bid facts, news releases, education packages, legacy and impact assessments (1999, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d); 2010 Legacies Now reports including financial statements, social sustainability reports (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008); City of Vancouver city council reports on the Vancouver Olympic Village and the Olympic vote process (2005, 2007, 2011a, 2011b). Also, additional online secondary documentary sources included the official sites of the IOC, 2010 Legacies Now, and various branches of the Canadian government and the United Nations. A limited number of supplementary images and articles were provided by non-governmental sources such as Amnesty International Canada (2010) and the Australian Commonwealth Games Association (2007).

Secondary documentary sources were analysed, and themes relating to the research questions listed in section 2.4 were identified. Themes included: aboriginal participation; aboriginal integration; legacy programming; capacity building; funding structures; public private partnerships; protocol development; Canadian identity; Vancouver identity. These were tabulated manually and were used to contextualize research and assess the suitability of the assumptions made.

Primary data was collected through an in-depth semi-structured interview with the Executive Director of the First Nations Snowboard Team (outlined in section 5.3). The interview was conducted to gain further information about the nature of the
Squamish and Lil’wat Nations’ participation in the 2010 Olympics, to gain specific information about the First Nations Snowboard Team and the 2010 Legacies Now organization, and to bridge the informational void between primary and secondary sources on the subject of this specific legacy program.

The interviewee was selected on the basis of his professional expertise. The interviewee was directly involved in the programming, legacy planning, and social service and infrastructural development in the Squamish and Lil’wat First Nations community. The interviewee’s direct experiences with various facets of the 2010 legacy planning processes provided relevant, informed insight to the research questions outlined below.

In as far as the information gained was from a professional with significant experience with the Games-related development in the Four Host First Nation communities, the interview is not subject to questions of reliability. However, that is not to say the responses were entirely unbiased; opinions, affiliations, and motivations were taken into consideration when objectively analyzing the responses of the interviewee in the larger context of legacy planning and Games-related development. However, this is an advantage, not a shortcoming, in understanding the nature of indigenous participation and the resulting legacies of the Vancouver 2010 Games.

2.3: Methodological Limitations

The bulk of the research for this project was conducted in Vancouver, Canada in the summer of 2010. While Vancouver had hosted the Games only six months earlier, much of the organizational infrastructure and many of the professionals that had worked directly on the planning, staging, and hosting of the Games were no longer available. The transnational group of IOC professionals had long since left the city, and both the VANOC and FHFN Olympic offices had closed, making it difficult to reach individuals for interviews.
The core VANOC documents, including the bid book, sustainability and financial reports, and a variety of planning and protocol agreements were downloaded from the official Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games (www.vancouver2010.com) website in the summer of 2010. However, the official site was deactivated in December 2010. All attempted web visits to the original www.vancouver2010.com site redirected users to the International Olympic Committee website, where only a fraction of the original documents were available. As all related planning documents had already been downloaded, this did not affect the ability to continue this research project. However, it did highlight the nature of corporate publication and selective access to information. Before, during, and shortly after the 2010 Games, this information was available to the general public because the demand for accountability and transparency was high. However, once the Games were no longer of immediate public interest, the nature of VANOC’s open access to information changed.

Also in this vein, governmental and legal documents had to be analyzed objectively, taking into consideration Canada’s existing legal frameworks and the possible different perspectives and needs of the stakeholders involved. Often, due to the formalized nature of the discourse in the documents, the socio-economic intricacies behind the institutional frameworks were not immediately apparent.
2.4: Research Questions

The main questions asked in this analysis are:

1. What were some of the underlying urban development incentives behind the Vancouver 2010 Olympics?
2. How does the IOC, through the mandated integration of indigenous peoples into the Olympic Games, act as a norm creating body? How were First Nations people represented by and for the 2010 Games? What are the implications of superseding Canadian legal processes though a privately backed development project such as the Olympics?
3. What are some of the legacies of the 2010 Olympic Games for First Nations communities in the Lower Mainland and the Province of British Columbia? What is the outlook for the sustainability of 2010’s planned legacies?
4. How can the VANOC and FHFN partnership be interpreted? What are the implications of promoting the selective development of certain First Nations?

3.1: Introduction

Located on Canada’s West Coast, the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) is the third-largest municipality in Canada with a population of approximately 2.1 million (MetroVancouver, 2006). While the city’s most recent mega-event, the 2010 Olympics, is the subject of this analysis, Vancouver’s mega-event led urban development strategy dates back to the middle of the 20th Century. In the past sixty years, the city has hosted the British Empire and Commonwealth Games (1954), a World Exposition (1986), and bid to host the Winter Olympics in 1976 and 1980 before being awarded the 2010 Olympics in 2003 (Australian Commonwealth Games Association, 2007; International Olympic Committee, 2010a; Chappell, 2010). The City of Vancouver co-hosted the XXI Winter Olympic Games with the Resort Municipality of Whistler, located 125 km from downtown Vancouver, and four local First Nations bands (referred to in the Vancouver Olympic context as the Four Host First Nations) from February 12th to February 28th, 2010. The geographic region and Olympic sites are illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: Vancouver Whistler Olympic Venue Locations
Source: (International Olympic Committee, 2009, p. 12)

Global inter-urban competition for resources and opportunities is not a new phenomenon. In the colonial era, cities in colonial power centers fought for the control of maritime trade and transportation networks, while more contemporary competition pits cities around the globe against one another in the race to attract corporate headquarters, international centers of finance, and important components of the “central command functions” of the global economy (Sassen, 2007, p. 85). However, it must be noted that as the global economy becomes more highly specialized and diversified and as the locations of production, consumption, and accumulation become more flexible, so too are cities required to become more specialized in the way they seek to attract capital,
promote growth, and forge a unique and competitive niche in our increasingly urban world.

Mega-events are used by post-industrial cities to prompt urban (re)development, attract tourism and foreign direct investment, and raise the cosmopolitan image of the city both on the domestic and international scale. Since the 1950s, the importance of large-scale events as core components of the City of Vancouver’s urban development agenda has been increasing. This chapter will review the Vancouver 2010 Olympics’ infrastructural and economic development agenda, positing some answers to research question 1 (Section 2.4): What were some of the underlying urban development incentives behind the Vancouver 2010 Olympics?

This begins with an outline of some of the major theoretical economic and developmental rationale underlying mega-events, drawing on major research done in this field and contextualizing it with an overview of some of the projects that were carried out in the name of the 2010 Games in Vancouver.

The latter half of the chapter will outline how the City of Vancouver’s mega-event based urban planning strategy sought to strategically (re)construct a local First Nations image and identity through the 2010 Olympics, and the possible implications these constructions have on community, ownership, and development in the city. Chapters 4 and 5 will build on the themes outlined here, and discuss the discursive and effective implications of this construction.

Two of the leading theories that figure significantly in the analysis of the Vancouver / Whistler 2010 Olympics as an infrastructural and economic development tool are Harvey Molotch’s (1976) theory of the city as a growth machine, and David Harvey’s (1989) neoliberal-era system of urban entrepreneurialism. Molotch and Harvey both focus on the physical and economic implications of contemporary urban development, looking at how various stakeholders strategically manipulate the urban environment to be more growth stimulating. The application of these theories to the
Vancouver / Whistler 2010 Olympics will be explored in more detail in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

It must be noted that this project is not simply about how neo-liberal forms of urban development are shaping infrastructural growth in the City of Vancouver; a substantial amount of research already exists on this subject. While both Molotch’s (1976) theory of the urban growth machine and Harvey’s (1989) analysis of new urban entrepreneurial management strategies in late capitalism have been used to account for strategies of competitive place-promotion and urban image creation with the aim of attracting investment and development in mega-event host regions, these theories and the academics that employ them focus on the causes and effects of event-related infrastructural and economic development, largely failing to connect these efforts with (1) the strategic processes of identity construction underlying mega-event bids; and (2) the strategic constructions of place, space and cultural identity through these events. As Black (2007) points out, the developments that mega-events espouse can also be highly politically and socially symbolic in nature. He argues that mega-events can be used as opportunities to “signal important changes of direction, ‘reframe’ dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key messages about what the host has become/is becoming” (262). These elements will be explored in more detail below.

In order to contextualize how Games-related discourse constructed First Nations participation, representation, and integration in the 2010 Olympics, the analysis of the mega-event as an urban development strategy must be counterpoised with some theories of identity construction. Anderson’s (1983) theory of imagined communities provides a useful point of departure for understanding how nationalism and communal identity are constructed. While this theory analyses communal identity at the level of the nation state, the ways in which Anderson proposed that community identity is constructed can also be applied to identity construction in an urban region.
A sizable body of literature outlining how the Vancouver Olympics were used for politically and socially strategic means also provides a valuable counterpoint to those analyses focusing on infrastructural and economic development. Whitson (2004), Black (2007), and Winstanley (2010) investigate the strategic use of the Olympics to raise Vancouver and Canada’s profile globally, while McCallum, Spencer, and Wyly (2005), and Surborg, Wyly, and VanWynsberg (2008), Shaw (2008), and O’Bonsawin, (2010) explore the processes of identity construction through the Vancouver 2010 Olympics in a more regional context.

3.2: Vancouver 2010 Olympics as an Infrastructural and Economic Development Tool

As mentioned in section 3.1, the staging and hosting of mega-events has become one of the recurring methods that the City of Vancouver has used to prompt growth and investment by “attract[ing] and retain[ing] mobile capital and people – through place enhancement and regeneration and the promotion of selective place information” (Hall, 2006, p. 59). This type of development is often “associated with large-scale public expenditure, the construction of facilities and infrastructure, and urban redevelopment and revitalization strategies […]” (p. 59). One of the most controversial Games-related development projects, the Olympic Village in Vancouver’s Southeast False Creek, will be discussed in more detail in section 3.2.3. First, however, Molotch (1976) and Harvey’s (1989, 1990) theories will provide a theoretical framework for understanding the processes involved in this type of event-led development.

3.2.1: The City as a Growth Machine

Molotch’s (1976) theory of the city as a growth machine proposes that, even across diverse political and commercial agendas, local business and governmental elites are strategic stake-
holders in shaping urban development. As the visibility of an urban region increases through event-related media attention, so does the demand to live, work and invest there. This can contribute to an inflation of local property prices. Molotch suggests that because members of the urban elite often own significant amounts of real estate, they stand to benefit from the rise in property prices. Thus, “the desire for growth” prompts the construction and maintenance of a highly attractive urban image, and “provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites” (Molotch, 1976, p. 310).

While Molotch developed the growth machine theory at a time when the hosting of mega-events was just beginning to be used as a strategic urban development strategy, it has since been often applied to cases of mega-event-led development in general, and to the Vancouver 2010 Olympics in particular (McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005; Hall, 2006; Surborg, Wyly, & VanWynsberg, 2008). For example, McCallum et. al. (2005) and Surborg et. al. (2008) use Molotch’s theory of the city as a growth machine to outline the key role that Vancouver’s transnational capitalist class played in pushing through the 2010 Olympic bid, as well as in the construction of a highly-strategic Olympic marketing platform that appealed to both the IOC (to gain votes for Vancouver’s candidacy as the 2010 Olympic host city) and to Vancouverites and Canadians (to rally support for and promote local ownership of the controversial Olympic bid).¹

¹ Bid cities must exhibit significant local support of an Olympic bid in order for their candidacy to be accepted by the IOC. In response to public protest against the allocation of public funds to the Olympics, the City of Vancouver held a public opinion poll in 2003, in which the continued support of the Vancouver Olympic Bid was articulated by a narrow majority of voters (City of Vancouver, 2005; Shaw, 2008, p. 31). The resistance to the 2010 Olympics that originated in the First Nations communities, ‘No Olympics on Stolen Native Land,’ will be outlined in more detail in section 4.4.3.
3.2.2: Urban Entrepreneurialism

Harvey’s (1989; 1990) conception of urban entrepreneurialism in the era of post-modern flexible accumulation also provides a framework for understanding how and why the City of Vancouver sought to prompt urban regeneration through mega-events such as the Olympic Games. According to Harvey (1989), urban entrepreneurial strategies lie at the heart of modern and post-modern urban transformation, as local booster coalitions work to attract foreign funding for public-private development partnerships (p. 7). As will be shown in section 3.2.3, the infrastructural and social development projects created by the 2010 Olympics harnessed civic, provincial, federal, and private funding to create and re-invent Vancouver.

The transition from managerial to entrepreneurial strategies of urban governance began in the mid-1970s, as increasing inter-urban competition prompted cities to create specialized niches though the “(a) competition for position in the international division of labour; (b) competition for position as centers of consumption; (c) competition for control and command functions (financial and administrative powers in particular); and (d) competition for governmental redistribution” (Harvey, 1990, p. 255). Most significantly, this increased competition has forced cities to tailor their corporate capacities to the needs of global corporate networks. The resulting urban redevelopment plans feature concentrations of office spaces, communications capacities, and networking hubs ranging from airports to teleports. These infrastructural capacities allow for efficient business transactions, creating the ideal urban business environment. Cities build these hubs to create an attractive corporate investment climate in order to become a center of economic control “within a restricted space of interaction so as to facilitate highly efficient and interactive production systems” (p. 8). Foreshadowing Sassen’s (2007) theory of an interconnected network of command and control functions of the global economy, Harvey
(1989) points out, “command functions have been a strong growth sector in these last two decades [...] , so pursuit of them has more and more appealed as the golden path to urban survival” (p. 10).

In order to contribute to the highly attractive urban image that cities seek to create, capital-intensive attractions (including both permanent fixtures such as malls and amusement parks and one-off events such as conferences, Expos, and Olympic Games) have also become essential components of urban entrepreneurial regeneration strategies. The mega-event has become one means through which urban regions try to raise their visibility internationally, and draw attention to the city as a safe and competitive investment center. Quoting Bianchini, Harvey (1989) points out that an abundance of leisure opportunities in a city “create a climate of optimism – the ‘can do’ culture essential to developing the enterprise culture. [...] The city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or visit, to play and consume in” (p. 9).

However, cities are often not able to fund the state-of-the-art infrastructure that both a specialized, competitive corporate sector and a successful mega-event would require without a significant amount of private financial investment. This funding often comes in the form of public-private development partnerships, and is not entirely unproblematic. Drawing on Molotch’s (1976) theory of the city as a growth machine, Surborg et. al. (2008) point out that public-private partnerships are generally initiated by and set to benefit a small number of political and business elite. The public sector, in contrast, often needs to acquiesce to the needs of private-sector investors in order to secure the funding needed for speculative “gentrification, cultural innovation, and physical up-grading of the urban environment” (Harvey, 1989, p. 10). “Heavy public subsidies, infrastructural contributions and seductive grants are mobilized by public and public-private development agencies alike, to lure in the international real estate capital that has the muscle to make such projects work” (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 227). Further, the public sector is often required to absorb the financial risks implicit in this
speculative development (such as cost over-runs, real estate or currency devaluation, and over-accumulation and overinvestment), leaving public resources vulnerable while creating relative security and more flexibility for the movement of multinational capital (Harvey, 1989, p. 11).

While the public sector often enters into public-private partnerships to harness external funding for large-scale redevelopment projects, they are often left financially vulnerable, socially fragmented, and under duress in negotiations with corporate investors. This raises questions such as why and how such exclusive allocations of public resources garner the support of local citizens, as it is generally those most dependent on public resources who stand to lose more than they might gain from corporate and event infrastructure developed through entrepreneurial urban redevelopment schemes. While economic and infrastructural urban development may, at first glance, seem to stand in contrast to the discursive and constructive effects of mega-events that will be examined in more detail in the following sections, gaining public support for entrepreneurial development through the construction of a new cosmopolitan identity are strategically and inextricably linked.

3.2.3: Entrepreneurialism in Action: The Vancouver Olympic Village

As both Molotch (1976) and Harvey’s (1989, 1990) theories outline above, mega-events such as the Olympics can provide the political and economic rationale for a variety of medium- to large-scale urban (re)development initiatives. Large-scale events with significant public backing provide cities with an opportunity to access development funding from a variety of public and private sources. In line with these assumptions, VANOC’s statement on economic sustainability outlines their developmental rationale for hosting the Olympics in Vancouver:
Managed well, events such as Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games can generate sustainable economic benefits for the communities and regions and countries that host such large-scale events, including jobs, business development opportunities, trade and infrastructure improvements. During VANOC’s lifespan, economic benefits were created by VANOC, government partners, corporate sponsors, the non-profit sector, the tourism sector and the broad base of organizations and businesses involved in the Games. (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010, p. 87)

While outlining every piece of social and infrastructure developed related to the 2010 Games is outside of the scope of this analysis, it is useful to contextualize Molotch (1976) and Harvey’s (1989, 1990) theories with an example of one of Vancouver’s Games-driven developments. The story of the public-private partnership (PPP) construction of the 2010 Olympic Village is a prime example of what Harvey (1989, 1990) would describe as one of the major defining features of urban entrepreneurial development in the era of late capitalism. Upon being awarded the 2010 Games, the City of Vancouver entered into a multi-party agreement with the federal government, the provincial government, the resort municipality of Whistler, the Vancouver Bid Corporation, and national Olympic and Paralympic committees. This comprehensive agreement outlined the different developmental and financial commitments for which each of the Canadian signatories would be responsible throughout the planning and execution of the 2010 Games.

One of the most significant commitments for the City of Vancouver was the on-time construction and provision of the 2010 Athlete’s Village (Multiparty Agreement for the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2002). Site 2A in inner city False Creek, a highly-valuable piece of waterfront property that developers had been vying to access since Vancouver’s last mega-event in 1986, was chosen as the site of the 2010 Games Village. The 2010 Games offered the City an opportunity to fast track the
redevelopment of the “last remaining large tract of undeveloped waterfront land near downtown Vancouver” (City of Vancouver, 2011). The Olympic Village, outlined in Figure 3.2 below, will eventually be home to 16,000 people, with 252 affordable housing units, a community centre, childcare centers, an elementary school, and a community garden (City of Vancouver, 2011b). While this sounds like the ideal family-oriented coastal lifestyle, The City of Vancouver’s description of the Olympic Village fails to include its complex financial story.

Figure 3.2: Vancouver Olympic Village in Southeast False Creek
Source: (City of Vancouver, 2011)

As per the Multi-Party Agreement, VANOC received $580 million from the provincial and federal governments to help fund the renovation and development of Games-related infrastructure (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010, p. 87). $30 million CAD of this was granted to the City of Vancouver to help fund the Olympic Village (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2007, p. 69). The City was responsible for finding a third-party developer to fund and build
the project, and entered into a public-private partnership agreement with small local developers Millennium Developments Inc.

Millennium, themselves unable to finance the entire construction project outright, borrowed money from two American corporate financiers, Quest Capital Corp. and Fortress Financial (Smith & Bayne, 2007, p. 5). Of note here is that, due to the guarantee of on-time completion the City had made to VANOC and the IOC, the City did not sell the land to Millennium, but leased it through a “Project Lender Protection Agreement” (PLPA) for $193 Million CAD. This PLPA gave the City the option of revoking the lease and assuming control of the development of the Olympic Village site, in the event that Millennium would not be able to complete the development of the Village in accordance with the schedule that was promised to VANOC and the IOC (Smith & Bayne, 2007, p. 4). This provided the City with the flexibility to meet their Olympic commitment, but also left them financially vulnerable. Assuming the Millennium development project also meant assuming the loans to Quest and Fortress, and finding the capital (either in their own accounts or through a subsequent PPP) to finish the Games Village on schedule. Given the flexibility the PLPA gave both Millennium and the City, both financiers had required that the City underwrite a $200 Million CAD portion of their loans to Millennium, leaving the City on the hook for the loans in the event that the development company were unable to complete the project and repay the loans themselves with the income that would be generated through the sale of the housing units.

In 2008, it was determined that Millennium would not, in fact, be able to complete the Village on schedule. An insufficient number of condominiums had been pre-sold to be able to fund the completion of the project, and the dramatic hit the North American real estate market took in the wake of the current financial crisis left the possibility of immediate further sales limited. Left with few options, the City assumed the responsibility for the completion of the project, and with it, the financial setback of Millennium’s cost over-
runs, outstanding land lease payments owed to the City (until that point, only $20 million CAD of the $193 million CAD had been paid), and debts to Quest and Fortress. This supports Harvey’s (1989) statement, that “public-private partnership is entrepreneurial precisely because it is speculative in execution and design and therefore dogged by all of the difficulties and dangers which attach to speculative as opposed to rationally planned and coordinated development” (p. 7).

3.3: Urban (Re)imagining – the Olympics as a Socio-Political tool

It is important to note that while events such as the Olympic Games and soccer World Cups are often used as infrastructural development initiatives, they also function as opportunities to re-imagine distinct and strategic urban and national identities (Hall, 2006). This section will begin by outlining some of the theoretical underpinnings of community identity construction, contextualizing Anderson’s concept of imagined communities within the more specific framework of socio-political mega-event analysis outlined by Wamsley and Heine (1994), Whitson (2004), McCallum et. al. (2005), and Black (2007). Examples of how community cohesion and support for both the Calgary 1988 Olympics and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics were fostered through volunteerism and community education programs provide contextual examples to the theoretical assumptions.

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2 At the time of writing, the City was put into receivership of the Olympic Village, giving it control over the marketing and sales of the remaining unsold housing units. The City is still owed $760 Million (Bula, 2010).
3.3.1: Imagined Communities

Anderson’s (1983) concept of imagined communities provides a good point of theoretical departure for understanding the implications of strategically constructed local and national identities through sporting mega-events such as the Olympics. While his work considers the construction of a national, not local, community, his general conception of how identity is constructed is transferable, and can thus be applied to the strategic constructions of spatial and ethnic identity espoused through the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

Anderson (1983) argues that nationality and nationalism are socio-cultural concepts that are imagined, limited, sovereign, and communal in nature (p. 49-50). He argues that while citizens of a nation-state will never know most of their fellow citizens, there exist connections in the minds of individual citizens that have been formulated by generations of shared experiences, nationalist iconography and imagery, and common value systems. Since the age of European Enlightenment, increasing secularization has prompted constructed senses of nationalism to replace lost senses of religious homogeneity amongst citizens of a nation-state. According to Anderson, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Anderson, 1983, p. 49). In the same vein, the production and marketing of mega-events uses images, iconography, and symbolic constructions of a shared identity to bring together a region or a nation’s citizens.

3.3.2: (Re)Constructing Civic Identity through the Olympic Games: Lessons from Calgary 1988 and Vancouver 2010

Gaining support for the Olympic Games by constructing a generalized Vancouverite identity that appealed to transnational developers and sporting officials, but that was still relevant to local residents, figured prominently in Vancouver’s successful bid for the 2010 Olympics (McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005). In keeping with
Anderson’s conception of communities as imagined constellations of fragmented individuals, Henderson and McEwan (2005) explain, “national identity is made, not given. Identity construction is a political process that serves a political purpose. A common national identity can go some way to securing the popular consent that sustains the state’s legitimacy and its system of rule” (p. 173). In the same vein, processes of strategic place-promotion and civic identity construction helped ensure the success of the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics and the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics. How these processes took place, and the subtexts they held about local and regional senses of identity and ownership, will be explored in more detail below.

The hosting and staging of mega-events can contribute significantly to the strategic reimagining of an urban region, both by and for its citizens. Whitson (2004) argues, “a mega-event […] is not only about showing the city off to the world. It is also about putting the global on show for the locals, and inviting them to take on new identities as citizens of the world – identities that will henceforth be lived in their production and consumption of global products” (p. 1223). “[…] It is important to understand that in western Canada the discourses of identity being circulated before and during [the Calgary and Vancouver Olympic Games] were directed as much at locals as they were at visitors and external audiences.” (p. 1221). In Calgary, the eight-year preparation for the 1988 Olympics included much more than just the construction of sporting venues: teachers were given Olympic-themed modules to incorporate into their curricula. For the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, a 60-page educational package was prepared in English, French and German, and distributed by VANOC and the IOC. The package highlighted the Vancouver Games’ contribution to environmental, economic, and social sustainability, and included modules on everything from the international spirit of Olympism and Olympic history, to geography of the Pacific Northwest and lessons on First Nations arts, culture, and language (International Olympic Committee, 2009).
Citizens were also encouraged to take part in hosting the Olympic Games through the active promotion of rigorous volunteer programs. In Calgary, almost 10,000 citizens were invited to volunteer at the Olympics, and in Vancouver, the number of volunteer number exceeded 25,000 (Wamsley & Heine, 1994; International Olympic Committee, 2010d). The preparation for volunteering at both Games included months of training on hosting etiquette, and how to convey the proud local Olympic spirit to visitors from around the world. Volunteers were reminded that they were representing both their city and the international Olympic movement, and that only certain types of conduct worthy of the international attention the Games would bring to the city. In the case of the 1988 Games, “Calgarians were encouraged by organizers, through various aspects of participation, to identity with particular aspects of the Games, thereby aligning them closer with officially produced significations” (Wamsley & Heine, 1994, p. 78). While significant research into the effect of educational programs and volunteerism in the case of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics has yet to be done, Wamsley & Heine show that the strategic re-framing of Calgarians’ attitudes in the year leading up to the 1988 Olympics helped ensure that the Games were met with very little conflict and opposition.

Interestingly, Whitson (2004) notes that some of the most significant legacies of the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics did not come from increases in international tourist revenue, large-scale real estate development, or an influx of foreign direct investment into the city. Rather, one of the most significant lasting economic benefits was that citizens internalized the cosmopolitan image embodied in the marketing campaigns for the Calgary Olympics. This constructed cosmopolitanism prompted a marked change in local consumption habits: citizens sought to relive the international, cosmopolitan feeling of the Olympics by demanding longer shopping hours, by visiting cafes and restaurants more frequently, and by taking part in the vibrant arts, cultural and recreational opportunities that remained after the Games.
While some parallels can be drawn between the 1988 and 2010 Games, the bidding, staging and hosting of the Vancouver Olympics was much more than an attempt to construct a renewed sense of cosmopolitanism amongst Vancouverites. More than acting as tools that cities can use to promote cosmopolitanism amongst their citizens, mega-events such as the Olympics are “critical junctures where globally mediate urban identities are refashioned, future directions forged, and past lineages overwritten in a context of global inter-urban competition” (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009, p. 257).

Whitson (2004) notes that since the 1960s, “Canadian cities have sought to change the somewhat provincial image they have historically had, and they have used mega-events such as the Olympic Games, World Expositions, and other ‘second order’ international sports events to try to reposition themselves on the world stage” (p. 1215). In Vancouver, the Olympic bid was prompted by “a blend of [the city’s] insecurity and ambition” (Black, 2007, p. 266). The “city’s core objective [was] not to minimize but rather to accentuate the differences between it and otherwise comparable cities internationally,” drawing attention to the beautiful natural surroundings, the welcoming international investment climate, and the burgeoning sustainable development sector (Whitson, 2004, p. 273; Surborg, Wyly, & VanWynsberg, 2008). Despite its setting, wealth and sophistication, Vancouver felt the need to prove that it has broken free from its traditional place in Canada’s hinterland, and is moving from being a largely resource-dependent economy to a distinctly unique world-class city.

3.4: Conclusion

The Vancouver Olympics were hosted with a number of key underlying development incentives. The elite-led booster coalition backing the Games sought to foster the type of economic and infrastructural growth outlined by Molotch’s (1976) growth machine theory, and applied to the case of Vancouver by McCallum et. al
(2005) and Surborg et. al. (2008). They also used the Games to market the city as a burgeoning global hub, ready for increasing foreign direct investment (Harvey, 1989, 1990; Hall, 2006).

The 2010 Winter Olympics created an opportunity to signal a shift in the city’s development trajectory, away from its image as a provincial Canadian backwater towards an image as a world class city (Whitson, 2004). This was mirrored by latent attempts to entrench Vancouverites’ cosmopolitan identities, creating an internal shift in the way in which Vancouverites constructed their place in Canada and the world.

Not least, Olympic backers also had local development aspirations. The Olympics presented an opportunity to harness public funding from both the provincial and federal governments to help offset the costs of Games-related infrastructural development. One of the Games’ lasting contributions to Vancouver’s landscape is the Vancouver Olympic Village, a large-scale public-private partnership project that was built on one of Vancouver’s last remaining tracts of undeveloped inner-city property.
Chapter 4: Indigenous Representation

4.1: Introduction

Bidding for and planning an Olympic Games is a highly competitive process that spans nearly a decade, involves a diverse set of domestic and international stakeholders, and requires the visible support and enthusiasm of host city constituents (Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2001; McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005; Gold & Gold, 2007; Surborg, Wyly, & VanWynsberg, 2008). While each of the four competitors demonstrated all of these characteristics, Vancouver’s successful bid featured one element that set the city apart from the other locations vying to host the 2010 Games: the unprecedented role that local First Nations communities would play in staging and hosting the Olympics.

In 2004, VANOC signed an official partnership protocol agreement with the Four Host First Nations Society (FHFNS) to co-host the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. While this marked the first time in Olympic history that an indigenous organization would officially co-host an Olympic Games, this was certainly not the first time indigenous rights had appeared in the multilateral and international sphere. In fact, the strategic partnership between VANOC and the FHFN can, to some extent, be read as a result of the international visibility of the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and to the International Olympic Committee’s integration of indigenous capacity development through the IOC’s Agenda 21. The institutionalization of the rights of indigenous people at the multilateral and international level, and how

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3 Cities must submit their Olympic bids to the International Olympic Committee eight years before the Games they are bidding to host. Vancouver’s 2010 Olympic Bid was submitted in 2002, and the final decision to award Vancouver the 2010 Olympics was made in 2003 (International Olympic Committee, 2010). While original aspirations to host an Olympic Games began decades earlier, Vancouver’s 2010 bid was started in 1996 (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2007, p. 7).
this contributed to the construction of the VANOC and FHFN partnership, will be explored in more detail in the coming sections.

The groundbreaking partnership between VANOC and the FHFN also provides a new angle of analysis within the growing body of literature on mega-event urban legacy planning. Given Canada’s historically unequal and exploitative relations with First Nations communities, actively promoting the FHFN and VANOC partnership in the hosting of the 2010 Olympics can be seen as an attempt to mark the dawn of a new era in First Nations and non-aboriginal equality within Canada. However, whether the equality espoused through the Olympic partnership is purely symbolic or does, in fact, highlight a real and measurable movement towards equality and reparations with First Nations groups is too complex to be considered within the scope of this project. The following sections will instead seek to answer research question number 2: *How does the IOC, through the mandated integration of indigenous peoples into the Olympic Games, act as a norm creation body? How were First Nations people represented by and for the 2010 Games? What are the implications of superseding Canadian legal processes though a privately backed development project such as the Olympics?*

4.2: Indigenous Rights on the International Agenda

4.2.1: United Nations and Indigenous Peoples

Since the UN Economic and Social Council established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982, the United Nations have been working to institutionalize the social, cultural, political, and economic rights of indigenous peoples around the world. These efforts have included a number of high profile initiatives. The decade 2005-2015 was named the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (SIDWIP), and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was ratified on September 13th, 2007 (United
Nations, 2006; United Nations, 2008). 144 members of the General Assembly voted in favour of the declaration, 4 voted against, and 9 abstained. While the Declaration marked the official institutionalization of the rights of indigenous peoples in a multilateral forum, four countries with significant minority indigenous populations (Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand) did not ratify the Declaration. Of note is that, despite the fact that Canada has not ratified the Declaration, some elements of the integration of First Nations people into the Olympic Games can be seen to meet the objectives of the 2005-2015 SIDWIP. The objectives of this decade are as follows:

1. Promoting non-discrimination and inclusion of indigenous peoples in the design, implementation and evaluation of international, regional and national processes regarding laws, policies, resources, programmes and projects;

2. Promoting full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in decisions which directly or indirectly affect their life styles, traditional lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous peoples with collective rights or any other aspect of their lives, considering the principle of free, prior and informed consent.

3. Re-defining development policies that depart from a vision of equity and that are culturally appropriate, including respect for cultural and linguistic diversity of indigenous peoples.

4. Adopting targeted policies, programmes, projects and budgets for the development of indigenous peoples, including concrete benchmarks, and particular emphasis on indigenous women, children and youth;

5. Developing strong monitoring mechanisms and enhancing accountability at the international, regional and particularly the national level, regarding the implementation of legal, policy and operational

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4 In March 2010, Canada agreed to “take steps to endorse this aspirational document in a manner fully consistent with Canada’s Constitution and laws” (Amnesty International Canada, 2010). The official Declaration, however, remains unsigned.
frameworks for the protection of indigenous peoples and the improvement of their lives. (United Nations, 2006)

While these objectives are somewhat general in their propositions, it can be argued that the official inclusion of the Four Host First Nations into the development and hosting of the 2010 Olympics fits within some of the targets outlined above. The VANOC and FHFN partnership, which divided the authority over Games-related planning and ensured the redistribution of Olympic development contracts and legacy program funding, addresses the mandates of objectives 1, 2, 3 and 4. However, the VANOC and FHFN partnership did not change the local, provincial, or national legal frameworks handling First Nations issues in Canada, and, save for some fast-tracked land settlements with groups that were directly affected by Olympic events or tourist traffic, the "legal, policy and operational frameworks for the protection of indigenous peoples and the improvement of their lives" remain largely unchanged (United Nations, 2006).

4.2.2: Agenda 21: The IOC and Aboriginal Participation

Due to its high visibility and massive membership, the IOC has become one of the most influential private international organizations in the world. It has, despite "its history of elitism, constructed itself as an international institution that many people identify with more readily than the UN" (Whitson, 2005, p. 32). Of no small significance is the fact that, at present, the IOC has more national members than the UN (p. 32). Given their relative omnipotence, then, it is possible to understand how and why the IOC influences international norm construction. Participant nations, especially Games hosts, are required to meet certain political and normative expectations to be permitted to take part in the Olympic Games. Thus, one could argue that, through the large-scale
adoption and production of norms and values, the IOC contributes significantly to the promotion of behavioural norms around the world.

In response to the UN’s Agenda 21, the IOC released its own version of the document on sustainable development in 1999. Section 3.3.3 of the IOC’s guidelines highlights the “strong historical ties [indigenous populations have] to their environment, and endorses the UNCED action in favour of their recognition and the strengthening of their roles” (International Olympic Committee, 1999, p. 45). In this context, the IOC intends “(a) to encourage [indigenous] sporting traditions; (b) to contribute to the use of their traditional knowledge and know-how in matters of environmental management in order to take appropriate action, notably in the regions where these populations originate; and (c) to encourage access to sports participation for these populations” (p. 45). While these values represent ways in which the rights and needs of indigenous people can be fostered through sport, the inclusion of such ideas by a private global institution is not neutral. The IOC’s membership, most notably those cities and countries vying to host an Olympic Games, have a significant financial interest in meeting and exceeding the standards of behaviour set by the IOC. The implications of the selective transmission of multilateral values through an international organization will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

4.3: Past Olympic Indigenous Representations

4.3.1: Canada: Montreal ’76 and Calgary ’88 Games

While the 2010 Olympics marked the first time an organizing committee officially partnered with an indigenous group to host an Olympic Games, the representation of indigenous communities in Olympics hosted by post-colonial societies is not new. The Vancouver 2010 Games set a new precedent for aboriginal integration and participation in Olympic programming both in Canada
and internationally, but both the 1976 Montreal Summer Games and 1988 Calgary Winter Games, the two Canadian cities to host Olympic Games before Vancouver, included significant representations of First Nations culture.

In the summer of 1976, Montreal became the first Canadian city to host the Olympics. Politically, the city of Montreal and the province of Quebec were experiencing major transitions during the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1960s, Quebec was undergoing a “Quiet Revolution,” which sought to reduce the power of the Catholic church in the Quebec school system, nationalize hydro electric power capacities, and assist the growth of local business in order to modernize Quebec and develop a French-speaking Canadian business class (Whitson, 2004, p. 1219). In Montreal, Mayor Jean Drapeau’s growth coalition was using mega-events such as the Expo ’67 and the 1976 Olympics to show the world that Montreal was emerging as an “economically booming and culturally vibrant city,” and a “global destination for tourists and investors” (p. 1219).

Between the world-class city aspirations of Drapeau’s booster coalition and the increasing French-Canadian quest for self-determination through arts, cultural and economic development, it’s not surprising that the integration of First Nations people did not figure more significantly into the preparation and staging of the 1976 Games. O’Bonsawin (2010) points out that the Games’ closing ceremony was held in “commemoration” of the region’s First Nations peoples, and that it was a celebration designed “by Olympic organizers for Aboriginal peoples” (p. 147). French-Canadian choreographer Michel Cartier and composer André Matheiu designed a performance drawing on extensive indigenous representations, which included a dance entitled La Danse Sauvage, in which over 250 non-indigenous people dressed and painted to look like “Indians” led 200 representatives from the nine First Nations in what was marketed as a “traditional” indigenous dance (p. 147).

Like Montreal, Calgary’s 1988 Olympics also aspired to with market Calgary as a world-class city of increasing Canadian and
international cosmopolitan and economic importance. The Olympics offered Calgary a chance to “signal its transformation from a provincial backwater into a world city representing the very cutting-edge of modernity” (Wamsley & Heine, 1994, p. 84). In this light, it is easy to understand how and why the integration of First Nations communities into the planning and staging of the Olympics was not a top priority for the Calgary Olympic Committee (OCO): the traditional imagery associated with First Nations culture did not fit with the “cosmopolitan” image that the OCO was attempting to market.

Local First Nations groups, however, were not entirely left out of the form and process of the 1988 Olympics. Local streets, shopping malls, and Olympic infrastructure invoked a romanticized spirit of indigenous culture, with names such as Crowfoot, Deerfoot, Blackfoot, and Nakiska. Native imagery was used in the ceremonies, emblems, medal designs, and in the stereotyped juxtaposition of Alberta’s First Nations, cowboys and Mounties as a tourist attraction (Wamsley & Heine, 1996a). However, actual First Nations participation in the Games was limited, and, as Wamsley & Heine (1996b) point out, “a message to portray successful multiculturalism” – not encourage the development of more culturally aware and integrated communities – “in Canada was an important subtext of the Games” (emphasis added; p. 85).

In 1976 and 1988, the institutionalization of the rights of indigenous people had not yet risen to the international sphere. Indigenous people did not figure significantly on the UN’s agenda, and the IOC was not yet in the business of re-working international policy documents to include the rights of indigenous people. While the movement towards reparations and equality with Canada’s First Nations people were already being discussed nationally, they had yet to rise significantly on the international agenda. As such, there was little pressure from the IOC or any other international governing bodies to integrate indigenous people into local development initiatives, including Montreal and Calgary’s Olympic Games. Some argue that First Nations were (mis)represented through these two
mega-events (Wamsley & Heine, 1996a, 1996b; Magdalinski, 2000; O’Bonsawin, 2006, 2010). However, it can also be argued that neither the Calgary nor the Montreal Olympic Committees were under any pressure to collaborate with local First Nations.

4.3.2: International: Sydney ’00 Games

In the 2000 Sydney Summer Games, organizers relied on informal tradition, not official historical perspectives of indigenous peoples, in the staging and planning of the opening ceremony. This provided the host city with an opportunity to “recount, and in many instances reinvent, national narratives. As such, indigenous peoples were relegated to nominal and inconsequential roles” (O’Bonsawin, 2010, p. 144). Sydney’s opening ceremony featured indigenous dancers interwoven with waves of settlers, culminating in a pluralistic celebration of unity to represent “Australia […] as the cosmopolitan and diverse society it is today” (SOCOG, 2000).

The Sydney Games were hosted under the motto of “reconciliation” between aboriginal and settler Australians. Winstanley (2010) points out that in addition to celebrating international sporting excellence and creating infrastructural and social development opportunities, the Olympics have “come to represent […] a space within which […] subnational reconciliation can take place” (p. 10). At this time, Australia was under significant international scrutiny for the treatment of its aboriginal populations. While other Western post-colonial states were working towards institutionalizing systems for the establishment of land claims treaties and self-governance for indigenous people, Australia removed aboriginal rights to negotiate on pastoral leases (O’Bonsawin, 2010, p. 145). The United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) placed Australia under “urgent priority” due to the “damaging findings” against the government’s treatment of Australian aboriginal peoples. “This was the first time in history that
CERD expressed ‘serious concerns’ about a Western nation going backward on the land rights of indigenous people” (p. 145).

Given the disconnect between the narratives of domestic indigenous reconciliation espoused through the Olympics and parallel international scrutiny for the mistreatment of aboriginal Australians, it is clear that the 2000 Games were being used for strategic, constructive purposes. Black (2007) might argue that this coupling was an effort to show the world that Australia was not, in fact, as oppressive towards its indigenous people as was currently being proposed at the multilateral level. Domestically, Whitson (2004) argues that images of unified ethnic pluralism were as much an attempt to entrench feelings of unity, equality, and progressive multiculturalism amongst Australians themselves. How and why this discourse was generated has been the subject of other research (Magdalinski, 2000). What remains clear, however, is that the integration and celebration of indigenous imagery in the Sydney opening ceremonies was far from neutral.

4.4: First Nations and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics

Integrating and acknowledging the First Nations communities in the staging and hosting of the 2010 Olympics could be read as one of many continued attempts to provide redress for the “historic displacement, maltreatment and marginalization of Canada’s First Nations[,] a well-known and shameful aspect of Canada’s otherwise relatively benign international façade” (Black, 2007, p. 269). However, the VANOC and FHFN partnership can also be seen as a response to mounting international pressure from both multilateral and international private institutions to incorporate the rights and values of indigenous peoples into community development and local governance. What is of key concern here is that, in keeping with the UNDRIP and the International Olympic Committee’s Agenda 21, the Vancouver Bid Committee built a large part of their bid platform on the role local First Nations communities would play in the staging and
hosting of the Games. The details of this partnership will be discussed below, while the symbolic and effective significance of the changing ways in which international norms are adopted at the local level will be outlined later in this work.

4.4.1: Four Host First Nations Partnership Protocol

![Map of Traditional Territories of the Four Host First Nations](image)

*Figure 4.1: Traditional Territories of the Four Host First Nations*

Source: (International Olympic Committee, 2009, p. 34)

The 2010 Olympics were hosted on the traditional territories of the Coast Salish people. The territories of the Lil’wat, Tsleil-Waututh,
Squamish, and Musqueam, to which treaty claims are still largely unresolved in the Canadian legal system, are outlined in Figure 4.1 above.

On November 24th 2004, the Four Host First Nations signed a protocol with VANOC, stating that the First Nations would play an integral part in the planning, staging, and hosting of the 2010 Winter Games. The founding of the Four Host First Nations Society marked the first time an Olympic organizing committee had established such a partnership with Indigenous people (International Olympic Committee, 2010b). Shortly thereafter, the FHFN were recognized as official partners by the IOC, also marking the first time in Olympic and Paralympic history that the IOC had recognized indigenous people as official Olympic host partners (International Olympic Committee, 2010b; Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010a).

This partnership was highly celebrated by local First Nations people. Lil’wat, Tsleil-Waututh, Squamish, and Musqueam leadership saw this partnership as an opportunity for local First Nations to take a leading role in hosting the Olympic Games, capitalize on Olympic-related development, and use the media attention as a vehicle to raise awareness about First Nations culture around the world (Squamish Lil’Wat Cultural Centre, 2008; International Olympic Committee, 2010b; Marchant, 2010). However, the partnership was also met with protest (Shaw, 2008). This will be explored in more detail in below, while some of the legacies of this partnership will be examined in Chapter 5.

4.4.2: Aboriginal Representation in the 2010 Olympic Games

Analyzing every time Canada’s First Nations were represented, referenced, integrated, presented, or showcased within the scope of the 2010 Olympics would require its own research project. However, as was highlighted in section 4.3, when Olympic organizing committees program events and celebrations for, not with, indigenous populations, the images used and representations they
espoused are not necessarily the same representations that indigenous people would themselves have chosen. Even though the 2010 Games were celebrated as having reached the highest levels of indigenous participation in an Olympic Games to date, some representations of indigenous culture were still contested as being misleading and misrepresentative. While some might deem the following cultural anomalies or misrepresentations to be insignificant, they highlight the fact that, through the hosting and staging of mega-events, cultural intricacies are often diluted, generalized, and constructed to market a cultural image to the world that helps support the ideals being transmitted by the event marketers. These images are not, in fact, truly representative of the diverse nature of the ethnic group being represented.

In April 2005, VANOC unveiled the logo that would represent the 2010 Olympics. The logo, a caricaturized Inukshuk dubbed “Ilanaaq,” or “friend” in an Inuit language, was chosen as the icon that would represent the Games (Figure 4.2 below).

![Vancouver 2010 Olympic logo](image)

*Figure 4.2: Vancouver 2010 Olympic logo, “Ilanaaq”*

*Source: (Winter Olympics Vancouver - Blog, 2010)*
However, the use of an Inukshuk, a set of stacked rocks that Inuit people set up as guideposts travelers in Northern Canada, was seen by some as a disappointing misrepresentation of British Columbia’s First Nations arts, culture, and iconography. Some argue that “Ilanaaq” also pays homage to one of downtown Vancouver’s most recognizable landmarks, the Inukshuk that has adorned the beachside at English Bay since Vancouver’s last mega-event, the 1986 World Exposition (Figure 4.3 below). However, others argue that a First Nations symbol from the region, such as a totem pole, would have been more appropriate (O'Bonsawin, 2006, 2010; National Geographic, 2010).

Figure 4.3: Expo ’86 Inukshuk at English Bay, Vancouver
Source: (Tourism Vancouver, 2009)

While athletics might be the main attraction at an Olympic Games, the seventeen-day sporting event also attracts a significant number of additional arts and cultural events, parties, exhibitions, and low- and no-cost activities that help create and maintain a celebratory feeling in the city. It has become the trend at Olympic Games and World Expositions for many of the competing countries,
local organizations, and sponsors to set up pavilions and houses, which are open to the public and celebrate the spirit of the Olympics while highlighting a unique community, culture, theme, or product. At the Vancouver Olympics, fourteen Canadian and thirteen international pavilions were erected throughout the downtown core, with another eleven domestic and international pavilions providing a wealth of entertainment for athletes and visitors in Whistler (Bollwit, 2010; Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association, 2010). Of note here is the way in which Canada and Canadian unity was presented through the construction of these houses. The majority of the Canadian houses were sponsored by different provinces and territories (such as the British Columbia Pavilion), regional associations, (such as the Atlantic Canada House and Canada’s Northern House), and select demographic or ethnic groups (such as the Place de la Francophonie and the Aboriginal Pavilion). Some might argue that a land as large and diverse as Canada could not effectively be represented under one roof, and that the Olympics provided a valuable opportunities for a variety of national cultures to be celebrated. While this is certainly true, it is also noteworthy that the conspicuous separation of only two of Canada’s many minority populations (French-Canadians and Aboriginals) into distinct subdivisions speaks to a very specific, if somewhat dated, division of cultures and races within Canada.

The examples highlighted above are two of the most conspicuous public representations of First Nations people in the staging of the Olympic Games. However, one of the most significant constructions was one that went largely unnoticed by Olympic spectators. As O’Bonsawin (2010) points out, one of the most telling representations of Canada’s First Nations people began with the Olympic bid, submitted to the IOC in 2002. Section 1.1 of the 2010 Olympic Bid Book outlines Canada’s political institutions. Of note is that the bid book cites federal, provincial, local, and First Nations bodies of government, highlighting the fact that “Canada became the first nation to entrench the rights of Aboriginal peoples [....] [and] has
recognized, as a matter of policy, the inherent right of self-government” (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2002). While the opportunity for self-government does exist, this statement misleadingly represents the true nature of aboriginal integration at the Canadian federal level; “a national policy has yet to be developed that recognizes First Nations as an official political institution within Canada” (O’Bonsawin, 2010, p. 148). While many, particularly those unfamiliar with Canadian governmental systems, would have overlooked this re-articulation of First Nations as a de facto branch of Canada’s government, how the Olympic discourse represents the place of aboriginal Canadians within the non-aboriginal majority is hardly negligible. By allowing the 2010 Bid Committee, a group of Vancouver’s political and business elites, to re-write Canadian political institutions “by provid[ing] the IOC with an abridgement of complex national structures,” “leads one to question the integrity, or at the very least, the organizational creditability” of the Olympic movement (O’Bonsawin, 2010, p. 148). The potential legacy of this representation for First Nations people will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

4.4.3: Protesting Vancouver 2010

While the 2010 Olympics featured an unprecedented level of First Nations integration into the staging and hosting of an Olympic Games, the VANOC and FHFN partnership was not uncontested. Discontent arose from within both aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities throughout British Columbia and Canada. This was partly in response to the exclusivity of the VANOC and FHFN protocol process. While FHFN leaders hailed the development opportunities the 2010 Games would bring to their communities, others saw these “opportunities” as “bribes.” Shaw (2008), a professor at the University of British Columbia and the founder and spokesperson of the No Games 2010 Coalition, describes a document that a concerned environmentalist brought to his attention
in the early stages of the Vancouver bid planning. The document was “an agreement between the Bid Corp and the Squamish and Lil’wat native bands. In payment for their support of the Games being held in their respective traditional territories, the bands would receive a cash payment and cultural centre” (p. 22).

The document in question is the Shared Legacies Agreement (SLA), signed in 2002 by the Squamish and Lil’wat First Nations, the Vancouver Bid Corporation, and the Province of British Columbia. Under this Agreement, the Government agreed to allocate 300 acres of prime real estate in the Sea to Sky corridor for the two Nations “to pursue economic development opportunities within their shared territories, contribute $2.3 million for a skills and legacy training project, and contribute $3 million dollars toward the construction of the Squamish Lil’wat Cultural Centre” (Squamish Lil’Wat Cultural Centre, 2008). It should be noted that the Shared Legacy Agreement was not created to resolve an outstanding land claim; the Province of British Columbia awarded the Squamish and Lil’wat Nations 300 acres of land in addition to disputed and settled land claims in their traditional territories (Marchant, 2010).

Given Shaw’s (2008) anti-Olympic sentiments, it’s possible to understand why he claims this agreement was, “for all intents and purposes[,] a bribe to bring about First Nations approval.” p. 22). O’Bonsawin (2010) expands on the problematic implications of this type of agreement in her analysis of the No Olympics on Stolen Native Land resistance movement. By “buying off” local indigenous people in the name of the 2010 Games, the Bid Corp was able to supersede federal treaty deliberation processes. By effectively circumventing the institutionalized treaty process, the Bid Corp and VANOC challenge competing notions of land ownership that have evolved in British Columbia: aboriginal title to traditional territory, on the one hand, and private-ownership models that accompanied imperialist development, on the other.

Further, O’Bonsawin (2010) points out that the imposition of Olympic policy and programming has significantly altered the British
Columbia Treaty Process (BCTC). She states that, since the 2010 Olympic Games were awarded to Vancouver, only one of the 49 sets of negotiations with First Nations communities in British Columbia has reached a Final Agreement – Stage Six: Implementation of a Treaty (p. 151). Conspicuously, this agreement was reached with the Tsawwassen First Nations. While they are not a member of the FHFN, the Tsawwassen First Nations will “play an active role in the 2010 Games as the traditional territory of the Coast Salish community is not only within 30 kilometers of downtown Vancouver but also because the province of British Columbia, through BC Ferries, has established a major port on Tsawwassen territory” (p. 151). By fast-tracking the negotiation of this treaty, the province “secured the uninterrupted functioning for the major passenger and shipping sorts of the lower mainland,” saving BC and Canada “massive embarrassment” up to and during 2010 (p. 151).

Despite these criticisms, many aboriginal and non-aboriginal people throughout the Lower Mainland and the province of BC saw the 2010 Games as an opportunity. Marchant (2010) points out that the SLA established an historic partnership between the Squamish and Lil’wat nations, which both communities regard as one of the greatest lasting legacies of the 2010 Games. The legacies that the planning, staging, and hosting of the 2010 Games brought about for First Nations people will be explored in more detail below.

4.5: Conclusion

The examples outlined above show how the IOC, through the mandated integration of indigenous people into the Olympic Games, acts as a norm creating body. Given the power of influence the IOC has on its extremely large membership, it is possible to understand how the IOC adapts international agendas created by the United Nations and entrenches norms and values through international (private) channels. By expecting certain standards of social and political conduct from its members, the IOC can influence the
transmission of these norms to its member nations. In this manner, the integration of local First Nations people into the staging and hosting of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics can be seen to meet the objectives of the UNDRIP despite the fact that Canada has not yet ratified the declaration.

While 2010 was not the first time aboriginal communities had been featured in Olympic performances and iconography, the VANOC and FHFN hosting partnership facilitated unprecedented levels of First Nations integration and redistribution. The Four Host First Nations were presented as equal partners in the production of the Olympic Games. However, some critics argue that First Nations culture was diluted and generalized to present a marketable image that would be transmitted throughout the rest of Canada and the world, and that the imagery used misrepresented the intricacies and specificities of Coast Salish culture (O’Bonsawin, 2006, 2010).

Both academics and activists criticized the exclusivity of the 2010 hosting partnership (Shaw, 2008; O’Bonsawin, 2006, 2010). It can be argued that superseding provincial and federal legal processes through fast-tracking land claims settlements and Shared Legacy Agreements that included a 300 acre signing bonus raises questions as to whether or not this strategic partnership was an attempt at redistributing Games-related opportunities amongst all First Nations people, or whether it represents a strategic partnership amongst a group of well-positioned aboriginal and non-aboriginal elites.
Chapter 5: 2010 Olympic Legacies for First Nations Peoples

5.1: Introduction

As has been shown in the previous sections, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics prompted a variety of infrastructural, social, and economic developments in the years leading up to the Games. The Vancouver Bid Corporation, made up of local political and business elites, positioned the 2010 Games on a platform of First Nations celebration, in part in response to the growing demand for aboriginal integration and reparations by supranational organizations such as the UN and the IOC. Without involving local indigenous communities in the preparations and hosting of the 2010 Olympics, Vancouver may not have won the bid, and would not have been able to fast-track some significant large-scale development projects, such as the Vancouver Olympic Village described in section 3.2.3.

However, the official rationale for hosting the Olympics in Vancouver did not just include a plan to redevelop large portions of urban space and celebrate Vancouver’s cultural pluralism. Vancouver’s bid was built on a platform of holistic, redistributed growth. The Games would, as VANOC claimed, help create measurable and lasting social, economic, and environmentally sustainable development through the planning and execution of a variety of Games-driven legacy programs (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010, p. 109).

Including strategically planned post-event legacies in an Olympic Games is a relatively new phenomenon. In the early years, legacy planning generally referred to the sustainable use and maintenance of Olympic Games’ facilities, and to the development of local recreational and professional sporting capacities. The 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics were the first Games to generate significant revenue, primarily through real estate development,
sponsorships, and media broadcasting. Before this time, Olympic Games brought cities prestige, but generated very little money (Burbank, Andranovich, & Heying, 2001; Reid, 2008). In the years since, post-Games legacies have become one of the main arguments bid cities use to gain the support of local constituents, government financiers, and the International Olympic Committee. The Olympics are no longer a seventeen-day celebration of international athleticism; the Games are also a cross-sector development tools. As planning committees have recognized the need to promote and plan for an increased redistribution of Games-related wealth, the realm of Olympic legacy planning has expanded to include other forms of infrastructure, and educational and social programming.

The full breadth of the planned legacies of the 2010 Games outlined in VANOC’s 2007 Business Plan is too extensive to analyze in this project. Instead, the following section will examine how the mandating of sustainable legacy planning at the federal level influenced the Vancouver 2010 legacy planning. It will address research question 3: What are some of the legacies of the 2010 Olympic Games for First Nations communities in the Lower Mainland and the Province of British Columbia? What is the outlook for the sustainability of 2010’s planned legacies? An overview of the 2010 Legacies Now Society, the organization tasked with planning and implementing many of the Games’ social legacy programs, and an example of one of the most successful Four Host First Nations legacy programs, the First Nations Snowboarding Team, will aid in this analysis.

5.2: Institutionalizing Legacy Planning

Sustainable legacy development was integrated from the outset of Vancouver’s host city bid process. The federal government’s Policy for Hosting International Sports Events (“Host City Policy”) mandates that legacy planning be integrated into any
mega-event bid submitted by a Canadian city, ensuring the financial and social sustainability of sporting event legacy programming. According to the Host City Policy included in the Vancouver 2010 Bid Multi-Party Agreement (2002), the federal government has historically been the sole funder of sporting legacies (p. 25). In an attempt to move away from this phenomenon, the federal Host City Policy states that legacies should now be planned using a multi-party partnership model that includes the participation of multiple levels of government, various non-governmental and private sector stakeholders. As such, the federal government’s contributions to Games-related legacies must be matched by other branches of the public sector, with the federal government contributing up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the budget required to develop and sustain legacy programming.

As per the requirements the Multi-Party Agreement, the Province of British Columbia incorporated the 2010 Legacies Now Society on June 5th, 2001 (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). It was initially formed “under an agreement with the Vancouver Bid Corporation to manage and deliver programs in an effort to maximize legacies that could be created for sport during the bid phase for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games […]” (p. 1). 2010 Legacies Now was founded “to create and capture […] new partnerships that benefit communities long after the Games are over” (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010, p. 96). It was the first-ever legacy organization to be in place before the start of an Olympic Games, marking an early benchmark for the development and maintenance of sustainable legacies that would result from the 2010 Vancouver Games.

Shortly after Vancouver was awarded the Olympic Games, trusteeship of the $110 million CAD provincial and federal contributions to the Olympic legacies budget was handed over to the 2010 Legacies Now Society. The organization’s mandate was expanded to include “work[ing] in partnership with community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector
and all levels of government to develop sustainable legacies in sport and recreation, healthy living, the arts, literacy, volunteerism and accessibility in communities throughout British Columbia” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010, p. 1). The funds have been “strategically invested in programs, organizations and communities, and through [2010 Legacies Now’s] networks, leveraged existing relationships and facilitated new partnerships to create self-sustaining community legacies [through the development of] innovative sustainability programs that focused on social, economic or environmental benefits” (2010 Legacies Now, 2010c).

While the programming established with over 4,000 partner organizations around BC addresses a wide variety of socio-cultural concerns, 2010 Legacies Now’s specific focus on the development and maintenance of programming in BC’s aboriginal communities is of most interest in the context of this research. Since its inception, 2010 Legacies Now has partnered with over 125 aboriginal community service providers to develop sporting and recreation capacities in First Nations communities (2010 Legacies Now, 2010b). It helps fund youth and family literacy, health, and educational programming around the province that support both aboriginal and non-aboriginal British Columbians, and has also liaised with aboriginal groups and Olympic sponsors in the development of a variety of programs supporting the ongoing capacity building of First Nations communities. Some notable examples of these include the Aboriginal Sport Gallery at the BC Sports Hall of Fame, the Aboriginal Youth Sport Legacy Fund, and the Vancouver 2010 Aboriginal Youth Legacy Program.

The Vancouver 2010 Aboriginal Youth Legacy Program (AYLP) was one of the few legacy programs managed by 2010 Legacies Now that was created through direct engagement of both VANOC and the Four Host First Nations. The Province of British Columbia, the Squamish and Lil’wat Nations, and VANOC
contributed to the AYLP. This fund supports aboriginal youth development programs both within FHFN communities and around the rest of the province. This partnership created a system through which FHFN organizations could use the infrastructural support of 2010 Legacies Now to ensure that the legacies developed with their legacy programming budgets would best meet community needs in a competitive, cost-effective manner (Marchant, 2010). Making 2010 Legacies Now the manager of the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Program ensured that the money FHFN communities received to develop community legacy programs could be strategically invested, maximizing the longevity of the fund. Further, the 2010 Legacies Now administration process subjects the uses of the fund to a series of external checks and balances, which has both helped reduce unnecessary costs and encouraged the development of local administrative infrastructure.

5.3: 2010 Sustainability Star: First Nations Snowboard Team

One of the most highly acclaimed legacy programs established by and for aboriginal youth in the years leading up to the 2010 Games is the First Nations Snowboard Team (FNST). The 2010 Sustainability Star award-winning project was established by Squamish Nation Special Project Coordinator and FNST Executive Director Aaron Marchant, who, over the course of just a few years, built a group of ten youth from one First Nations community into a network of thirteen teams of keen, competitive snowboarders spanning First Nations bands throughout BC and Washington State.

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5 VANOC’s contribution consisted of one-third of the royalties that the committee earned from the sales of the official Aboriginal licensed merchandise sold for the 2010 Games (2010 Legacies Now, 2010).

6 “To be awarded a Sustainability Star an innovation must: demonstrate two or more sustainability features (social, economic and/or environmental); be directly linked to the 2010 Winter Games; produce a measurable outcome; and be new to the Games region or the Games in general or significantly scaled up through the Vancouver 2010 Games” (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010).
Marchant recognized the opportunity and visibility the Games would bring to the Squamish and Lil’wat First Nations, and sought to capitalize on the related growth opportunities early on. Partnering with local ski hills for seasons passes and equipment donations, and professional Canadian snowboarders for coaching lessons, he developed the FNST, the first Canadian snowboarding organization operated by aboriginal snowboarders, as a “vehicle for social change, [...] leading the country in holistic and inclusive programming to develop, support and encourage Aboriginal athletes” (2010 Legacies Now, 2010a). The concept was “to take ten youth, and mold them to train ten more youth. In the first year we had ten, the second year we had sixty-six, the third year we had ninety, and now [2010] we have almost 245 snowboarders from thirteen different divisions [First Nations bands], partnering with fourteen different mountains across BC and Washington State” (Marchant, 2010).

Participation in the First Nations Snowboard Team is much more than a recreation opportunity. Participants have to maintain good grades at school and at least 90 per cent attendance at team functions, and are subject to drug and alcohol testing. Youth are encouraged to embrace the sport of snowboarding as a hobby, a health and fitness regime, and as a tool to develop skills that they can carry forward with them into their adult lives. Training high-level aboriginal athletes is not only good for community members, but is also supported by resorts throughout the province: “That’s what a lot of the resorts want to see, is more First Nations up on the mountain in the employment sector, for long-term employment. Why recruit from Australia when you have First Nations half an hour down the road?” (Marchant, 2010).

However, while the positive response the FNST has gotten from First Nations youth has been overwhelming, numerous external barriers still exist for young aboriginal riders. As Marchant points out, very few children in First Nations residential communities have direct experience with the sport. While the traditional lands of the Squamish and Lil’wat Nations are within 100 km of Whistler, one of
the largest ski resorts in North America and co-host municipality of the 2010 Games, most children did not grow up skiing or snowboarding and are therefore not familiar with the “resort culture.” Being part of the FNST gives participants an “alternate eye on life. By getting the kids on the mountain at [age] nine or ten, they become familiar with the lifestyle and culture,” and can explore the options of competing or working in the industry when they grow up. For both recreational and high-performance athletes, membership in the FNST comes with a lot of personal, athletic, and team growth. As Marchant points out, the culture of high-performance athletics can be very challenging: “Competing in a world where they’re travelling to resorts, with kids whose parents are either doctors or lawyers, they are there on their own. They have to do it on their own. Some of them are doing well, but that’s definitely an obstacle. It’s a different scene” (Marchant, 2010).

The disconnection between winter Olympic sporting traditions and First Nations communities goes beyond the initial apprehension youth have with an unfamiliar sporting culture and lifestyle. Because most aboriginal adults also have little direct experience with the sport, it can also be difficult to garner support from within First Nations communities. Marchant points out:

“Imagine – you go into a Chief and Council room, maybe only one in twenty has been on a ski hill. If you have never done it, you can’t understand it. We have to try to convince them that this is a good thing. […] Getting the buy-in from the kids was number one. Once we had their buy in, getting their families on board was easier. Everything became a lot easier.” (2010)

Having the support of community Chiefs and Councils is not just good for FNST team morale. It is essential to the sustainability of the FNST program. In the early years, partner divisions would send Marchant a cheque, with the funding and administration to be handled by Marchant and the FNST administration in Squamish.
However, Marchant quickly realized that the only way both the core FNST program and its partners could grow and ensure sustainability was for divisions, through the support of their own band recreation departments and chief and councils, to carry the responsibility of coordinating and funding their own teams.

While the core Squamish and Lil’wat snowboarding team is still currently funded by an annual grant from the 2010 Legacies Now Aboriginal Youth Sporting Fund, the $3 million CAD start-up capital in the AYSF outlined in the previous section will not likely last beyond 2014 (Marchant, 2010; Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010). As such, Marchant and his team are working to bring additional First Nations bands into the FNST network to increase the visibility of the organization, diversify resort partners, and increase levels of sponsorship from organizations such as Nike, RBC, and corporate developers such as Concord Pacific, whose stake in the Squamish and Lil’wat territory along the Sea to Sky corridor is increasing as the Nations seek to develop some of the highly valuable property allocated to them through the Shared Legacies Agreement outlined in section 4.4.3 (Shaw, 2008; Marchant, 2010).

5.4: The Sustainability of 2010’s Planned Legacies

While the benchmark set by the integrative planning of 2010 Olympic legacy programs has made 2010 Legacies Now an internationally recognized “leader and innovator in community legacy development and social change” (2010 Legacies Now, 2010c, p. 85), it may be too early to determine the long-term viability of Olympic legacy programming. The Multi-Party Agreement (2002) allocated 60 per cent of VANOC’s post-Games revenue to funding legacy programming, a large portion of which include the programs administered by 2010 Legacies Now (p. 25). However, the final financial reports issued by VANOC post-Games indicate that the 2010 Olympics generated neither surplus nor deficit (Vancouver Organizing Committee, 2010b). Further, the provincial contribution
that 2010 Legacies Now had been receiving in the years leading up to the Games has been significantly decreased, requiring the organization to “diversify and expand its revenue streams” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010, p. 1). It has also meant significantly decreasing its programming portfolio.

Moving beyond the 2010 Games, 2010 Legacies Now’s scope is changing from developing new and progressive community partnerships to becoming “a venture philanthropy organization” tasked with accelerating “growth in carefully selected not-for-profit organizations to create measurable social change in the areas of sport and healthy living and literacy and life-long learning” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2010, p. 1). As a part of this process, many of 2010 Legacies Now’s programs are being transferred to partner organizations that will continue to manage the programs established as a legacy of the 2010 Games.

Building the organizational infrastructure of non-governmental partners will both increase the independent functioning capacities of service providers around the province and help 2010 Legacies Now streamline its own portfolio by cutting back on its number of external partners. However, it may also erode the institutionalized system of checks and balances the 2010 Legacies Now umbrella has established. Also, if 2010 Legacies Now is scaling back its portfolios due to fewer financial gains than expected and not due to a planned development timeline that included building the capacities of partner NGOs until they were able to function without the support of 2010 Legacies Now, the true ability of partner organizations to continue to develop and maintain programs that will meet the legacy objectives can be called into question. Finally, the administrative diffusion that will result from the withdrawal of 2010 Legacies Now’s centralized capacities may make it harder to evaluate the sustained growth of 2010 legacy programming in the future.
5.5: Conclusion

In the Olympic context, ‘legacy’ generally refers to infrastructural or social projects that will be maintained long after the seventeen-day sporting event. In the case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics, a variety of legacies will remain for First Nations people throughout British Columbia. The planned legacy programs such as those administrated by 2010 Legacies Now are building capacities and promoting social sustainability in numerous communities around the province.

While it is too early to make a full assessment of the sustainability of the Games-related legacy programs, the outlook for the future is optimistic. The cost-sharing model instituted by the federal Host City Policy created a system in which legacy programs were funded by a number of different public and private contributions, ensuring that the longevity of the programming was not reliant on the ongoing contributions of one sole funder. Also, 2010 Legacies Now’s method of developing the organizational infrastructure of its partner organizations may help ensure that, when responsibility for the ongoing maintenance of legacy programming is handed to the non-governmental partners, they are able to sustain their programming without the administrative and financial support of 2010 Legacies Now.

Whether Olympic legacies were equally redistributed and will foster socially sustainable growth in First Nations communities all across the province, however, is not as clear. Due to their direct involvement in the Games, some of the legacy program funding, such as a portion of the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Program, will only benefit the FHFN communities. Further, the Olympics presented Vancouver’s local First Nations groups with a unique bargaining platform that other aboriginal communities did not have: without their consent and cooperation, the Olympic Games could not have take place in Vancouver. This bargaining platform created an opportunity for local First Nations groups to increase their local and international
visibility, increase their real estate holdings, and bridge inter-band disputes to establish a development trajectory that may leave other First Nations groups outside of the Lower Mainland infrastructurally and developmentally disadvantaged.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1: Discussion

Three areas of analysis come together to develop an understanding of the legacies resulting from the integration of the Four Host First Nations people into the hosting and staging of the Vancouver / Whistler 2010 Olympics. The first area of consideration is the developmental rationale behind the 2010 Olympic Games. An elite-driven booster coalition with significant economic and political incentive for hosting the 2010 Olympics used the Games to market the city as a burgeoning global hub, ready for increasing foreign direct investment. The event offered the city a chance to signal Vancouver’s shift from a resource-based regional hub towards an image of a world class cosmopolitan city both domestically and internationally. The Games also presented an opportunity to secure public funding from all three levels of government, contributing, in part, to the entrepreneurial redevelopment of the last remaining tracts of undeveloped inner-city property.

The second area of consideration is that while the integration of aboriginal people into the staging and hosting of the Games can be rooted in multilateral normative discourses, the construction of a marketable aboriginal image and the selective allocation of incentives is incongruent with the holistic capacity building of all of Canada’s aboriginal people. It has been argued that the IOC, through the mandated integration of indigenous people into the Olympic Games, acts as a norm creating body. By adopting the multilaterally institutionalized integration of indigenous people into its own agenda, the IOC exerts certain standards of social and political conduct on its members. The integration of local First Nations people into the Vancouver 2010 Olympics can be read as an example of this phenomenon. However, while the VANOC and FHFN host partnership met unprecedented levels of First Nations
engagement in the Olympic Games, the diluted and generalized image of First Nations people marketed for the Olympic Games misrepresented the intricacies and specificities of Canadian aboriginal culture. Finally, the selectivity of the VANOC and FHFN partnership, which superseded provincial and federal legal processes through the granting of a variety of monetary and infrastructural incentives to FHFN, raises the question of whether or not this was an attempt at redistributing Games-related opportunities amongst First Nations people in general, or whether it represents a strategic partnership amongst a group of well-positioned aboriginal and non-aboriginal elites.

The final consideration is the viability of the legacy programs that remain for British Columbia’s First Nations people. The federal cost-sharing model created a system in which legacy programs were funded by a number of different public and private contributions, ensuring that the longevity of the programming was not reliant on one sole funder. Also, 2010 Legacies Now’s method of developing local organizational infrastructure may help ensure the sustainability of legacy programming once the administrative and financial support of 2010 Legacies Now is withdrawn.

Whether the legacies of the 2010 Games were distributed equally, however, is not as clear. Some of the legacy program funding will only benefit the FHFN communities. Further, the VANOC and FHFN partnership created an opportunity for Lil’wat, Musqueam, Tsleil-Waututh, and Squamish First Nations to increase their financial and social stability, establishing a development trajectory that may leave other First Nations groups outside of the Lower Mainland at a disadvantage.

There are a number of ways in which the VANOC and FHFN partnership can be interpreted. Given the tumultuous and unequal history of First Nations people in Canada, the inclusion of the FHFN in the 2010 Vancouver / Whistler Winter Olympic Games could be interpreted as a performative signaling of the changing relationship
between local, provincial, and federal governments and aboriginal communities.

However, given the argument that the FHFN partnership did not redistribute Games legacies amongst aboriginal peoples from across British Columbia or Canada, it can also be interpreted as a strategic partnership between two well-positioned groups of mobilized elites. In this light, it can be read as a component of a larger elite-driven urban entrepreneurial development initiative.

Promoting the selective development of certain First Nations groups is somewhat problematic. While it can be argued that selective growth is better than no growth at all, if the development fostered amongst the selected few leaves fewer resources for the development of other groups and individuals, the resulting inequality calls into question the cumulative benefit to societies as a whole. Further, if private actors side-step legal channels by developing incentives for partnership that impact the government’s ability to address similar concerns in non-host regions, it diminishes the legitimacy and efficacy of institutionalized legal processes.

6.2: Questions for Further Research

A number of areas of further research could build on the themes analyzed in this project.

In the Canadian Federal Hosting Policy (2002), the first stated social objective for hosting an international event is that is should promote Canadian identity and citizenship. Bid cities must “specify how the event will foster mutual understanding and consensus among Canadians and demonstrate the advantages and benefits of Canadian life and society” (p. 27). A discourse or content analysis of the performances, imagery, symbolism and/or marketing of the 2010 Games could help outline how the Olympics constructed versions of national identity. It would be interesting to contextualize this against the ways in which Canadians from a variety of different ethnic,
linguistic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds interpreted these symbols, and how the Olympics influenced the constructions of their respective Canadian identities.

In order to determine the true sustainability of the legacy programming designed and implemented for the 2010 Games, it would be interesting to conduct a study following the growth and development of some of 2010 Legacies Now’s partner organizations. Were the organizations able to build and maintain independent funding sources to create lasting change, or did established programs cease to function when the 2010 Legacies Now budget was reduced after the Olympics were over? In which ways is it possible to compare the sustainability of Games-related social legacy programming to the sustainable use and maintenance of sporting infrastructure built exclusively for the Games?

While this phenomenon was not addressed in this analysis, mega-events have been proven to “threaten the housing rights of hundreds of thousands of people globally. The Olympic Games alone have displaced more than two million people in the last 20 years, mostly the homeless, the poor, and minorities such as Roma and African-Americans” (Center on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2010). One of the strongest counter-arguments against Vancouver’s candidacy as Olympic host city was the large number of highly visible street-engaged and homeless people living in the Downtown East Side, an inner-city area bordering on the hockey arena and opening ceremony venue, and situated within three kilometers of the Vancouver Olympic Village. Community members, social services providers, and backers of anti-Olympic movements such as No Olympics on Stolen Native Land and the No Games 2010 coalition worried that both local infrastructural developments and re-visioning of the inner city for the Vancouver 2010 Games would exacerbate homelessness and displace some of Vancouver’s most vulnerable citizens.

It would be of value to do a longitudinal analysis of the effects of the cost over-run and the municipal debt incurred by the
Vancouver Olympic Village, for example, on municipal budgeting and the provision of public services in the coming years. In the years following Expo ‘86, the municipal and provincial governments had to implement stringent austerity programs, cutting back on a variety of public services because of Expo’s significant negative impacted on the City’s financial stability (Whitson, 2004). Kris Olds’ (1996) study on the effects of hallmark events on housing rights in Canadian cities after the Expo ‘86 found that, in large part due to the cut-backs to social and infrastructural support services through this austerity program, the event contributed to a significant rise in homelessness and diseases such as Hepatitis C and HIV in the city of Vancouver, with most of this rise concentrated in the Downtown East Side. A pre- and post-Game analysis of the number homeless or under-housed, of single-room-occupancy hotels, emergency shelters, and relative price and availability of low-income housing in the Downtown East Side and the Greater Vancouver Regional District would outline the effect the Olympic Games had on homelessness in the city and contribute to the field of study analyzing the effects of mega-event on land tenure and evictions. It would also be a significant contribution to Vancouver’s city planning agenda.
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Appendix A: Interview Transcription – Aaron Marchant

Interviewee: Aaron Marchant, Special Projects Coordinator and First Nations Snowboard Team Executive Director, Squamish Nation
Interviewer: Karla Kloepper
Date: September 23rd, 2010

AM: I was on board before the bid went in for the Games. We actually met about four years prior to winning to bid; the Squamish and Li’l’wat Nation with late Chief Joe Matthias and Chief Alice Danger (sp?) from the Lil’wat Nation had heard that Vancouver might put a bid in for the Games. So they… Looking and realizing the scope of the Olympics, what a large event it is, comparable to Expo, it was a good idea for the two nations to start meeting together and figure out that we’re going to be in these games together. So we started to schedule regular meetings, we started to develop a plan to become involved, not to just be there for opening and closing ceremonies, to be fully active partners in the Games.

With that, um, the team grew, and more interest grew. As we got closer to the Games, and the Bid was going to be official, there were actually committees and a Board of Directors developed and Squamish and Li’l’wat signed a protocol agreement with the Provincial government. And also on sort of, looking at a legacy of that protocol agreement was that yes, it was for the Games, but also within our traditional territories, if there is a developer who would like to develop, say, on our boundary line, of, say, Squamish and Li’l’wat territory, the developer will go through our consultation process and if it’s not approved, will say [to the government] that he was unable to get anywhere and the government will say “Go ahead with the program because the two First Nations can’t battle amongst themselves whose land it was.” So what we did by coming together and signing the protocol agreement is we took that number one argument away from the government and instead of saying “This is yours or ours” we are now saying “this is ours collectively” which allowed us to really eliminate that time, that time process, the years, that would normally to take to go through that process just to get anywhere. That was probably one of the most tangible legacies that you really don’t hear about.

KK: Mmmhm. Right.

AM: So, that protocol agreement is in place. Um, we are continuing to develop lands. Shortly after that, one of the legacies was the selection of 300 acres, and the 300 acres selection was in the Sea to Sky corridor was awarded by the provincial government. So, we had a group of Squamish and Li’l’wat members, leaders who started to do the land selection and they strategically did the land selection. They chose 11.4 acres here, 12.3 here, and all prime real estate. Once the provincial government realized the land we were selecting, they sent a memo to our chief and council stating the land that we select cannot exceed $13 million CAD in value because very acre we were selecting was worth one million. And of course that was after the fact. We won that in the court of law, to continue to select the lands. About six months later, the Province newspaper read, “First Nations become biggest landlords in Whistler.” So, I think it was very… it was very… Chief Joe Matthias and Alice Danger’s foresight on how it was all going to roll out really took effect and to date, we’ve gone through the process, we’ve selected our lands, the nations are investing into getting those lands developed, ready for development, or set aside, or whatever it might be used for. And so now we really have a lot of corporate organizations wanting to become long-term partners. Like Concord Pacific. And other large organizations are becoming partners.

So that really, uh, and, they provide support to community events, to the staffing and the research that needs to be done, and so the 300 acres was a great…. It wasn’t part of a land claim, but it is definitely one of the legacies. We have those 300 acres to build our capacity within this region.
The Squamish-Lil’wat cultural centre is a big legacy. It’s a machine of its own. They have somebody there that can answer all the questions, it’s 40,000 square feet, is it, Lindsay, something like that? $36 million, 40,000 square feet? Don’t quote me on that, but it’s something like that.

L: Yeah, something like that..

AM: It’s a very large building. Something like that.

There was also the naming and recognition along the highway, and I can actually give you, what I wanted to do was print you out the Shared Legacy Agreement document.

So, within that, the one legacy, and during the bid, so, we had to impress the IOC to have the Games here so we hosted them at our Gym, and I remember we were not allowed to use Olympic colours or rings, so what can we do? So we rented round tables and then we had different coloured table cloths. To make it look like the rings, but it wasn’t usage of the rings. And then we set up entertainment, we had Tewanee [Joseph, CEO of the FHFN] bring out the performers, and we had a Squamish and Lil’wat performance and fed them, and then the next day we hosted a meeting at Totem Hall in Squamish, and, um, just to show that the First Nations were fully active and working with the 2010 Bid as a partner and that there were to be no obstacles coming into the Games. As long as we continue to remain partners.

During that process of the bid, I asked Steve Podborski, who was working with the Bid Corp, how our youth benefit. Not 5 years from now, but how will they benefit today. And, we had this idea, I took some kids snowboarding, actually, I just bumped into them, they’re really good, and I wanted them to, uh, go into competition, compete, have equipment, but they had chipped boards, jackets that filled like sponges with water, so we started to develop a budget, really, it was expensive, so we needed a fund.

KK: Sorry, this was still during the bid process?

AM: Yes, this was still during the bid process. So we developed a power point, played it for about a year, then, right after we won the bid, about a week and a half, two weeks later, Chief Gibby Jacob called me and said “Let’s do this program.” Steve Podborski came and said, “When can I meet with you?” He came into our office, we met. He said “Aaron, let’s not just do this for Squamish and Lilooet Nation, let’s do this for all of BC, if not Canada.” And here’s a great guy. He introduced me to this guy names Todd Allison, and Todd had developed a lot of the national sport programs and they’ve done work internationally with FITHS, and competed internationally, both of them, on the national team, so here we have all of these Olympic resources in our backyard now that we won the bid, and Todd, who was going to connect us to all of the coaching facilities and to all of the people who were going to help us and we just found that, rather than us just going and approaching Cypress Mountain, we would call, and they would say “Great, when can we come down and meet with you? Todd told us all about this. We want to be a part of it.” So they came down right away and said “yes, we support seasons passes to the mountain to your youth to train.” Which took off that cost and then we ordered a bunch of our equipment from Korea, a friend of mine was distributing in Korea at the time, snowboard equipment, and so it was very, the resources were there and the funding was minimal and our concept was to take 10 youth and mold them to teach younger youth and so on and so on.

It seemed to work, because year 1 we had 10, year 2 we had 66, the third year we went into like the 90s, and currently we have over 200 members, probably about 245 people involved this year, 200 of whom will be seasons pass holders.

In 13 divisions at 14 different mountains. That’s throughout the province and going into Washington state, Tulalip division.

KK: I was wonder, when I was looking through the information, were there any jobs created for the youth that were mentoring to become instructors, to become leaders, is this all on a volunteer basis, or are any of them teaching or being paid to teach?

AM: Yes, well, in year one there was just myself. In year two, I had to bring on someone to help me with the growth. So we brought on Jessie Williams, who, she worked with us for a year, and then helped train Lindsay, and then Lindsay came...
on board, and then we had someone else, help us once we got closer to the
games and it was really.....

Because running 13, working with 13 First Nations and their bands and the local
resorts you have to be visible and present in the communities with all of your
documentation, making sure the quality of the program is there as well. So, when
we certify an instructor, we hire them at $100 to teach the kids, or, once they get
their level 2, the rates go up, and what some of them are doing, like Sandy Ward,
she is employed by Whistler/ Blackcomb, as an instructor, uh, she also works on
the ziptrek in the summer and that's what a lot of the resorts want to see, is more
First Nations up on the mountains in the employment sector, for long term
employment. Why recruit from Australia when we have First Nations half an hour
down the road? But the obstacle for First Nations, is, you know, being, like, some
of our kids from the community, if I were to take some of the youth here from the
city of from [Squamish land] skiing up to Whistler, they would be way out of their
comfort zone. So we think by taking them skiing at 9, 10 years old, and just giving
them an alternate eye on life, then, um, they’ll be natural, they’ll want to be part of
either a competitive community or just a good opportunity for long-term
employment, um, because sometimes with our kids, we encourage them to go to
school, especially through our program, we have an athlete agreement that they
sign, they must maintain a certain grade level, and we just did our selection, a lot of
it is based on their attendance with our program and the attendance with their
school. Or how their grades are. So now we have kids who are saying “I have
straight As” or “I have straight Bs, I can be on the snowboard program.” That’s a
win-win.

As far as employment.... Everywhere we have a division, um, we have a manager
So the fundamentals of our program, is because there are not a lot of first nations
on the hill, when you are in a group, make sure they’re well behaved. We’ve
actually been complemented on our group, especially at provincial events, which is
good for us, because a lot of the other competitors will go out Saturday and go
celebrate at the local pub, well, our team is not allowed, you’re staying in, and the
next day, it gives them the upper hand as well.

KK: yeah, yeah. So you guys have a no drug and alcohol policy?
AM: Yeah, during FNST time. As legal adults, we can’t control their own time, but
we actually do drug testing across the street from the YWCA
We also do lots of nutrition training, teaching them right from a young age. Now
that they’re young adults, they just go to the deli, know what they’re getting, and
make healthy food choices. You start to see the results. It’s very tangible.
Each one of these kids is a season’s pass holder. This is a legacy from the
Games that Whistler/Blackcomb supports, and all the other resorts support
because we’re offering such a program.

The AYSF funds our core program, the Squamish and Lil’wat program. Each of
the other divisions fund their own. We secure the mountain partner for them, and
provided the equipment. For the first couple of years, they would send me a
cheque, our finance dept would administrate the fund though cheque req’s, but the
only way we could grow was by handing the responsibility to the division. So we
basically showed them what it takes to operate, and it’s better because now it’s
their responsibility to put more resources into it. More funding, more activities,
some will go out and do tree planting to raise funds, other ones will do car washes,
each division does their own unique thing.

KK: Yeah, I’ve been noticing that you guys have a lot of paraphernalia around
here. What kind of things have you been doing? I noticed that, on, maybe it was
the 2010 Legacies Now website, that it was talking about branded aboriginal
clothing and that kind of stuff, how has that worked?
AM: Um, it’s worked well, it’s an interesting logo that we have, it was done by a
pretty famous artist, Rick Harry, so, it’s a snowboard and it’s got a bear on the
bottom, and so this logo was really a catchy item, and so we took this logo, this
was going to be our snowboard team logo, and we started to develop different
boards. It’s been a huge hit. We took one to London, and everyone saw it and
loved it. It’s been showcased a lot.
The visibility has been awesome. Imagine, you go into a chief and council room, and maybe out of 20, 1 person has ever been to a ski hill. 1. And now we have to convince them this is a good thing. Well, if you’ve never done it, you can’t understand it. And that’s what the kids say, too, they say “we’re good, but none of our community knows how good we are. But then we started to get more and more kids actively involved. Getting the buy-in from the kids was #1. Once we had their buy in, getting their families on board was easier. Everything became a lot easier.

Additional funding coming from indig. Rec departments, chief and councils. We Don’t want to go into a community and operate for just one or two years. Want to have a long-term commitment.

Our snowboarders could come be part of the games, through a few different events, can go back and inspire the community. Must be in good standing with the community. Long-term athlete development plan and training. How to deal with racism, how to deal with a child that’s been, whose parents were up late, but the kid is still there to snowboard. How do you deal with a headspace like that?

“It can’t be all about snowboarding. It is quite a bit more.”

Competing at the Provincial level has been interesting, because the kids are competing in a world where they’re travelling to resorts, with kids whose parents are either Drs or lawyers; they are there on their own. They have to do it on their own. Some of them are doing well, but that’s definitely an obstacle. It’s a different scene

We’re now trying to get more mountains on board. We go to the mountains, and go to the partners, and tell them; “GO EXPAND to your local first nations.” Every time they expand, we charge them a $2000 admin fee to the first nations group. They can have the program, the content, the equipment, the seasons passes, and consultants for $2000. We’re almost giving the program away. But the goal is not to make a lot of money. It’s to get kids on the mountain.

We pitch the program using a power point. The partners then make an agreement between us (FNST) and the team. We give a budget and a list of deliverables. If they have any money left at the end of the season, it can be carried forward to the following year.

It’s a matter of time before snowboarding will go national within the Aboriginal sport community. Canadian Snowboard federation and Aboriginal Sport circle need to come together and sign an MOU. Need to work together. FNST is at the bottom of the mainstream provincial committee. Until there is an MOU, snowboarding can’t become a national Aboriginal sport. For now, using our model to go to First Nations communities. Good, because they are looking for programs to develop.

KK: Where does your funding come from? How have you guys been getting funding from 2010 Legacies Now?

AM: Our funding comes from 1 time $3mil contribution from BC to Sq and Lil. It’s our Nations’ money, and 2010 is the trustee. FNST applies to the ASYF every year in a grant process, but it’s allotted to be our money. We probably have till 2014 to build our program into our own recreation departments. Then it would fall under the nation’s funding. Goal is to build relationships with RBC, Nike so we can increase our level of corporate sponsorship. Also, as the lands get developed, more corporate partners will be available to help develop the capacities of the FNST. This yearly grant process should only last until 2014. It’s more and more work every year. The more people hear about it, the more people want to be a part.

Working with the federal gov’t and VANOC; chiefs went to bat. It was an easy time to work on a protocol. For example, we required that every time an international dignitary comes to Canada, the Chiefs from the given area is to be introduced at the same level as the premier. Will continue beyond the games. This contributed to an important level of recognition that will continue beyond 2010.