SOCIAL CAPITAL, CHAIN MIGRATION AND THE ETHNICIZATION OF MIGRANT POPULATIONS:
THE TURKISH-GERMAN EXAMPLE

Master's Thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

awarded by the Philosophical Faculty of
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i. Br. (Germany)
and the
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban (South Africa)

Submitted by

Ilka Sommer
ilka.sommer@gmail.com

February 2006

Social Sciences
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CHAIN MIGRATION AND THE ETHNICIZATION OF MIGRANT POPULATIONS:

THE TURKISH-GERMAN EXAMPLE

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

2. SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY: CAPITALIZING THE SOCIAL? ............................................. 4
   2.1 TRACING THE ORIGINS .................................................................................................. 4
      2.1.1 BOURDIEU ON SOCIAL INEQUALITY ...................................................................... 4
      2.1.2 COLEMAN ON HUMAN PRODUCTIVITY ................................................................ 7
      2.1.3 PUTNAM ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE ............................................................. 9
      2.1.4 MERITS AND LIMITS ............................................................................................... 11
   2.2 REFINING THE CONCEPT ............................................................................................... 14
      2.2.1 FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE ................................................................................. 14
      2.2.2 STRONG AND WEAK TIES ...................................................................................... 15
      2.2.3 CONCRETE AND SYMBOLIC TIES ............................................................................ 16
      2.2.4 LOCAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TIES ..................................................................... 17
      2.2.5 BENEFITS AND CONSTRAINTS ............................................................................... 17
   2.3 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 18

3. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE CAUSES OF MIGRATION ...................................................... 19
   3.1 DEFINING MIGRATION ..................................................................................................... 19
   3.2 CLASSICAL EXPLANATIONS OF MIGRATION ................................................................. 21
      3.2.1 RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL .................................................................................... 22
      3.2.2 PUSH AND PULL FACTORS .................................................................................... 23
      3.2.3. LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................................... 24
   3.3. NEW EXPLANATIONS OF MIGRATION .......................................................................... 26
      3.3.1 MIGRANT NETWORKS AS SOCIAL CAPITAL ......................................................... 26
      3.3.2 CUMULATIVE CAUSATION ..................................................................................... 29
      3.3.3 MIGRATION SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ 30
      3.3.4 LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................................... 31
   3.4 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 33
4. Example: Chain Migration from Turkey to Germany __________ 35

4.1 Establishing the Link: Pioneers and Followers from 1961-1973 ________ 36
  4.1.1 Labour Migration and Its Causes ________________________________ 36
  4.1.2 Selectivity and Social Capital _________________________________ 38

4.2 Maintaining the Link: The Use of Social Networks Since 1973 ________ 43
  4.2.1 Family Reunification and Other Channels __________________________ 44
  4.2.2 Social Capital and Cumulative Causation _________________________ 45

4.3 Current Debates: Do Turkish Immigrants live in Ethnic Enclaves? _____ 46

5. Social Capital and the Ethnicization of Migrant Populations __ 48

5.1 Defining Ethnicity ________________________________________________ 48
  5.1.1 Culturalism _________________________________________________ 49
  5.1.2 Structuralism ________________________________________________ 49

5.2 Power, Inequality and the Genesis of Ethnic Groups ________________ 51
  5.2.1 Core-Periphery Relations ______________________________________ 51
  5.2.2 The Interstate System _________________________________________ 52
  5.2.3 Class Dimensions ____________________________________________ 54

5.3. Discourse and Reproduction ______________________________________ 55
  5.3.1 Politics, Media and the Social Sciences __________________________ 56
  5.3.2 Self-Perceptions of Common Fate ________________________________ 58
  5.3.3 A Word on Individual Agency __________________________________ 59

5.4 Ethnicization and Social Capital: So What? _________________________ 60

6. Conclusion ______________________________________________________ 61

References _________________________________________________________ 64
1. INTRODUCTION

Most social groups cultivate notions of the prototypical Other. German public discourses unmistakably name this prototype the Turkish migrants, and in certain contexts synonymously the Muslim migrants. One of the most commonly perceived problems in this regard is that they congregate in ethnic enclaves while only socialising among themselves, or – in the new German terminology – they form a Parallelgesellschaft (parallel universe). Thus, heated debates evolve around questions such as whether this is their or our fault – and then, as a consequence, whether they have to integrate themselves more or we have to help them more. Social scientists study for instance whether they do indeed only maintain contacts with other Turkish migrants or whether they have also German friends and neighbours, or whether ethnic enclaves actually hinder integration or can be considered as a kind of Binnenintegration (internal integration). More recently, a new stream in migration theory has emerged which emphasises that the concept of the ethnic enclave is gradually an inaccurate description due to the rising networks that the migrants maintain to their country of origin. Yet, while the idea of emerging transnational social spaces has challenged the enclave as unit of analysis, the tacitly underlying concept of them has largely remained the same.

This paper adopts a different approach. The aim is not to make an empirical statement about the highly politicised issue of immigrant incorporation. Instead, I would like to invite the reader to a speculative exploration of the question why the observation of ethnically segregated enclaves is so prominent. The required equipment is an understanding and valorisation of sociological thinking as an “anti-fixating power” (Bauman 1997: 17). Rather than confirming the categories that are apparently deeply rooted in our minds, our expedition intends to discover alternative explanations. Most likely it will be a bit irritating at times and maybe it even reveals more questions than answers. Yet, this is necessarily an indicator of its success. The aim is to “defamiliarise the familiar” (ibid.) and to enhance reflection on the way we think, speak and act. Therefore, this shall not just be seen as a mere intellectual exercise, but as a relevant contribution to discursive controversy and social change.

We start from the prejudice at hand: Turkish immigrants in Germany congregate in ethnic enclaves while only socialising among themselves. The first question I have refers to the verb congregate. Does this imply that each individual immigrant came alone and then watched out where his/her co-ethnics are in order to go and live with them? And if this is the case, how come he/she was on one hand so flexible, mobile and adaptive in
regard to new circumstances and apparent better opportunities when deciding to migrate, but after the migration so inflexible, immobile and dependent on a certain group? The connotation is that the migrant is strongly motivated by an economic interest in material progress, but culturally he/she rather wants to conserve what he/she has. Can this be a complete explanation? The answer is of course no.

The prejudice is based on at least two problematic and contradictory assumptions. First, that individuals are rational actors who make decisions independently from each other and second, that collectives are static and homogenous cultural containers consisting of mechanic elements. Indeed, the prejudice in question does reflect contradictory scientific traditions. The motivation to migrate is apparently based on economism while post-migration patterns are thought to be guided by the principles of culturalism. In order to explore alternative explanations we have to apply a theory which combines these two ways of thinking.

Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of social capital as an essential element of his theory of social inequality and conflict offers an answer to this problem. Social capital is, in brief, the benefits and resources which can be mobilised by virtue of membership in groups or networks. Hence, this is the asset of which – according to the examined prejudice – Turkish immigrants are supposed to possess a lot. Moreover, Bourdieu’s theory represents an approach which integrates economism and culturalism by introducing the interface of social structure. That is why it is reasonably applicable to our purposes. We will thus have to explore how social capital relates to migration on one hand and how social capital relates to ethnic group membership on the other hand.

To begin with we will dedicate ourselves to some details of social capital theory (chapter two). In order to stress the relevance of Bourdieu’s approach it will first be necessary to differentiate his ideas from others scholars who have been working on social capital, i.e. primarily James S. Coleman and Robert D. Putnam. After evaluating the three theories and justifying the choice for Bourdieu, we will nevertheless have to define and refine our own understanding. This is crucial as Bourdieu did not particularly design his theory to make it applicable to issues of migration and ethnicity.

Consecutively, social capital is applied to the study of migration (chapter three). In correspondence to the first criticism we developed in regard to the prejudice that we seek to challenge, we will argue that – unlike what classical economic theories suggest - individuals do not in general decide to migrate independently from each other but have to be seen in their social and structural context. Consequently, chapter three first explains what is generally understood as the classical economic theories, i.e. the rational actor, and
the push and pull factor approach. After having pointed out their limitations and counter arguments, particularly by world system theory, we come to the new explanations of migration, which are a collective term for those approaches drawing upon the concept of social capital and migrant networks. The conclusion consequently consists of a statement about the role of social capital in causing migration, from then on referred to as chain migration.

The next chapter consecutively illustrates the relation between social capital and chain migration in regard to Turkish migration to Germany (chapter four). Yet, this shall strictly be seen as an illustrating example and not as a case study as such. Moreover, it is considered to be quite interchangeable. Any other migration stream, characterised by chain migration between two countries and paralleled by observations of ethnic enclaves could have also been chosen: Mexican-US, Algerian-France, etc. Due to constraints of time it is not possible to apply the developed theoretical framework to primary empirical research. Therefore, I will largely draw upon secondary data from earlier studies on social networks, which are usually limited in regard to time and place of the survey implementation, and interestingly, mostly focus on those areas which are labelled as Turkish enclaves in order to show the relevance of chain migration on the formation of ethnic enclaves. Yet, this practice seems quite tautological. Moreover, the definitions of social networks and social capital vary quite a lot, as well as what the specific surveys wanted to find out. As comprehensive and systematic data on this issue is rather rare, it will thus not be possible to draw valid conclusions from the given sample. These are some of the main limitations that our theoretical exploration is confined to.

As the ethnic enclave seems to be linked to chain migration and the possession of social capital, we will then put the cart before the horse and ask which factors are creating an ethnic identity, then referred to as ethnicization (chapter five). Unlike what is assumed by classic cultural theories, social collectives are not seen as being primarily determined by cultural distinctiveness. Instead, structural inequalities and power differences are considered which are likely to impact on the ethnicization of a particular migrant group. Therefore, chapter five first discusses why the structuralist approach is favoured over the culturalist approach to ethnic identity. Referring to Wallerstein’s work on the modern world system and to Bourdieu’s theory of the social field, we subsequently try to make out these structures in more detail. Ethnicization and social capital are then re-connected to each other.

In the Conclusion, we will review our theoretical exploration, logically linking social capital, chain migration and ethnicization of migrant populations, in order to come to an assessment why the ethnic enclave is a commonly observed phenomenon.
2. SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY: CAPITALIZING THE SOCIAL?

One major point that all social capital theorists – including myself - want to make is that social relations matter. Yet, the conjunction of the two terms social and capital might initially sound fairly contradictory. Therefore, we have to take a closer look in order to understand why social capital theory has emerged and what different scholars mean when they make the point that human relations matter.

2.1 TRACING THE ORIGINS

Actually, we cannot speak of just one social capital theory. As Robert Putnam reveals, the concept has been independently invented at least six times over the 20th century until it had reached a firm place on the intellectual agenda (see Putnam 2000: 19-20). Today, it is basically three scholars who are widely acknowledged as representing the classics of social capital theory: Pierre Bourdieu, James S. Coleman, and Robert D. Putnam himself. As all of them came from different schools of thought, they do not necessarily agree on the answer to the questions why social capital matters and for whom it matters. Nevertheless, a major commonality is that all of them developed their ideas about the meaningfulness of social relations because they regarded the explanatory powers of their respective scholarly tradition as insufficient.

2.1.1 BOURDIEU ON SOCIAL INEQUALITY

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) started his work on social capital in the 1980s, motivated by an interest in stratification and elite theory. While being considerably influenced by Marxist economic sociology, he did not share the conviction that societies are solely structured by different economic classes being in conflict with each other. His approach sought to challenge the prominent view that economic exchanges are self-interested and profit-driven while cultural and social exchange relations belong to the realm of an innocent disinterestedness (Bourdieu 1986: 242). Consequently, he developed the stratification model further and introduced – in addition to economic capital – first the dimension of cultural capital and later social capital. Bourdieu characterises the relationship between the three forms of capital as follows:

Capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up
of social obligations (‘connections’) which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital (Bourdieu 1986: 243).\footnote{Social capital will be defined below while economic and cultural capital can only be summarized briefly: Economic capital can easily be quantified by using the monetary system as profit is defined as a function of financial investments; Cultural capital exists in three different states: the embodied, the objectified and the institutionalised state: Embodied cultural capital means the general capacity to invest individual efforts to work on oneself as a continuous learning process; Objectified cultural capital refers to material possessions expressing cultural symbols and values, such as books and paintings; Institutionalised cultural capital represents achieved formal qualifications to objectify ones cultural capital by legal certificates.}

By regarding cultural and social capital as being actually or potentially convertible into economic capital, Bourdieu stresses the importance of including these dimensions in the study of social hierarchies. Capital in general is considered to be accumulated labour (or energy) that individuals and collectives own in material or embodied forms up to different capacities (Bourdieu 1986: 241). Thus, capital ownership is equal to the access to resources and, therefore, the exertion of power. In order to grasp the social world in its entirety, it is consequently necessary to study the laws by which the forms of capital can be converted into one another. Yet, this does not mean that these kinds of exchange relations do produce linear and predictable outcomes.

The three dimensions of the different forms of capital represent together what Bourdieu calls the social field, or the objective structure of relative subjective positions. Yet, as social reality is characterised as “accumulated history” (Bourdieu 1986: 241), children are not born with the same opportunities, but start their lives from their respective inherited relative subjective position. Thus, the structure of the multidimensional social field determines the struggles over resources and power and the strategies different agents adopt to change or preserve their social position (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 101; 114-115). Each form of capital tends to produce and reproduce itself: economic capital owners are likely to accumulate more economic capital while ownership of cultural capital also facilitates its additional accumulation. That is why the social field consists of comparably stable social inequalities constantly reproducing themselves.

After this general introduction to Bourdieu’s theoretical underpinnings of social structures, we shall explore the specific meaning and effects of social capital. In 1980, Bourdieu published his first draft on social capital in the French journal \textit{Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales}:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249).\footnote{In the French original: “Le capital social est l’ensemble des ressources actuelles ou potentielles qui sont liées à la possession d’un réseau durable de relations plus ou moins institutionalisées d’interconnaissance et d’interreconnaissance (Bourdieu 1980: 2). Indeed, what Bourdieu called “Le Capital Social – Notes Provisoires” in 1980 has been completely adopted as a definition for his later publications on social capital in the German and English translations.}
Thus, for Bourdieu, social capital is an asset that individuals or collectives (families, companies, nations, political parties etc.) own by virtue of their connectedness. One major feature in this context is its function as a multiplier: the more connected a particular entity is, the more it is able to benefit from the economic, cultural and social capital inherent in the entire network. In this sense, not only the quantity of an agent’s disposable connections counts, but also the overall volume of the respective types of capital accumulating to one’s social capital (see Bourdieu 1986: 249). Using the economic terminology of investment strategies, either being conscious or unconscious, but potentially leading to pay-offs in the short or long run, Bourdieu explains why individuals and collectives may accumulate social capital.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s aim was surely not to capitalize the social by making individual actors think of their social relations in terms of their mere usefulness. In fact, it did not matter to him that much whether they do or not. Rather than being concerned with individual rationales behind the accumulation of social capital, i.e. conscious or unconscious, interested or disinterested, he sought to point out the associated structural effects and dynamics of social capital ownership on power relations and the reproduction of inequalities. In this context, Bourdieu highlights that through material and symbolic exchanges within a certain group, the group continuously re-produces itself and reaffirms its boundaries while stabilising its (dominant) position vis-à-vis those who do not belong. In this context, he mainly refers to social capital as exclusive, prestigious club membership as well as renowned family names and nobility titles (Bourdieu 1986: 250).

As social membership derives from “mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 249) it always has a symbolic character functioning as so-called symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, the objective structure of the social field only becomes meaningful through strategies of classification and distinction, i.e. social positions are legitimised with the help of symbolic capital:

Symbolic capital – another name for distinction - is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e., when it is known and recognized as self-evident (Bourdieu 1985: 731).

Consequently, symbolic capital derives from the “work of representation” (Bourdieu 1985: 727) establishing distinctions between the Self and the Other. These distinctions

---

3 The Habitus is one of Bourdieu’s most prominent concepts in this context. Nevertheless, it can only be briefly outlined here: The habitus is defined as “durable, transposable, structured (and structuring) dispositions of individuals” (Bourdieu 1990: 53), largely inherent in the respective relative position in the social field. Thus, the concept of habitus embeds the identity of the individual into the societal structure. By cultivating a certain habitus, being inherent in communicative practices, social groups maintain their distinctions from other groups.
frequently draw from apparent visible attributes, such as in the case of ethnic and racial categories which are represented as objective social differences (Bourdieu 1985: 730). As the power relations inherent in the objective structure of relative subjective positions in the social field are reflected in the perceptions and classifications of the social world, they contribute to the steadiness of these hierarchical relations. That is why symbolic capital is also described as symbolic power – which indeed might be a better term to distinguish it from the other three forms of capital. Symbolic power is the power to make different entities exist through effective influence on categories and distinctions. In other words, symbolic power is the power to nominate. Thus, it determines the knowledge about the social world which itself becomes the object of ideological struggles in the social field (see Bourdieu 1985: 729). Our language is consequently the product of previous power struggles. The exertion of symbolic power is successful if a certain discursive order is accepted as perfectly legitimate and self-evident (Bourdieu 1985: 728-730). In another context, Bourdieu does also speak of symbolic violence:

Symbolic violence ... is the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity […] I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1996: 167-168).

As a result of symbolic violence, the reproduction of social hierarchies by the dominant social groups – aimed at the preservation of their respective position - often parallels the acceptance by the dominated social groups who perceive the representation of the social world as legitimate reality. According to Bourdieu, this concept applies to various relations of domination, be it in regard to the construction of racial, national, ethnic or gender categories.

To sum up, for Bourdieu social relations matter, first, because individual and collective agents can use them in order to gain more power and improve their position in the social field and, second, because social capital reproduces and affirms social hierarchies and structures of domination. His approach evidently bridges a gap between the scholarly traditions describing reality solely in terms of economic action and those focusing simply on communicative action.

2.1.2 Coleman on Human Productivity

James S. Coleman (1926-1995) was an American sociologist whose main field of interest was the sociology of education. In contrast to Bourdieu, Coleman stood in the tradition of rational choice theory which is based on the principles of classical economic theory con-

---

4 Some scholars have therefore even argued that Bourdieu’s concepts of social and symbolic capital amount to the same (see Fine 2001: 56).
ceptualising individuals as profit-maximising agents and social structures as an aggregation of individual actions. In fact, Coleman has decisively contributed to the rise of the rational action paradigm in contemporary sociology (see Field 2003: 21). Nevertheless, by introducing the concept of social capital, Coleman acknowledged that cooperation occurs – even among self-interested individuals - and certain features of social structures can function as a useful resource which might facilitate individual productivity. Thus, he perceives his approach as “part of a theoretical strategy that involves use of the paradigm of rational action but without the assumption of atomistic elements stripped of social relationships” (Coleman 1988: 118).

While Bourdieu focuses on the structural effects of producing and reproducing social belonging, Coleman is more interested in individual rationales and potential benefits of membership in particular social structures. For him, the value of belonging to certain groups or communities does not necessarily derive from the accumulation of capital inherent in the network, but from either the existence or the eventual creation of effective social norms. This includes for instance norms of reciprocity, the generation of trust and the fulfilment of mutual expectations and obligations which can also be enforced through the provision of rewards or the imposition of sanctions by the community (Coleman 1988: 102-105). Thus, the individual member who is able to rely on these particular communal efforts can incorporate it as a factor in his or her own decision-making processes. As a result, social capital can facilitate the productivity of the individual in terms of different desired outcomes, economic as well as non-economic.5

Coleman’s main interest was the role of social capital in the creation of human capital which is misleadingly often seen as an analogy to Bourdieu’s cultural capital.6 In his empirical studies he has shown that the closure of social networks as well as the appropriation of social organization, i.e. the transfer of social capital from one context to another, has striking positive effects on the performance of children in school (Coleman 1988: 105-116).7 In general, he has emphasised social capital as being inherent in families

5 Coleman gives some illustrations how these different forms of social capital are used by individual rational actors to assert their interests (Coleman 1988: 97-100). One example is the choice taken by a mother of six children to migrate from Detroit to Jerusalem. The mother expected to be able to leave her children playing in the streets of Jerusalem as the community ensures that unattended children will be supervised. By comparing the social structures in Detroit and Jerusalem according to her knowledge, she thus came to the conclusion that she will benefit more from living in Jerusalem.

6 Indeed, human capital refers – like cultural capital - to the achievement and embodiment of skills and qualifications. Nevertheless, the two concepts can not be regarded as interchangeable as the former focuses on the functional, the latter on the structural implications of capital. The same applies to the distinction between Coleman’s concept of physical capital, i.e. material resources, and Bourdieu’s economic capital.

7 The findings were that the pupils performed better the more the parents spend time with their children, the more the parents are connected to the parents of their kid’s friends, and the more the children’s different social environments are overlapping, for instance, that they would see the same people at school, in their neighbourhood, in their religious community and during other leisure activities.
and church communities, referred to as primordial social ties, while largely discarding the value of what he called constructed forms of social organisation (see Field 2003: 27).

Moreover, Coleman has pointed out that social structures can be characterized by high or low degrees of social capital meaning the effectiveness of social norms and the trustworthiness of the environment. He states that unlike physical and human capital, social capital is not a private good, but “inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman 1988: 98). As a public good, social capital brings about the classical problem of free-riding, meaning that people tend to benefit from it without contributing to the creation and the maintenance of the resource. Due to the free-riding problematic, rational actors are not likely to invest in the creation of dense and trustful social structures and we can observe a general underinvestment in social capital. In Coleman’s own words:

.. because the benefits of actions that bring social capital into being are largely experienced by persons other than the actor, it is often not in his interest to bring it into being. The result is that most forms of social capital are created or destroyed as by-products of other activities (Coleman 1988: 118).

Moreover, low degrees of social capital might also be determined by further external factors such as the availability of other sources of support such as high levels of wealth or access to governmental welfare services (see Coleman 1988: 103).

In summary, for Coleman social capital matters as an asset of individuals or corporate actors being derived from the resources inherent in social relations and facilitating the achievement of economic and non-economic ends. This approach might resemble Bourdieu’s at first sight. Nevertheless, the major distinction is that Coleman’s social capital theory is a functional framework, whereas Bourdieu’s is structural. The former focuses on social capital as a tool of human productivity and is largely perceived as entirely benign, whereas the latter emphasises the malignant effects of capital ownership on the structures of inequality.

2.1.3 Putnam on Democratic Governance

The American political scientist Robert D. Putnam, born in 1941, has ultimately placed the concept of social capital on the American public agenda in the mid 1990s. Putnam stands in the communitarian tradition of political thought, stressing the value of the community in shaping individuals and promoting social responsibility and collective action in order to achieve certain political goals. In this context, one main focus is the role of civil society in sustaining democratic governance.

Putnam’s work on social capital largely draws from Coleman’s earlier
conceptualisation while entirely disregarding Bourdieu’s contributions. Like Coleman, Putnam saw the value of social relations in the creation of networks, norms of reciprocity and trustful structures which can facilitate coordinated action (see Putnam 1993: 167). However, as a political scientist Putnam was much more concerned with the function of social capital for societies as a whole than for small-scale structures, such as family or religious communities.

Indeed, in his empirical study *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Putnam 1993) Putnam revealed that administrative performance as well as economic productivity are hindered by prevailing traditional organic communities - Coleman’s source of strength - and fostered by established modern forms of pluralist social structures. He based this distinction on indicators of civic engagement such as membership in associations, referenda turnout, as well as newspaper readership (see Putnam 1993: 91-99). Where civic structures are absent, relations are hierarchical, i.e. dependent on patron-client relationships, and trust is a personalized asset, whereas high levels of civic engagement are paralleled by horizontal relationships and generalized social trust. As exclusively the latter facilitates collective action, it is necessary for the successful functioning of complex societies. In this context, Putnam introduced the concept of social capital in order to emphasis the value of civic engagement for democratic governance.

A few years later, Putnam transferred his ideas on the civic community to the context of the United States of America, in his publication *Bowling Alone* (Putnam 1995; 2000). In empirical detail Putnam underpins the argument that social capital has declined in the United States during the last four decades. According to him, evident trends of individualization, and particularly the rise of television and other home-based entertainment technologies, have led to the continuous disappearances of the social glue, i.e. solidarity, social trust, and norms of reciprocity. This in turn has led to serious problems of collective action concerning any field of the American society such as political participation, the health system, crime and security, education and economic prosperity. Thus, Putnam’s central message is “we Americans need to reconnect with one another” (Putnam 2000: 28).

Like Coleman, Putnam considers social capital as a public good. Nevertheless, they have different opinions how it is brought into being. While Coleman thinks that it is a random by-product as the rational actor does not have much incentive to invest in its creation, Putnam is more optimistic by promoting rationales for the self-interested individual as well as the actions of political institutions. He stresses that cooperation does

---

8 By comparing data from different Italian regions, Putnam has shown in particular that the correlations between democratic performance and civic engagement were much higher than between democratic performance and socio-economic factors – as other explanations suggested. According to Putnam, it is thus the different levels of civic engagement that determine the great differences between the high levels of development in the Northern Italian regions vis-à-vis Southern Italy.
not mean selflessness, but as de Tocqueville, the father of American communitarianism, has pointed out “self-interest rightly understood” (de Tocqueville 2000 [1835/1840]: 219). Cooperation in this sense is seen as long-term self-interest which might nevertheless require short-term altruism. Despite Putnam’s emphasis on human agency, he also sees the degree of social capital in a given society as largely influenced by historical circumstances, i.e. the logic of path dependency: “where you can get to depends on where you’re coming from, and some destination you simply cannot get to from here” (Putnam 1993: 179). ⁹

To sum up, for Putnam social capital matters because it is a collective asset, characterising social cohesion and solidarity of a given society, which enhances cooperation and social trust. Thus, it is able to solve social dilemmas in the spheres of democratic governance, economic prosperity, public health and security, education, and other policy sectors. In contrast to Bourdieu, Putnam neglects the role of power and conflict possibly deriving from social organisation and focuses on social capital as a mere means of societal integration. He draws a sharp contrast to Coleman, by stating that - rather than social closure and kinship ties - it is civic activity arising from multiple memberships in associations characterised by horizontal relationships which are an essential resource for modern societies.

2.1.4 MERITS AND LIMITS

As we have seen, the three scholars who are widely renowned as the classics of social capital theory approached the topic from quite different angles and interests. Taken together, they touch upon many aspects that the sociological discipline has always been concerned with. These all-embracing capacities make the concept strong, but at the same time empirically hardly tangible. By referring to social relations in terms of resources, interest and power, social capital is able to bridge different academic disciplines as well as different traditions of thought. Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam can indeed be regarded as bridge builders who were trying to overcome the gap between the micro level of individual decision-making and the macro level of structural determination. That is why migration scholar Thomas Faist speaks of social capital as a “crucial meso link” (Faist 2000).

In regard to our research interest, the limitations seem obvious: none of the classical concepts was introduced in order to study human movements and none of them conceptualises social relations as potentially stretching beyond specific territorially bounded entities. In effect, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam perceive social capital as a mere local asset which either characterises the resources within certain communities

---

⁹ This logic explains why the Northern Italian regions find themselves in a virtuous circle of cooperation, whereas Southern Italy is hindered by a vicious circle of non-cooperation.
residing in particular regions and cities or national societies. Nevertheless, social capital has already been persuasively adopted by prominent migration scholars such as for instance Douglas S. Massey (et. al. 1994; et. al. 1998; 2003), Alejandro Portes (1998; 1997; & Sensenbrenner 1993) and Thomas Faist (2000). Our approach will thus largely rely on these works. Yet, these scholars do not sharply distinguish between social capital in Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s eyes, but use combined approaches instead.10

Putnam’s approach has mainly been used to study integrative patterns of national societies and sometimes in regard to the dynamics creating and maintaining diasporas or so-called transnational social spaces (Hiller & Franz 2004; Faist 2000), but it remains inherently insufficient in explaining why migration occurs as well as which powers bring social capital inherent in a particular group into being. That is why it is largely discarded in this study. Indeed, Putnam constructs social capital as a cure-all for communities and national societies, while new analytical insights beyond Coleman’s are rather rare. His concept has little value in capturing social capital as embracing different kinds of social structures. Instead he describes solely the civic benefits deriving from civic engagement as social capital. Thus, Putnam’s approach sounds quite tautological: civic regions are more civic because they are more civically engaged (see also Portes 1998: 20). In fact, Bowling Alone reads like a powerful political combat organ promoting values of social responsibility and social cohesion in an increasingly individualizing society like the United States. Referring to social capital instead of out-dated versions of responsibility, cohesion or solidarity might thus serve the purpose to avoid association with morality preaches. Consequently, the old values represent themselves in a new and fashionable guise: one that does not promote selflessness, but self-interestedness as ultimate and benign goals. Putnam’s concept thus adapts perfectly to a highly individualized mind set, the prototype of the rational actor, in search of empirical evidence regarding his or her long-term benefits before committing him- or herself to communitarian values. Despite this harsh criticism, we have to acknowledge that it was Putnam who has popularised the concept of social capital. Most public debates on social capital are inspired by Putnam’s work and policy makers largely draw from his findings.11

10 The combined approach is most evident in Faist’s definition who combines its aspect of power with group-internal integrative capacities: “Social Capital are those resources that help people or groups to achieve their goals in ties and the assets inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to cooperate in networks and organizations, serving as mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities” (Faist 2000: 102).

11 The World Bank has for instance adopted Putnam’s discourse on social capital to fight poverty and underdevelopment (see World Bank 2001) and the Social Capital Foundation also dedicates itself to the strengthening of civil society and social cohesion (see www.socialcapital-foundation.org, accessed on 29/12/2005).
Coleman and Bourdieu have generally been more influential in the study of migratory processes. Surprisingly, they have often been cited simultaneously (Massey et al. 1998; Portes 1998) even though they represent different and opposed paradigms. While some scholars take Bourdieu’s framework of economic, cultural and social capital as quite similar to Coleman’s framework of physical, human and social capital (Smith & Kulychn 2002: 157,177), others recognize an ambiguity regarding the question whether Bourdieu’s concept of capital should be seen as structural theory or as a theory allowing for choice actions (see Nan 1999: 30). Indeed, without an understanding of where his thoughts came from, i.e. Marx’ work on social stratification and domination deriving from capital ownership, he can easily be read as promoting a socially embedded rational choice theory similar to Coleman.\textsuperscript{12} One common criticism of social capital theory therefore is that social relations have been isolated from their element of affection and spontaneous liking, being solely seen in the light of usefulness and conversion into other forms of capital. The individual actor might thus also use Bourdieu as guidance to enhance his or her upward mobility by investing more in social capital. This approach is indeed not that far from rational choice and micro-economic theory – just adding that social relations matter as a resource besides wealth and education.

However, there is one major difference between Coleman and Bourdieu that should not be disregarded: Coleman assumes that social capital exists without questioning or analysing how these structures came into being. He seems to perceive them as a random gift, such as belonging to certain primordial communities, or as by-product of individual choices and activities. For Bourdieu, on the other hand, membership is determined by the historical structures of social inequality and he is particularly interested in the mechanisms reproducing these hierarchies over time. Through the concept of symbolic capital (or symbolic power) Bourdieu links capital ownership and structural inequalities with ideological struggles over legitimate knowledge. Thus, Bourdieu’s approach is more sophisticated as he not only emphasises agents benefiting from social structures through their respective membership, but also structural dynamics bringing membership into being which – in turn - impacts again on struggles over power and knowledge.

Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s approach also has some crucial limitations: his elaboration on social capital mainly considers elitist groups while neglecting that social capital can be a useful resource for everyone (see also Field 2003: 17). Thus, he completely ignores the role social capital might play in cases where people are poor of cultural and/or economic

\textsuperscript{12} In his publication An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology Bourdieu defends his theory against the criticism that he presents the economism of rational choice theory (see Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992: 115-122). He particularly argues that his notions of interest and capital do not correspond to individual rules of human behaviour – such as in economic theory – but are used to describe what brings these rules into being.
capital. It is quite likely that – where social capital has to replace other resources – its dynamics are even more far reaching. Further, as Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of the social field is bound to national societies, he does not include changes of capital constellations through migration. As a result, his concept remains quite static. Yet, we have to presuppose that migration processes largely impact on the respective capital constellations of the individuals: Economic capital might change in value due to exchange rates and different standards of living in different countries. Similarly, institutionalised cultural capital depends on the acknowledgement of qualifications which in turn depends on national regulations. Thus, qualifications acquired in the country of origin might not be useful in the new environment and the migrant experiences a decline regarding the respective capital constellations.

In this context, Anja Weiss has criticised a methodological nationalism in research on social inequality resulting in her promoting the study of “The Transnationalization of Social Inequality” (Weiss 2005). Even though this aim is supported here, the tools which would make it possible to study inequality on a global scale incorporating the effects of different streams of human movements and the degrees of transferability of the forms of capital have yet to be developed.

2.2 REFINING THE CONCEPT

As the last section has pointed out, social capital theory is still in its infancy. It is not one consistent theory, but a melange of different approaches having in common that they want to stress the resource character of social relations. Before analysing the role of social capital for migratory processes, we will thus have to specify the usage of the term as adopted here. Yet, due to the mentioned problematic, our approach will be considered a working concept.

2.2.1 FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE

In order to give consideration to the different dimensions that social capital theory inheres, we have to distinguish between the functional and structural perspective which are both inherent in Bourdieu’s theory of the social field. Thus, this paper adopts the following working definition:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249).

It is perceived as coherent with the definition used by migration theorist Alejandro Portes (1998) who also combines elements from both Bourdieu and Coleman. According to
Portes, social capital is the “ability to secure benefits through membership in networks and other social structures” (Portes 1998: 8). The term ability is chosen as it refers to social capital ownership as an effective resource which can be mobilised for different purposes – not necessarily economic objectives, but in the long run convertible into economic capital. Moreover, it requires a certain individual capability in order to function as such. Due to the characteristic of convertibility social capital increases the potential access to other forms of capital. Consequently, it is not only the size of the network or the quantity of connections that counts, but also the quality, i.e. the extent of economic, cultural and social capital inherent in the entire network. It is not specified here what kind of benefits different actors are able to secure as the needed or aspired support might vary in regard to different circumstances and relative subjective positions in the social field. That is why we cannot make any generalized assumptions about individual motivations and interests either.

This working definition representing the functional perspective of social relations principally combines Bourdieu’s simplified version with Coleman’s approach. As most migration scholars use this definition, it will form the base of chapters three and four. Further analytical distinctions which are necessary for the contemporary study of social relations and human migrations will be introduced in the next sections. Bourdieu’s structural perspective which goes beyond Coleman’s approach will be the cornerstone of chapter four. Asking what brings discourses on ethnic identity into being, the concept includes the mechanisms creating group membership. Bourdieu’s social field theory and the notion of symbolic power play a major role in this context (see 2.1.1). The focus thus is on social capital as a dimension of social inequality being the result of historical structures or accumulated labour. Social memberships, i.e. “relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 249), are seen as the effect of the struggles over legitimate knowledge within the social field. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Bourdieu’s theory does largely refer to a nation-state framework and does not include migratory phenomena such as the ethnicization of migrant populations. That is why this study ultimately extends beyond Bourdieu’s conceptualisation and will be assisted by Wallerstein’s ideas on the construction of peoplehood in the modern world system (see chapter five).

### 2.2.2 Strong and Weak Ties

From our daily experiences we know that not every contact that we maintain is identical. Usually we distinguish more or less intuitively between close friends or family members and a range of other people we know. These differences refer to the distinction between strong and weak ties, borrowed here from social network analysis. As Mark Granovetter (1973) has pointed out, most sociological studies have focused on strong ties when ana-
lysing small-scale community and support structures as it is assumed that those resources can be mobilised more easily than weak ties. He has brought forward the following definition:

.. the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie (Granovetter 1973: 1361).

In his article, entitled “The Strength of Weak Ties”, Granovetter has nevertheless shown that it is particularly the weak ties that are more valuable for economic or political achievements, rather than the strong ties. While the latter are mainly located within homogenous group of family members and intimate friends, weak ties are linkages between diverse networks and heterogeneous populations. According to Bourdieu’s theory, relations among people occupying similar social positions in the social field tend to be more stable than those cross-cutting social positions (Bourdieu 1985: 726). A similar distinction has also been developed by Woolcock (2001). He differentiates between bonding social capital involving people in similar situations such as family members and close friends, bridging social capital concerning more distant relations of people in similar situations such as loose friends and workmates, and linking social capital which stretches beyond homogenous relations connecting people in dissimilar situations (see Woolcock 2001: 13). These degrees of strengths regarding social ties have to be kept in mind as they are likely to have different effects.

2.2.3 CONCRETE AND SYMBOLIC TIES

A further analytical distinction needs to be made between concrete (or personal) social ties and symbolic social ties. While concrete social relations are personal contacts based on face-to-face knowledge of the respective other, such as relatives, friends, co-workers etc., symbolic social relations do imply an imagination of belonging to each other. This imagination is generally built upon the invention of stories of common origin or a common language, usually referred to as national or ethnic communities (see Anderson 1983). Yet, this imagination is not random or automatically emerging out of cultural similarity. By contrast, the perceived similarity is the product of power relations and symbolic struggles (see 2.1.1). This does also mean that benefits arising from membership in social structures can stretch beyond personal contacts as the felt – or imagined - belonging to one and the same idea (or identity) is enough for the creation of social capital. Thus, besides concrete social ties, symbolic social ties represent a useful resource for the actors who are

13 Nevertheless, we have to consider that imagined communities can also be based on different criteria such as shared experiences, common interests or occupations. This is the case regarding for instance political parties, religions, environmentalists or gay communities.
embedded in these kinds of imagined communities. Nonetheless, symbolic membership and concrete membership can in general be more or less formalized and the respective networks can be more or less dispersed around the globe.

2.2.4 Local and Transnational Ties

Social relations can, of course be more or less concentrated in one area. The social capital classics have largely based their theories on a concept of social capital which is bound to a given locality, i.e. for instance a city, a region or a nation-state. As this paper deals particularly with the transnationalization of social relations paralleling migration from one country to another, we have to make a distinction between so-called local and transnational ties. Even though the term ‘local’ is quite elastic, we define it here as being equal to the territorial entity of the nation-state while ‘transnational’ shall mean that a given individual is in either concrete or symbolic forms connected to people residing in different, at least two, nation-states. As Turkish-German migration is the example of this study, the distinctive reference is based on political boundaries and not on geographical distances, for instance. Indeed, as nation-states differ largely in size, our local ties might be more dispersed than our transnational ties. Further, we should not confuse this distinction with the former one, i.e. that local ties are always concrete whereas transnational ties are always symbolic. New transportation and communication technologies which are increasingly affordable for ordinary people evidently lead to an augmentation of concrete transnational ties. On the other hand, local ties are often based on an imagined nation-hood which does not imply that everybody knows his or her co-nationals. Nevertheless, these dichotomies have to be seen as ideal-typical analytical distinctions being in reality more fluent than presented here.

2.2.5 Benefits and Constraints

Usually, the concept of social capital has been used to study the benefits deriving from social membership. Portes has made the point that “it is our sociological bias to see good things emerging out of sociability; bad things are more commonly associated with the behavior of homo economicus” (Portes 1998: 15). Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) were the first to emphasise that the very same groups, networks and other social structures do often also have constraining, or negative effects for the individual members. This involves not only exclusive effects, i.e. restrictions from access by outsiders, but also constraints on individual freedom regarding different decision-making processes. Further, Portes argues that where feelings of belonging to one community derive from a belief in a common fate
of victimisation and discrimination, these feelings often result in downward levelling norms: individuals who are pursuing adaptive strategies in order to achieve upward mobility, are not respected by the community and the results is an ongoing stagnation. Or else, due to strong norms of mutual obligation, successful members might experience excessive claims from other group members demanding for instance the provision of jobs or financial assistance (see Portes 1998: 15). Even though these mentioned constraints are neither included in our definition nor subject of this study at all, it is important to bear in mind that social relations which are the essence of social capital are not an entirely benign or predictable resource for the individual actor. They can open doors as much as they can close others.

2.3 CONCLUSION

“It may be social, but why is it capital?” (Smith & Kulynch 2002) – many criticisms of social capital theory consider the concept as “colonisation of other social sciences by economics” (Fine 2001: 5). This chapter sought to show that some approaches can indeed be assigned to the idea that social relations are functional in terms of maximising profit and well-being. We have chosen Bourdieu’s conceptualisation as it goes beyond this idea by integrating social membership which is at the heart of social capital into a theory of power, inequality and conflicts over legitimate knowledge. While Bourdieu does not deny that individual actors do accumulate capital of all forms in order maintain or improve their position in the social field, his main interest is to find out why these rules are at play and how they reproduce structures of inequality. Thus, the functional and the structural perspective are not necessarily contradictory, and Bourdieu’s approach which combines both and stretches beyond methodological individualism and cultural essentialism, is chosen to explain the observation of ethnic enclaves in a theoretically comprehensive manner. Due to the constraints of the given material on social capital and the causes of migration, the following two chapters will largely build upon the functional perspective only, while the fifth chapter then considers and reflects the structural implications of ethnic categorizations. Subsequently, we are now proceeding to analyse how social capital relates to migration. The aim is to show that it is not just rationally acting individual migrants who are potentially congregate in ethnic enclaves after their arrival, as implied by the prejudice that we seek to deconstruct. As a consequence, the limitations of classic economic approaches are outlined, while the explanatory strengths of social capital are highlighted.
3. Social Capital and the Causes of Migration

Explaining the causes of migration has for a long time been the realm of economists and demographers. Sociologists were by tradition more interested in studying immigrant incorporation in receiving societies than answering the question why immigration occurred in the first place. Only since the 1980s, the mainstream of the sociological discipline has started to pay more attention to the reasons of human movements (see Schmitter Heisler 2000: 77). That is why the newer models of migration do generally include more sociological elements than the ones that were prominent in the 1970s. Today it is widely acknowledged that “[m]igration is a subject that cries out for an interdisciplinary approach” (Brettell & Hollifield 2000: vii). Since the 1990s, a wide range of academic disciplines being involved in migration theory have selectively adopted theoretical elements of social capital theory. As a consequence, new theories of migration are more differentiated and interdisciplinary than the ones 30 years ago. Presenting this entire development is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to highlight the shortfalls of the classical economic approaches while underscoring the capacities of the new explanations.

3.1 Defining Migration

Migration initially seems to be a fairly unambiguous concept. Hoffmann-Nowotny, one of the earliest sociologists in this field, has defined it most simply as “any change of people’s locality” (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1970: 107). Lee regarded migration as “a permanent or semipermanent change of residence” (Lee 1966: 49), whereas others have put emphasis on the shift of a person’s main residence (see Wagner 1989: 26). While these definitions are certainly indisputable, they leave much space for different interpretations and classifications. Common distinctions are, for instance, internal as compared to international migration (spatial dimension), temporary versus permanent changes of residence (temporal dimension), voluntary versus forced movement (causal dimension) as well as different legal typologies describing the channels for entering a particular nation-state such as labour migration, asylum migration, student migration, family reunification, marriage migration, illegal (or irregular) migration, etc. (legal dimension).

In our common-sensical understanding, we usually tend to link one dimension to another in rather unilinear ways. We often assume, for instance, that labour migrants are always voluntary movers and refugees are always forced movers. Nevertheless, deriving assumptions about the causes of migration from the legal status can be problematic. Force

---

14 Based on own translation of the German original “jede Ortsveränderung von Personen” (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1970: 107)
can in principal be exerted in different ways by a variety of circumstances as well as by different actors and authorities, including one’s own family and community members. Further, legal channels for migration, such as labour recruitment and refugee policies, represent opportunity structures on the macro-level irrespective of whether somebody wants to or somebody has to leave his or her place of origin. Thus, we have to assume that there are always different degrees of force and voluntariness involved and these are not necessarily represented in a person’s legal status. Indeed, forced and voluntary movement might even hardly be conceptually distinct. As social networks are likely to cut across legal distinctions while also following their own inherent dynamics of interpersonal power structures, it will not be convenient to distinguish sharply according to the above mentioned legal or causal typologies in the analysis of the role of social capital in the migration process.

Similarly, the above mentioned dichotomies regarding the spatial and temporal dimensions are not unproblematic either. Due to complicated questions of access, membership and citizenship, international migration is usually given more attention than internal migration. Often internal migration is also called mobility or relocation in order to differentiate it from international movements. However, we have to acknowledge that this type of classification is a construct produced by political (or territorial) boundaries and it does for instance neither involve geographical nor social distances. Indeed, the experiences of internal and international migrants might not be different in any given aspect. This is particularly striking regarding the lack of international attention given to internally displaced people as opposed to international refugees. Further, internal migration often precedes international migration, a process which is called step migration (see Faist 2000: 4). That means that in many cases international migrants do not leave their place of birth for another country immediately, but have shifted internally beforehand - usually from rural to metropolitan areas. Thus, the two categories are indeed more intertwined than one might assume. Yet, this paper will mainly focus on international migration as a central aspect is to show how the dynamics of social networks cross-cut border regulations. Nevertheless, different examples show that social capital also plays a significant role for internal migration (e.g. Bührer 1997).

The distinction between temporary and permanent migration is not uncomplicated either. First of all, migration always involves different degrees of permanence and can therefore hardly be classified by either-or categories. Secondly, what might have been intended as a temporary shift, can resolve in a permanent move as well as vice versa. And thirdly, migration is not necessarily a single event in a person’s life course, but can
theoretically occur many times and involve several places of residence.\textsuperscript{15} Faist understands any person as a migrant who “moves from one country to another with the intention of taking up residence there for a relevant period of time” (Faist 2000: 19). Unlike Treibel (1999: 21) who has put emphasis on the permanency of the change in residence, be it intended in the first place or happening unintentionally, Faist specifies the stretchable notion of “a relevant period of time” by referring to an intention of staying at least three months. In order to exclude short-term visitors and commuters, this paper adopts Faist’s definition. However, as the final focus is the ethnicization of migrant populations, the migrancy is thought to be more relevant the longer the residence lasts.

Besides the already mentioned typologies, there are some reasons to suggest that the notion of migration is not a neutral term, but evokes certain normative connotations. Even though, elaborating on these perceptions in depth would be beyond the scope of this thesis, some evidence suggests that migration seems to be paralleled by negative connotations, i.e. migrants are thought to be unqualified, poor and problematic. The emphasis on the term \textit{high-skilled migration} in recent years, might for instance indicate that the lack of the attribute \textit{high-skilled} means the exact opposite. Further, according to public discourses one comes to assume that being a migrant is an inheritable characteristic. Thus, it is not only people who migrated themselves who are perceived as such, but also their children and grandchildren. This is for instance reflected in notions of \textit{second and third generation immigrants}. These people are born natively, but are made immigrants. Whether this applies to children who have one native and one migrant parent as well, remains an open question.

This paper attempts to use the term \textit{migrant} as neutrally as possible. Consequently, connotations referring to education or financial background are not meant to be included in the definition of a migrant. If a certain social strata of migrants is referred to, this is always indicated by particular attributes. The next chapters will deal with the causes of migration and thus refer only to those who migrated themselves, not their children or grandchildren. As chapter four and five deal with ethnic categorisations, the so-called second and third generations will have to be included.

### 3.2 Classical Explanations of Migration

For a long time, neo-classical economic theory and its precursors have been the dominant and unquestioned tool to grasp the reasons why migration occurs. The rational actor model as an explanation on the micro-level and the so-called push and pull factor model as a macro approach do complement one another in this regard. Our hypothesis starts from the

\textsuperscript{15} In this context different classifications have been developed in recent years in order to describe back and forth movements such as for instance \textit{return migrants}, \textit{circular migrants}, \textit{transilient migrants} and \textit{transmigrants} (see Faist 2000). In the Southern African context, \textit{oscillating migrants} has also been used.
assumption that these approaches have deeply influenced common thinking and that is why migrants are usually perceived as economically thinking independent individuals. That is why they are briefly presented here.

3.2.1 Rational Actor Model

The rational actor model assumes that individual decision making processes follow the principle of economic rationalism. While this approach is an inherent paradigm of micro-economics, it has also gained influence in the sociological discipline in the recent decades (see 2.1.2). Since the end of the 19th century it has regularly been used to explain migratory processes (see Ravenstein 1885/1889; Lewis 1954; Sjaastad 1962; Lee 1966; Todaro 1969; Borjas 1989; Wagner 1989).16

A rational actor is someone whose decisions are based on the goal to make the largest benefit possible – or in economic terminology to maximise utility. Benefits, or utility, is basically understood in monetary terms, meaning that the aim usually is to increase one’s material well-being.17 In order to achieve this end, individuals decide on certain actions according to cost-benefit analysis. This means – to put it simply – that the expected costs are subtracted from the expected benefits. If the result is a positive net return, the individual undertakes the respective action. The underlying assumption is that it is possible to predict human behaviour by drawing from individual cost-benefit calculations.

In reference to migration, internally as well as internationally, the cost-benefit-model predicts that individuals compare for instance the economic and demographic factors in their residential region with other regions. Thus, individuals generally seek to move to places where they can get the highest income given their respective endowments with skills and qualifications, i.e. cultural capital. Consequently, the expectation to earn a higher wage (or to find employment in the first place) are positive incentives for migration, whereas the costs involved with the shift of residence, such as travelling and maintenance costs before finding a job, have to be subtracted. Consequently, migration occurs if the individual decision maker expects a positive net return from shifting to another locality where he/she can potentially convert cultural capital into economic capital.

This explanation of migratory processes has its earliest antecedents in the work of the geographer Ernest George Ravenstein in the late 19th century who sought to establish general laws of migration for example that migration follows economic rationsales and

---

16 The model presented here is definitely the simplest representation of the rational actor. Nevertheless, the same logic also underlies more sophisticated approaches. Yet, many scholars operating under this paradigm have acknowledged that individual decisions are never completely rational (see Lee 1966: 51).

17 Sjaastad also paid significant attention to the non-monetary factors regarding individual comparisons of costs and returns (Sjaastad 1962)
generally occurs from densely to sparsely populated areas and from low income to high income areas (Ravenstein 1885/1889). In this line of thought, the size of the migration flow from one region or country to another is conceptualised as an aggregation of individual cost-benefit analyses. Many migration scholars in the 20th century, particularly economists, demographers and geographers have followed this tradition, which became known as the push and pull factor model.

3.2.2 Push and Pull Factors

The push and pull factor model is not a different explanation of migration, but has to be seen as complementary to the rational actor model. While the latter demonstrates how individuals make decisions, the former explains on which factors their decisions or comparisons are based. Push factors are defined as those characteristics of a particular country’s labour market impelling individuals to leave, such as low wages or low employment rates, while pull factors are the attracting elements of another’s country labour market. Lee (1966) is often seen as the founder of the push and pull model, even though similar approaches have also been debated beforehand.

The economic disparities of national labour markets, such as wage differentials (income-differential hypothesis) and employment rates (job-vacancy hypothesis) are in the centre of neo-classical explanations why individuals migrate. According to the push- and pull model it is thus the countries whose economies are marked by low-wage rates and a labour surplus that are the labour sending countries while capital rich, but labour scarce countries, characterised by high wage and employment rates are the receiving countries. Nevertheless, this relationship is not perfect as different intervening factors, such as politically erected boundaries or geographical distances are also at play. Lee (1966) had further emphasized that information, particular about the country of destination, is always incomplete and it is, thus, the perceptions and expectations that count more than the actual facts.18

In regard to the neo-classical theory of migration, Borjas speaks of an “immigration market” (Borjas 1989: 460) being based on the idea of Adam Smith’s invisible hand while the logic that sorts people into different host countries functions the same way as the international trade of goods. As every individual seeks to maximise material well-being, international migration will tend in the long run to create a global equilibrium of production factors, i.e. a so-called pareto optimum. While the sending countries will experience a decrease in labour supply and an increase in wage rates, the opposite will

---

18 Nevertheless, even though these intervening factors are acknowledged, they do not amplify the push- and pull model in its essence as predictions are based on the actual economic disparities between labour markets.
occur in the receiving countries. State border regulations on immigration or emigration are seen as an intervening, or distorting factor of the immigration market and – according to the neo-classical approach – they should be removed in order to guarantee its regular functioning (see also Castles & Miller 1998: 20-21).

3.2.3. LIMITATIONS

Evidently, the predictions of the neo-classical approach are based on certain assumptions that have been criticised from different angles. Many criticisms regard the push and pull approach as too simplistic which has led to numerous amplifications as well as to the development of several new theories. This section presents some of the main short falls as well as the central theoretical counter stream, i.e. the historical structural approach.

Major criticisms concern the assumptions about human nature as being homogenous and predictable in regard to aspired monetary gains, motivations and taste. The push and pull model cannot explain, for instance, why some of the people living under the same conditions and having the same dispositions leave and others stay. As Massey and his co-workers have pointed out: “Humans might not only be motivated by a desire for gain but also by an aversion to risk, a desire to be comfortable, or simply an interest in building better lives at home” (Massey et. al. 1998: 10). Further, neo-classical theory assumes that the human being is a perfectly mobile and autonomous species taking any decision independently from his or her social context and being always ready to pack his or her luggage and leave if better alternatives come up. However, empirical data cannot sustain these assumptions. The limitations are obvious.

At first sight, some evidence might support the neo-classical approach, for instance that 110 million international migrants reside in the so-called developed world whereas only 64,5 million live in so-called developing countries (IOM 2005: 399). Nevertheless, it is not the countries with the highest wage and employment rates which accommodate the largest stock of immigrants (IOM 2005: 397). Moreover, considering the high economic disparities between countries far more people would have to move than they actually do. The world’s population is indeed quite immobile. In the year 2000, a total number of 175 million people were international migrants. This figure corresponds to only 2,9 % of the world’s population. As Faist explains: “Most potential migrants in the South either migrate internally, or do not migrate at all” (Faist 2000: 4).

---

19 This has been partly corrected by the new migration economics focusing on households as profit maximisers and risk managers instead of individuals.
20 An international migrant is defined here as someone living outside his or her country of birth for more than one year.
Further, we would assume that it is the poorest people of the least developed nations who decide to migrate to countries where the wages are highest in order to gain the maximum net return possible – but this can not be observed. Massey and his co-workers reveal: “A minority of nations accounts for the vast majority of the world’s international migrants and usually they are neither the poorest nor the least developed” (Massey et. al. 1998: 10). Moreover, while one country has high emigration rates, its similarly developed neighbour often has not. Additionally, international migration often also occurs in the absence of wage differentials, or where it does, it ceases before wages have become equal.

Furthermore, no empirical evidence suggests that international migration does indeed lead to a decrease in wage differentials and will in the long run create a global equilibrium (Massey et. al. 1998). As a response to these shortfalls, Piore developed the Segmented Labour Market Theory (Piore 1979; 1983).21 Transnational power structures as well as politically erected incentives and barriers have evidently to be taken into consideration, not only as intervening, but also as steering factors. As Faist has pointed out, the following puzzle needs to be solved: “Why are there so few migrants out of most places?” and “Why are there so many migrants out of a few places?” (Faist 2000: 3-8). The neo-classical theories might at most be a necessary, but evidently not a sufficient explanation.

In this context, one major counterpart to the neo-classical theories is world system theory. The latter considers – in contrast to the former – the unequal distribution of political power across nation-states which perpetuated global capitalist structures and reinforces social inequalities. Migration flows are - according to this theory – not the result of individual decision comparing (random) wage differentials, but occur due to the expansions of markets within global political hierarchies. Therefore, it is generally not the poorest people of the remotest regions who become international migrants, but the ones of intermediate status from areas undergoing social and economic changes. The expansion of global capitalism from the so-called core to the periphery thus reinforces the existing stratified economic order. Migration flows are historically rooted in colonial dependencies as well as massive labour recruitments by industrial states. This explains, for instance, certain directions of migrant flows such as why France has many Algerian immigrants while Germany’s largest groups of immigrants originated from Turkey. The world’s political economy can thus not be excluded from explanations on migration and refugee

---

21 Segmented (or Dual) Labour Market Theory assumes that international labour migration is mainly driven by pull factors, as initiated by the employers or governments of highly industrialised countries. It predicts the splitting of national labour markets into a secure primary sector and an insecure and flexible secondary sector largely based on unqualified temporary migrant workers. As wages in this secondary sector are kept low by institutionalised mechanisms, they do not simply rise in the event of decreasing labour supply whereas they may fall with growing supply of labour. Thus, short-term unqualified migration caters for a need of modern post-industrial economies and is unlikely to lead to a global equalisation of wages.
flows. However, nation-states’ controls can also not be the full explanations. As large numbers of undocumented migrants prove, any border remains porous to some degree (see Massey et. al. 1998: 14).

While neo-classical theories assume an undersocialised version of human nature, an atomic agent always perfectly mobile and entirely informed about opportunities, world system theory conceptualises the oversocialised version of the human being who does not have his own motivations and whose behaviour can be derived entirely from social structures. The former conceptualises movements as entirely voluntary, while the latter sees international migration as driven by structural forces of existing inequalities. But is this indeed an either or decision? In order to account for the complexities that are determining international movements, several new approaches have been developed.

3.3. NEW EXPLANATIONS OF MIGRATION

Common to the different approaches which are here called new explanations of migration is their focus on the dynamics of migrant networks. As we have seen, neo-classical theories accentuate the migrant’s individual decisions, and historical-structural explanations, such as world system theory, emphasise the role of capitalist structures and dependency regimes regarding the initiation of international migration. The new theories now seek to bridge the limitations associated with these approaches by introducing the meso-level, i.e. the role of social capital. Even though the new explanations of migration have only become popular in the 1990s, they are likely to attract more attention in the coming decades. As the world is becoming increasingly interdependent, the role of social and institutional migrant networks and linkages stretching across national borders is unlikely to diminish. Below, some of the new explanations are presented which, however, cannot be considered as conceptually distinct, but complement each other by referring to different analytical dimensions.

3.3.1 MIGRANT NETWORKS AS SOCIAL CAPITAL

The idea that migrant networks function as a kind of social capital is not entirely new. Indeed, processes of chain migration through social networks have been studied earlier on (Thomas & Znaniecki 1918-20; Choldin 1973; MacDonald & MacDonald 1974). However, it is only recently that these networks are concretised as a form of social capital facilitating access, accumulation and conversion into other forms of capital (Massey et. al. 1994).

Douglas S. Massey and his co-workers define migrant networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and
destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (see Massey et. al. 1998: 42). While the earliest emigrants of a given community usually have to face high costs and risks, these barriers successively fall with increasing migratory experiences within the community and, thus, make international migration progressively more likely. These international movements which are based on the successive development of dense migrant networks are also the major element in the processes described as **cumulative causation** (see 3.3.2).

In this context, Massey and his co-workers have shown that the first emigrants from a particular village community in Mexico who migrated to the United States are a highly selective socio-economic group. They are usually male and of working age, often married, and from the middle strata of the local hierarchy: “not so poor that they could not afford the costs and risks of migration, but not so affluent that migration was unattractive” (Massey et. al. 1994: 1492). However, with the evolution of migrant networks able to provide information and support, the migrants become less selective and more representative of the originating community.²²

According to Gurak and Caces (1992), migrant networks fulfil selective as well as adaptive functions.²³ Selectivity determines who migrates where and when while adaptation refers to the post-migration network dynamics experienced in the country or area of destination. As adaptation patterns are not the subject of this study, the focus here is on the selective function. The latter can be subdivided into three different hypotheses: the affinity hypothesis, the information hypothesis, and the facilitating hypothesis (see Gurak & Caces 1992: 156).

(1) The affinity hypothesis assumes that the likelihood of migration is dependent on the density of local networks of relatives and friends in the area of residence: the denser they are, the less likely that a person will leave this place. This is also the answer to the question: “Why are there so few migrants out of most places”? (Faist 2000: 125). Faist points out that for the majority of the world’s population social capital is a local resource that is not easily transferable. Yet, from the affinity hypothesis we can also deduce that the likelihood of migration increases the more networks of relatives and friends are diffused. Once migration, internally and externally, has started, it is thus likely to foster new

---

²² However, these results from the Mexican-United States experience cannot be assigned to the Western European context without further examination. Massey et. al. have indicated that it is only “meant to apply to cases where host-country immigration policies are relatively open, particularly those cases where clandestine migration is feasible” (Massey et. al. 1994: 1496).

²³ Faist (2000) has further added the “diffusion function” – which is actually similar to the selective function and therefore disregarded here – and the “bridging function” which leads according to him to the emergence of transnational social spaces by maintaining linkages between two countries. This phenomenon has in recent times often been looked at regarding the financial flows of remittances from migrants to non-migrants, but this is also not the focus of this study.
movements (2) The information hypothesis emphasises that the development of transnational migrant networks leads to increasingly intense circulation of knowledge - or rather stories - about the opportunities in the prospective area of destination and thus might encourage further migration. Nevertheless, this kind of circulating information is never perfect – as assumed by neo-classical theory - but always based on perceptions and interpretations. As a consequence, decisions can also not be considered as entirely rational or predictable, but have to be seen as in the context of given expectations. (3) The facilitating hypothesis, finally, is the one which has gained most attention in regard to the role of social capital in the migration processes. As mentioned earlier, it starts from the assumption that any act of migration successively reduces the costs and risks of future migrations. Known and reliable people at the destination area supporting new arriving migrants in finding accommodation and jobs, granting financial and psychological support or dealing with bureaucratic procedures, thus, facilitate the decision for migration as well as the settling process.

The interplay between migrant networks and national admission policies has to be considered as another selective factor. Where admission is restricted, family reunification is often the only legal chance to migrate – besides asylum migration and student migration. Thus, these policies boost the formation of migrant networks and processes of chain migration. Even illegal entry or overstaying as a tourist or asylum seeker is that costly and risky that it is unlikely in the absence of kin or friendship support (see Böcker 1994). Consequently, dynamics of migrant networks can even facilitate immigration where it is not officially wanted. In this context, the example of Turkish-German immigration will be presented in the next chapter. Other studies have analysed similar dynamics, such as Italian migration to Australia for example (see MacDonald & MacDonald 1974).

This is however no reason to assume that all non-migrants which are connected to migrants abroad are as likely to make use of these networks. Nor do we have evidence that all migrants are willing to help relatives or friends in their country of origin by letting them for instance marry their daughters or sons. Indeed, Böcker has shown that many settled immigrants in the Netherlands feel that their network of kin is making excessive claims on them and they “are not always willing to act as bridgeheads for prospective migrants” (Böcker 1994: 103). Among those who do, it also happens that newcomers are expected to pay huge bride-prices or they are otherwise betrayed and exploited by their helpers. Even though these practices are not the subject of this study, this is to stress that migrant networks should not be generalized as smoothly functioning ties of mutual assistance. Evidently, power relations between those who govern the access to the desired resource and those making claims are likely to play a decisive role.
Yet, we can conclude that – due to the development of migrant networks which function as a kind of social capital – the perpetuation of international movement is independent from the causes which started it, be it structural or individual. Moreover, Massey and his co-workers have stressed that chain migration does decreasingly correlate with wage and employment differentials as they are successively overshadowed by the falling costs and risks deriving from the growth of migrant networks (Massey et. al. 1998: 45). Due to these network dynamics governments have difficulties to control immigration flows, while family reunification simultaneously enhances their development.

### 3.3.2 Cumulative Causation

While economic terminology often refers to the notion of path dependency to describe how historical circumstances impact on current processes, a similar term – cumulative causation – has been adopted to explain migratory phenomena (Massey 1990). It explains why the expansion and the diffusion of migrant networks lead to self-feeding processes of population movements:

Causation is cumulative in the sense that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely (Massey et. al. 1998: 45-46).

Migration from one particular region to another can thus become independent from the causes that have started it. Through temporary or permanent return migrations, the network structure is constantly expanded and leads to new migrations through different channels. Due to the high costs and risks that the first emigrants face, they are likely to be a highly selective socio-economic group from the middle ranges of the local society. They are able to cover the costs and risks involved with an international movement, but are not that wealthy that they would not have an incentive to aspire to foreign employment. However, as migrant networks and experiences stretch into a broader segment of society, the process of cumulative causation is likely to become less selective (see 3.3.1). Social capital thus makes migration a self-perpetuating process which is likely to expand until it has reached a point of numerical saturation within a particular community. This is usually the case if networks have expanded so widely that everybody in the sending region is connected to someone abroad: only then migration begins to decelerate (see Massey et. al. 1998: 45). This inverted U-Shape of emigration that countries tend to experience in course of their economic development has also been called a “migration hump” (Martin & Taylor 1996).

In this context, Faist has further adopted the principle of cumulative causation to explain

---

24 The notion of community has to be taken as quite elastic in this context. Sometimes it implies the connotation of village or local community (geographical), sometimes it seems to refer to ethnic or religious communities. In any case it is supposed to stress the relevance of connectivity and support structures inherent in concrete and symbolic ties.
the dynamics of immobility: “the more often a person has decided not to migrate, the more likely she is to stay put” (Faist 2000: 124, 129).

Usually the first emigrants do not plan to settle permanently abroad. However, once migratory process has started it leads to irreversible changes in the social structure and the situation in the sending community does not remain as it was. These social changes thus often result in permanent international movements. While the emphasis has been on the spread of migrant networks, other cumulative feedback processes also have to be taken into account: Massey and his co-workers have identified seven other factors being discussed among scholars of migration (see Massey et. al. 1998: 46). One is for instance the redistribution of income through foreign wage labour which makes other community members aspire to increase their socio-economic position, too. Other factors, such as the redistribution of land and the reorganisation of farm production by use of new technologies lead to less need of local labour and the displacements of agrarian labour force which tend to lead to further out-migration. Furthermore, migration might even become a cultural value or a rites of passage for young men who want to increase their social status.

In regard to our study, the most relevant effect of cumulative causation is however the social labelling in the receiving country which Massey et. al. enumerate as the seventh factor (Massey et. al. 1998: 48): certain jobs become increasingly labelled as immigrant jobs and natives are reluctant to fill them. Thus, the structural demand for more immigrants is reinforced. In this context, we can add that this labelling might not only apply to particular occupations, but also to residential areas which become known as ethnic enclaves. The ethnicization of certain migrant populations – understood as social labelling - might thus be a process of cumulative causation resulting from large scale chain migration.

3.3.3 Migration Systems

Migrant networks between two particular countries or regions do not develop randomly, but are largely related to their historical-structural linkages. This has led to the idea of studying the emergence of so-called migration systems which is closely related to the main ideas of world-system theory and goes back to Mabogunje (1970). He suggested studying rural-urban migration as a dynamic process linking and transforming the region of origin as well as the region of destination. Inherent in this suggestion is the critique that studying migration only from the perspective of either the sending or the receiving area is not capable of understanding the processes and effects, that it entails, in their entire scope.

This approach has lately been adapted in order to study international migration (Boyd 1989; Fawcett 1989; Zlotnik 1992). According to Kritz and Zlotnik, “a migration system
includes at least two countries, although ideally, one would include in a system all countries linked by large migration flows” (Kritz & Zlotnik 1992: 3). Zlotnik suggests for instance to study Western Europe as one migration system due to similar histories of labour recruitment, similar levels of economic development and cultural background, as well as geographical proximity (Zlotnik 1992: 32). However, despite the attempt to describe migration systems as dynamic economic, social and political connectedness between sending and receiving countries, there is a strong tendency to name the system after the main immigration and not the emigration region, such as it is the case for the “Western European Migration System” (Zlotnik 1992; Massey et. al. 1998).

The migration system approach suggest that the linkages between countries leading to the emergence of migration systems largely rose out of colonial or other historical, economic or cultural ties which are often characterised by power imbalances. Besides interpersonal relations in migrant networks which link origin and destination countries, Kritz and Zlotnik refer to migrant institutions as intermediaries between the individual and the policy context, fostering the migration systems. They are formal ones such as recruitment agencies as well as informal institutions such as smugglers or marriage arrangers and further a range of humanitarian groups. Some might be institutions operating in support of the migrants, while others take advantage of particular vulnerabilities (Kritz & Zlotnik 1992: 7). These processes have been described as follows:

This imbalance, and the barriers that core countries erect to keep people out, create a lucrative economic niche for entrepreneurs and institutions dedicated to promoting international movements for profit, yielding a black market in migration (Massey et. al. 1998: 44).

Despite the existence of these dependency structures, Massey and his co-workers have emphasised that access to and knowledge of migrant-supporting institutions are also a kind of social capital which can under certain circumstance be mobilised by the interconnected individual migrant or household.

Migration systems thus might operate fairly independently from state operations, using legal channels effectively or circumventing them. That is why, governments have increasingly experienced difficulties in controlling immigration, whereas a black market of international migration emerges simultaneously.

3.3.4 LIMITATIONS

The new explanations of migration are evidently of great heuristic value in regard to our understanding why there are so many migrants out of few places and why so few migrants out of so many places (Faist 2000). While the neo-classical approaches assume individuals or at most households to act independently from each other by comparing labour market
conditions in the area of origin and the prospective countries of destinations, the new explanations focus on the inherent feedback dynamics of social networks as a form of social capital which can lead to exponential growth of migration chains. By implying that each new migrant changes the circumstances under which further migration takes place, they obviously employ a distinct and convincing logic.

Yet, the new explanations of migration can still not be regarded as fully developed theories. Their concentration on the perpetuation of international movements leaves the question open how it was started in the first place. Further, we do not get to know why migration chains develop between some countries, but not between others with similar historical linkages. Considering the fact that Germany’s labour recruitment policies also involved countries other than Turkey, the new explanations do not help us to understand, for instance, why Turkish chains are or were apparently more developed than Italian, Portuguese or Moroccan chains. Consequently, the new explanations do not make migration processes automatically more predictable.

Comprehensive and representative empirical research on this topic is rather limited, particularly in the European context (e.g. Massey et. al. 1998: 130). This might also be related to the problem that social capital is hardly a tangible concept and thus merely measurable. Moreover, it remains questionable whether, for instance, interviewing techniques could give an adequate answer to questions regarding network dynamics. We cannot expect a general high level of reflection on one’s own position within a set of relationships and their impacts on one’s behaviour. In the North American context this problem has been partly solved by showing that knowing someone abroad raises the likelihood of migration and – on the macro level – by exploring the so-called family and friends–effect which results in the empirical fact that new immigrants mostly settle among other immigrants from the community of origin (Massey et. al. 1998: 130). Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether people from certain social positions are more likely to use transnational migrant networks to shift to another country or whether these tendencies can be observed throughout the social field. The empirical assumptions presented in this chapter can hardly be taken as a fact as they are based on very limited and selective studies. We can observe the bias that migrants who move with the help of transnational migrant networks are always from enclosed and well-functioning village communities in developing countries and only the act of migration is thought to change these ideal conditions. Desocialisation through structural modernization, for instance, or the role migrant networks have among urban populations are seldom considered.

Despite these limitations, I regard the new explanations as an important step towards the acknowledgement of the complex dynamics fostering migration flows in today’s world.
They evidently demonstrate that the classical approaches are too simplistic to account for increasing interdependence and the logic of emerging transnational networks.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Neither the classical nor the new explanations of migration can give us an all-encompassing answer why international human movements occur. Whereas the former gives an explanation on the micro-level seeing migration as an individual decision to maximise profit and migration streams as an aggregation of these decisions, the latter does explain why structural network dynamics lead to exponential growth and sustain migration from one particular area to another over time. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but each of them can offer a certain piece of the whole picture. In this context, Massey and his co-workers (1998) have developed a quite convincing synthetic theory of international migration. It is based on a research review of different migration systems across the world and integrates the different approaches which have also been presented in this study.\(^{25}\) The synthetic theory cannot be presented in detail, but in order to identify the role that social capital plays among these theories, I will summarize it briefly.

The initiation of international movements is attributed to the predictions of world system theory, meaning that the rapid transformations which are brought about by the capitalist penetration of certain regions lead to the displacement of people who are consequently in search of new ways of sustaining themselves. Given this situation, the neoclassical model offers a possible explanation for the direction of movements undertaken by the displaced people, i.e. either to urban areas or to international centres where wages and employment rates are expected to be higher. However, this explanation is challenged by the new economics of labour migration suggesting that migration results from households strategies seeking to overcome the risks brought about by market failures rather than from individual decisions to earn higher wages. Segmented labour market theory as well as world system theory can be accredited for the structural demand for immigrants directing them mainly towards global cities to take up a job in the secondary sector. This can also be enhanced through formal recruitment practices.

These approaches represent together the models explaining why migrant flows from so-called developing to so-called developed countries are initiated, but they fail to answer why migration chains develop even in the absence of formal recruitment. The synthetic theory of migration attributes this role to social capital theory as well as the theory of cumulative causation while world system theory and segmented labour market theory...

\(^{25}\) Due to the constraints of this study the New Economics of Labour Migration, the Segmented Labour Market Theory as well as the World System Theory could not be elaborated in a separate chapter, but have been briefly presented under the section ‘Limitations’ of the classical approaches (see 3.2.3).
remain operative in regard to macro-structural global forces of international migration. The role of social capital is the “crucial meso link” (Faist 2000): through the development of transnational kinship and friendship ties, the costs and risks of international movements are reduced and consequently function as a resource which can be mobilised for support in the migration process. Thus, social capital has a selective function which is preconditioned by access to earlier migrant experiences and can be mobilised most effectively in regard to strong transnational ties within the family. This role of social capital is particular crucial in the event of restrictive immigration policies where family reunification is one of the main opportunities to be granted admission. The expansion of migrant networks finally leads to self-sustaining processes of additional movements as each act of migration makes additional movements more likely. Thus, chain migration tends to evolve in the event of historical linkages between countries being characterised by structural imbalances of power. Massey and his co-workers consequently attribute the directions of international migration streams mainly to historical structural forces while leaving its size and selectivity partly to micro, but even more to meso explanations.

In regard to our interest in the relation between social capital, migration and the perception of ethnic enclaves, these results mean the following: only processes of chain migration can be explained with the theories of social capital, cumulative causation and the emergence of migration systems. The causes of migration, in general, are quite complex and manifold, and, moreover, not every act of migration results automatically in chain migration. Yet, where chain migration develops this means, that many, or even most, of the involved individuals in this particular migration stream from one particular country to another are not atomic agents, but connected through strong ties which can be potentially mobilised as social capital. This means that it is possibly not individual migrants congregating in ethnic enclaves, but people who know and support each other since pre-migration times. If this is the case, what does make these areas ethnic, and, moreover, what does make them enclaves? One possible explanation is that chain migration tends to result in the cumulative process of ethnicization in regard to certain jobs as well as residential areas which become socially labelled as migrant jobs or migrant areas. It goes without saying that the attribute migrant is likely to be also replaced by the respective prototypical Other in each national context. This is how the term ethnic comes in. Before considering the ethnicization of migrant populations in detail, we will look at one particular example where chain migration and ethnicization can be observed in order to illustrate the role of social capital in these processes.
4. Example: Chain Migration from Turkey to Germany

The example of Turkish-German migration is chosen to demonstrate the relevance of social capital in sustaining migration from a particular country to another over time. The aim is to highlight the structural context of chain migration in order to show that the involved migrants cannot in general be regarded as independent individual decision-makers and settlers, but have to be seen in relation to their social and symbolic ties.

Turkish immigration to Germany during the past 45 years is largely associated with West-Germany’s labour recruitment practices during the 1960s and early 1970s. In contrast to those states which have traditionally been considered as countries of immigration, such as the USA or Australia, the aim was not to attract permanent settlers, but so-called guest workers who were meant to return after their contract expired. As many labour migrants did not return as expected before and further immigration even continued after labour recruitment was officially stopped in 1973, Germany has often been called a “reluctant land of immigration” (e.g. Martin 1998). Today German residents with Turkish background represent the largest group of immigrants and their descendants. It is estimated that around 3.8 million people from Turkey have migrated to Germany in the past five decades. Approximately 2.5 million have returned while 1.2 million have been born as Turkish citizens in Germany (see AiD 1/2005). Since 2000, children who have foreign parents, but are born in Germany are German nationals if one of their parents has been a legal resident for at least eight years. This applies to approximately 175,000 children so far. In total, roughly one third of all residents with Turkish origins, adults and children have become German citizens, most of them in the past ten years (see AiD 3/2005). Thus, any statistic regarding the Turkish residing in Germany remains ambiguous and has to be taken with a pinch of salt. Most sources assume around 2.6 million inhabitants of Turkish origin, including German citizens. According to official statistics 1,764,318 German residents are Turkish citizens and thus considered as foreigners, while out of this group more than one third has been born in Germany. These apparently confusing figures do already indicate that they are less of an homogenous alien group than popular discourses tend to assume.

26 (a) Besides, other forms of migration such as student migration and asylum migration did also occur, but due to relatively small numbers, these forms will be largely neglected here. (b) Turkish immigration to Germany means – before Germany’s reunification in 1990 - indeed Turkish immigration to West-Germany. While it is evidently a Western bias to think of West Germany as Germany whereas of East Germany as the GDR, it is here for practical reasons that, when referred to in the pre-1990 context, ‘Germany’ means West-Germany.

Not that ambiguous, but a matter of fact, is that permanent immigration occurred, even though governmental policies did not support this type of entry. It will have to be shown that social capital played a crucial role in this context. While this applies to the period before and after the recruitment stop in 1973, the change in entry policy is taken as a distinctive mark regarding Turkish immigration to Germany due to the altered or additional function of migrant networks to support legal entry and residence.

4.1 Establishing the Link: Pioneers and Followers from 1961-1973

Turkish labour migration to Germany was formally initiated with a bilateral recruitment treaty between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany which was set up in October 1961 and with certain amplifications renewed in 1964.28 It is estimated that between 770,000 and 900,000 Turkish workers migrated to Germany until formal recruitment was stopped in 1973 (e.g. Martin 1991: 22-23). Before 1961, only a negligible number of mostly young Turkish men went to Germany for additional training (Martin 1991: 21). In chapter three we have learned that it might be structural as well as individual reasons initiating international movement, but social capital dynamics are likely to sustain it over time. This section thus explores the causes which started the Turkish-German movement by looking at the economic and political conditions. Further attention is then given to factors that explain and demonstrate the emergence of migrant networks such as recruitment structures and the regional and social background of the migrants.

4.1.1 Labour Migration and Its Causes

Most scholars have analysed the causes of labour migration either from the German demand side or from the Turkish supply side. Here we conceptualise international movements from Turkey to Germany as a dynamic process within a certain migration system by looking at the causes from both ends (see 3.3.3).

During the post-war era, in the 1950s, the Federal Republic of Germany experienced its rapid economic growth which has also become known as the economic miracle. Indeed, the miracle was however largely driven by US-American strategic interests in the rapid reconstruction of Germany and its economy and the grant of supports through the Marshall plan. Yet, the phase of economic boom was soon characterised by a shortage of labour, particular after the construction of the Berlin wall which had stopped the migrant flows

---

28 Both Germany and Turkey also established other bilateral labour recruitment agreements. The FRG signed contracts with several other Southern European and Northern African states: Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Turkey furthermore signed contracts with the following other Western European states: Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1964), Austria (1964), France (1965), and Switzerland (1967).
from the German Democratic Republic. As a consequence, West German industries had an increasing demand of foreign labour in order to maximise growth. This mainly concerned construction sites, the coal-mines and the heavy industries.

While Germany had a shortage of labour, Turkey was facing high unemployment pressures. Besides rapid population growth, this social problem mainly resulted from the modernization of the agricultural sector. The share of employment in agriculture decreased from around 77% in 1962 to 65% in 1972 (see Paine 1974: 33). These developments led to the displacement of many rural workers and consequently fostered internal migration to the metropolitan areas. As the rapid growing industrial centres largely failed to provide jobs for the newcomers, the so-called gecekondu population remained without prospects and in miserable conditions.29 One of the rationales of the newly elected Turkish government to encourage emigration was to decrease unemployment and advance economic development through centralised state planning measures (see Hunn 2005: 33-34). Further reasons were the prospects to get potentially free access to the EC labour market, to receive remittances from migrant workers abroad as well as to benefit from the foreign-trained returnees (see Martin 1991: 3). Due to preceding close relations with Germany, the political and public opinion in Turkey was quite positive about this specific recruitment agreement (see Hunn 2005: 35).

According to the neo-classical theory the causes of Turkish-German labour migration must be related to differences in wage and employment rates. Unmistakably, Germany experienced a shortage of labour in the 1950s while Turkey faced a surplus. Moreover, at that time Turkey had the lowest per capita GNP in Europe (see Paine 1974: 27) while Germany was relatively well-off. While these unequal economic settings might have had an impact on individual migrant’s decision, they are evidently not just random differences, but can rather be attributed to the historical-structural conditions that have been theorized by world system theory. The displacement of workers in the agricultural sector did not result from a lack of development, but from the penetration of capitalism: thus, from development itself. In this context, it remains doubtful whether individual decisions to migrate can be considered as free and rational choices among numerous options. By contrast, it is more likely to be a funnel-like pattern: those who have lots of options can calculate and compare on a comparatively rational basis, while those who have limited prospects, are likely to take any given opportunity. That means that some individuals have more agency than others. In fact, historical structural conditions of unequal power relations and social stratification do restrict the dominated parts to a very limited amount of

---

29 *Gecekondu* is the Turkish word for *built over night* and refers to suburban settlements which mainly consist of provisional houses.
opportunities. Paine has pointed out that the Turkish government was rather forced to cooperate with receiving countries such as Germany as long as there were unemployment pressures and a foreign demand for migrant labour. As comprehensive restrictions on emigration could barely be successful in the case of Turkey, cooperation meant to maintain an influence on the selection of the migrant workers who left the country (Paine 1974: 24). The aim was to send mainly unskilled workers who would be trained in order to contribute to Turkish economic growth after their return. The recruitment practices and the selectivity of the migrants due to social network dynamics will be the theme of the next sections.

4.1.2 Selectivity and Social Capital

As pointed out in chapter three, social capital can be regarded in terms of its selective as well as its adaptive function. Most studies have focused on the latter, i.e. the question what kind of social capital fosters and what kind hinders the incorporation of immigrants in the receiving society (e.g. Schöneberg 1993; Nauck 1986; Özel & Nauck 1987; Janßen & Polat 2006). This function is disregarded here as it neglects the structural implications of group membership (see chapter five). Instead, the question is which factors contributed to the emergence of migration chains and to which extent were social networks relevant regarding the selection of labour migrants.

Interestingly, comprehensive data on this issue is quite rare. This might be symptomatic for the two facts that – during the 1960s and 1970s - the new explanations of migration were not of paradigmatic relevance and, moreover, it was largely assumed that the migrants were just temporary workers. Apparently, scholars did only discover this research issue after they had turned out to be permanent settlers and were publicly perceived as a social problem. Indeed, even most of the labour migrants themselves did not plan to stay permanently. By contrast, it appears to have been one of the main motivations to accumulate savings by earning foreign wages in order to build a better life at home after spending some time abroad (e.g. Hunn 2005; Pagenstecher 1996). Most of the few studies which have been conducted thus use retrospective surveys based on highly selective samples in areas which have been labelled for being hot spots. Nevertheless, there are some indicators which may allow us to draw conclusions on the extent that the resources that we call social capital contributed to chain migration between Turkey and Germany.

Recruitment Structures

In this context, it is worthwhile looking at the main recruitment mechanisms: anonymous recruitment, nominative recruitment, and tourist entry. The official procedure was the following. In order to recruit labour migrants, the German Federal Labour Office
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; BfA) and the Turkish Employment Service (TES) established labour offices in several urban centres in Turkey. German employers could request for specific numbers and required skills, but the requests were only transmitted to the Turkish offices when no privileged workers, i.e. from the EC recruitment countries, were available. The TES maintained lists of people who were wishing to emigrate. Requirements were to be within a certain age span – depending on the demanded skill level - to have basic literacy and to be of good health. As the waiting lists got longer, the TES gave priority to people from certain areas, i.e. less developed regions, members of Village Development Cooperatives and official disaster areas such as earthquake regions. Thus, some people with relatives or friends in these priority areas registered there under the auspices of a local muhtar to increase their chances to be selected (e.g. Faist 2000: 176).

Besides this anonymous recruitment, German employers could also nominate particular persons to fill their vacancies who would consequently also be given the relevant official entry permits. Yet, this recruitment practice was only open for large companies with more than 500 employers (see Wilpert 1992: 184). It was mainly successful as workers who had already been employed abroad, i.e. transnational social capital, functioned as brokers and gatekeepers. They did not only provide information to non-migrants while being on vacation, for instance, but could also trace vacant jobs and convince their employers to nominate their relatives and friends who were wishing to emigrate. Thus, only the availability of transnational social capital (affinity-hypothesis) made it possible for individual migrants to be informed about particular job vacancies and conditions (information-hypothesis) and to gain officially access to the German labour market (facilitating-hypothesis). The monetary as well as the psychological transaction costs of such a movement were reduced as the entry and work permissions were issued, the transportation was paid and a familiar person would await the newcomer at the destination who would even most likely be working for the same employer.

Another, third way to be employed in Germany as a labour migrant was to enter with a tourist visa, seek employment and then regularize one’s status. This practice was tolerated by the German authorities due to the high labour demands. Thus, this was an opportunity for people wishing to migrate, but not fulfilling the official selection criteria such as age, literacy etc., not being registered in one of the priority areas or not knowing someone abroad in order to be nominated. Estimates regarding the share of this type of unofficial entry vary between 20 % and 40 % of the officially recruited labour migrants (Martin 1998: 29). Most of them moved in times of high labour demand and to lesser extent in

30 For a discussion on these practices of privileging EC citizens vis-à-vis Turkish and African labour migrants see Hunn (2005).
years of low demand (see Paine 1974: 60-61). Data on the extent to which migrants who used the unofficial channels were encouraged by the support of their relatives and friends abroad is not available. However, as has been pointed out by various scholars, once migrant networks had emerged relatives and fellow-villagers are likely to have played a decisive role in protecting the illegal stay once the tourist visa had expired (e.g. Faist 2000; Böcker 1994).

According to data from the BfA, 66 % were officially recruited and one third out of these through nominative recruitment. That means that around 60 % in total were either nominated or used the unofficial channel by migrating as tourists (see Wilpert 1992: 184). Moreover, the German recruitment system favoured Turks to work in large companies where the nomination practice was also quite prevalent. Thus, these structures contributed to regional clusters. Migrants who knew each other from Turkey, could comparatively easy settle and work in the same region as friends and family members. In consequence, the described routes through which the Turkish migrants could enter the German labour market show that social capital could be effectively employed, once pioneer migrants had established the linkages which paved the roads for others to follow.

From Rotation to Family Reunion

Another factor that is likely to have contributed to the development of migration chains was the growing length of stay of the labour migrants which led to the subsequent immigration of family members. In order to avoid long-term stays, the entry permits were primarily only issued for one year. This was the so-called rotation model. After one year, the recruited workers were supposed to be replaced by other, i.e. new labour migrants. However, this so-called rotation model turned out to be inconvenient for most employers for whom it was rational to renew the contracts with workers who were once trained on their particular job. Moreover, protests also arose from the side of the trade unions, the sending state as well as the labour migrants themselves. As a consequence, prior restrictions on renewal of entry permits were eased. Due to the extended length of stay, the legal status of the labour migrants was improved and – preparing for spending some time abroad – the spouses and children followed.

Information and Perception

The mentioned recruitment structures and other chances for the use of social networks would not have been relevant without the individual migrant’s or household’s willingness to migrate. One major element that is likely to have increased the keenness of individuals to migrate to Germany was - besides economic necessities -, the intense exchange of
information between migrants, former migrants and non-migrants. To some extent this can obviously be attributed to high rates of immigration and remigration. Straube reports in this context that stories about the experiences in Germany were predominantly positive during the time of labour recruitment and even until the early 1980s (Straube 1987: 218). Yet, this information was not necessarily realistic as there was a general tendency to transmit success stories while brushing negative experiences under the carpet. In contrast to the classical push and pull model it was thus not the actual conditions at the place of residence and the place of destination which were compared, but the perception of these factors. In the 1970s West-Germany had become a myth which did largely fuel the eagerness to migrate.

**Regional and Social Background**

Most attention in regard to Turkish-German migration has been given to the regional origin in correspondence to the skill level of the labour migrants. Yet, the information on this matter is quite ambiguous. While some sources provide evidence that the labour migrants and their families were mainly East Anatolian peasants, others describe them as a highly selective group with skills above the average level. As already mentioned, large-scale systematic surveys have not been conducted. Most studies, carried out mainly in the 1980s, focused on one particular area of residence in Germany, which is known as an *ethnic* cluster, and evidently on one particular moment in time. Thus, these figures neither include the entire distribution nor the fluctuation of the migrants. Those persons who are not *visible* – meaning that they are not associated with Berlin-Kreuzberg, Duisburg-Marxloh or any other residential area that is labelled a *Turkish enclave*, or those who returned permanently to Turkey at some point, are not included in the samples. This might have led to certain selective effects of the findings. Moreover, most studies were conducted with quite a different research interest and, thus, they are hardly comparable with each other. That is why we have to consider the findings with a pinch of salt.

What is quite indisputable is that the early pioneers were mainly men aged between 20 and 40. They had at least primary school education and relatively high occupational skills as compared to the average in Turkey. Moreover, most of them originated from urban areas while only 17% were rural migrants (Faist 2000: 175). While at this stage, most of these labour migrants were recruited anonymously without having any connection to the receiving county, by the mid-1960s transnational migrant networks expanded in the course of further labour recruitment. Some studies provide evidence that it was mainly rural and village populations who engaged in chain migration (e.g. Gitmez & Wilpert 1987). Others have simultaneously pointed out that limited resources, i.e. mainly cultural and economic
capital, increased the likelihood of migrating through networks due to the aspect of convertibility of social capital (Özel & Nauck 1987; Faist 2000: 178). In general, the regional aspect and the resource aspect propose the same thing: that rural populations tend to have large-scale social capital to mobilise while being constrained by scarcity of money and education. Whether this is a wide-spread bias or not, cannot be proven here, but it explains why studies on this topic seem to concentrate on the question where the migrants actually originated from.

Faist has pointed out that the social capital which has fostered Turkish-German migration chains mainly derives from a solidarity which is inherent in so-called hemşeri ties. These are symbolic ties which are based on common communal or regional origin and extend narrow definitions of kinship even though they are also thought of as a primordial form of community. Indeed, hemşeri ties and friendship ties are thought to be closely related (Faist 2000: 172-173). In the case of rural-urban migration within Turkey, hemşeri ties played for instance a decisive role in providing support to newcomers (see also Karpat 1976). However, Faist has also further stressed the point that these ties are not in general free of any hierarchies and power structures. By contrast, depending on the social and political structure of the emigration region, the emerging migrant networks are rather characterised by patron-client relationships. The patron is clearly superior in terms of the goods and services he can provide, while the client’s duty is to grant respect and loyalty. In the absence of welfare state provisions, these ties are an essential resource to those being disadvantaged in terms of educational skills or financial background.

Well-respected figures, in regard to the question of origin, are official recruitment statistics which do, however, exclude those labour migrants who were not recruited through official measures, but entered Germany as tourists or illegally. This is significant as the latter could also include persons who would not have qualified in the official procedure due to age, skills, literacy or health reasons. Moreover, official statistics do only register the place of departure, but not the place of birth. As a consequence, the extent of two-step migration which follows the pattern of internal migration prior to international migration has not been captured (see Wilpert 1992: 179). Abadan-Unat had for instance found out that only 17 % of the migrants from Istanbul region were born there and 46 % of them were just short-term residents (1972, ref. Wilpert 1992). Other sources also support the evidence that step-migration was a common phenomena among the labour migrants (Wilpert 1992: 179; Goldberg et. al. 2004). Özel and Nauck (1987) studied the origins of Turkish men and women in Nordrhine-Westphalia and they came to the conclusion that

\[31\] The information provided by studies in Turkish language can unfortunately only be provided if they have been referred to in German or English texts on the topic.
nearly half of the migrants were born in villages, but only quarter migrated directly from their place of birth. Less than one-fifth was born in large cities while only 6% were from large metropolitan areas (Özel & Nauck: 68). Other findings support the trend that early migrants were likely to depart from urban areas while later, towards the end of the 1960s, the number of migrants directly moving from villages and small towns - without intermediary step migration - increased (Paine 1974: 75-76, 86; Gökedere 1978, ref. Wilpert 1992). As most Turkish labour migrants entered Germany between 1969 and 1973, this trend appears to be quite significant. Faist has interpreted this trend as such that with the linkages that the pioneers had established, step-migration became unnecessary (Faist 2000: 180).

Even though these findings might appear quite convincing, we have to remind ourselves that the sources are questionable. There is obviously a danger to think of villagers as unqualified, traditional and clan focused whereas of urban people as skilled, modern thinking and individualized. Having found evidence that a large share of Turkish labour migrants originated from rural areas makes us thus inclined to think that this is the cause of any problem: chains, enclaves, backwardness etc. We should be careful in taking them for granted and concluding that ethnic enclaves are the result of clan focused peasants migrating in chains. Nevertheless, the findings which have been presented in this section are convincing enough to believe that Turkish migration to Germany has not just been the result of independent individual decisions. Besides the role of macro-structural economic and political conditions, social capital inherent in migrant networks is likely to have played a significant role in determining selectivity and exponential growth of migrant populations. Moreover, it seems that some populations were more prone to use established migrant networks than others.

4.2 MAINTAINING THE LINK: THE USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS SINCE 1973

In November 1973 West-Germany stopped the recruitment of new foreign labour migrants due to the recession caused by the oil crisis. The aim of the German government was to decrease the number of foreign workers in the long run. At that time 910,500 Turkish citizens were living in Germany for whom it was consequently no longer possible to return to Turkey in order to see their families and then re-enter again later. They had to choose whether they want to return forever or whether they want to stay. While some of the former guests returned home, others had found their home in Germany in the meanwhile and prepared for a long-term stay by having their family members join them in Germany. The latter pattern particular applied to the migrants of Turkish origin whose numbers increased by 436,000 persons between 1973 and 1981 while the number of Spanish and
Greek labour migrants decreased. In order to emphasise the absurd expectations that people could be borrowed when needed and sent back when becoming superfluous, the author Max Frisch has coined the phrase: “We called for workers, but human-beings came!”

4.2.1 FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND OTHER CHANNELS

Turkish-German immigration through the channel of family reunification did not only begin with the official recruitment stop, but became evidently more important as other channels were closed. Since then, labour migration has been limited to high-skilled experts, scientists and so-called seasonal workers. The illegal or tourist entry route was no longer an officially tolerated practice and, thus, more risky. As a consequence, family reunification became the prominent pattern of Turkish immigration to Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, due to comparatively restrictive policies, only spouses and children under 18 years were granted permission. Since 1981, the age limit for children is 16 years. In 1983/84 the German government undertook measures to make the former labour migrants and their families return, but persuaded only a negligible number.

After the Turkish military coup in 1980 an increasing number of – mostly Kurdish – refugees sought asylum protection in Germany. Since then, the number of asylum applications by Turkish citizens always ranked second or third (e.g. Faist 2000: 171). Moreover, in the recent decades marriage migration gained increasing relevance (see Goldberg et. al. 2004). This mainly concerns the so-called second generation of immigrants who has been raised in Germany. According to the statistics maintained by the German embassy in Turkey, around 16,000 Turkish citizens yearly migrate to Germany as the spouses of settled immigrants or their descendants. Of these 54.8 % are women while 45.2 % are men.

Today, only one fourth of all German residents of Turkish descent came originally as so-called guest workers. 53 % have immigrated in the context of family reunification while 17 % were born in Germany. More than half of the adults have been residing in Germany for more than 21 years. While at the beginning Turkish immigration to Germany was largely male dominated, today, the number of males exceeds the number of females by only 5 %. Around two thirds of all Turkish citizens residing in Germany are younger than thirty years (see Goldberg et. al. 2004: 17).

---

32 Due to the given constraints of this paper, a comprehensive debate on return migration and the measures undertaken by the German government to foster return are largely neglected here.
33 The first ranks were usually subject to changes according to current war and crisis areas.
34 Marriage migration does imply that the bond of matrimony has been finalised by German authorities, either in Germany or at a German embassy. Family reunification applies to those migrations where the foreign authorities finalised the marriage.
4.2.2 Social Capital and Cumulative Causation

In general, the literature assumes that after the recruitment ban, the Turkish population from rural and village origins increased exponentially as compared to urban populations. Wilpert (1992) emphasises that the workers from the poorest regions in Turkey were least likely to have their family with them abroad and thus had the greatest potential for future immigration to Germany due to the large numbers still residing in Turkey. Thus, it is argued further that the immigrants from rural origins had more effective social capital at hand due to the larger size of the nuclear family and stronger community bonds as compared to urban populations. This finding is supposed to be particularly relevant as arranged marriages were and still are a wide-spread practice and provided opportunities for relatives in the first place, but also for fellow villagers (Wilpert 1992: 180). Consequently, this is taken to explain why marriage migration from Turkey remains a prominent practice. Yet, we remain sceptical. The argument somehow appears too linear to be realistic: most migrants had a rural background and that is why they have strong community bonds at their disposal. Consequently, they migrated in chains and maintain the bonds to their community of origin by arranging marriages to increase further migration. In the light of lacking comprehensive and reliable data, this seems to be an uncritical generalization.

It is not possible to prove the contrary here, but we can raise some counter voices. Sedef Koray has made the point that the structure of the migrant networks closely interacts with restrictive immigration policies in Europe (Koray 1999: 15). Thus, the closure of legal entry apart from marriage migration and family reunification, might foster the practice of arranged marriages as prospective migrants take advantage of the opportunities left open by the authorities. This is also the argument that has been adopted by Böcker (1994) regarding migration from Turkey to the Netherlands. She further points out that considering that emigration pressures in Turkey have remained high - migrants abroad often face excessive claims from their kin and community members, not only for marriages but also for financial support. On the other hand, the settled migrants can demand high bride prices from the young men from Turkey who want to get married in Western Europe (Böcker 1994: 97-99). Thus, Böcker wants to stress that the migrant networks do not operate outside broader power structures, and restrictive state regulations are likely to be complicit in stabilising these structures. Yet, in this case as well, we should be careful with generalizations. The vision that a whole young generation, and particular women, are driven into arranged marriages with their kin from remote areas in Turkey, has to be seen in the context of any other group-based stigmatisation.

Nevertheless, most scholars support the point that rural community ties have fostered chain migration, the maintenance of ties, and the emergence of residential clusters.
Moreover, Gitmez and Wilpert (1987) assumed that the strengths of ties did not only derive from rural community origin, but also from being considered an ethnic minority in Turkey. Ethnic minorities had apparently more effective social capital to mobilize than the majority population(s). Does this imply that there is a relation between ethnicization and the selectivity for chain migration due to the degree of social capital? Thomas Faist has seen the processes of cumulative causation over the last decades as a function of the strength lying in hemşeri ties: “The higher the density and strength of hemşeri, the higher the rate of emigration from particular communities and the higher the degree of residential clustering” (Faist 2000: 182). Yet, it has to remain an open question whether hemşeri ties refer to village communities, ethnicized communities or any other base of group solidarity.

Nevertheless, some indicators suggest that migrants who participate in chains do also settle in similar areas in the receiving society. A study in Berlin found for instance regional clusters of villagers from East Anatolia, the Black Sea and many Turkish of Kurdish origin (Gitmez & Wilpert 1987). Others approached the relation between chain migration and residential clusters by asking settled migrants whether they live close to their relatives or not. According to a comparative study conducted in 1981/82 in Frankfurt and Hanau, more than 70 % of the residents with Turkish background had relatives in Germany (apart from those with whom they eventually live in the same household) while half of them even had relatives at the same place of residence (Schöneberg 1993: 115). Even though there is a general trend in the literature to support the formation of residential clusters as a result of chain migration – actual evidence is rather limited (e.g.Wilpert 1992; Faist 2000; Özel & Nauck 1987).

4.3 Current Debates: Do Turkish Immigrants Live in Ethnic Enclaves?

The example of Turkish-German migration has demonstrated that this particular stream can indeed be characterised as chain migration. Transnational network patterns between migrants, non-migrants and future migrants could be mobilised as a form of social capital informing and facilitating the migration process. Among the factors which enhanced the formation of migrant networks are, for instance, the nominative recruitment practices as well as the tolerated tourist entry, transmitted success stories, extended length of stay and growing numbers of family reunion. In general, family reunification policies – before and after the ban of recruitment – and marriage migration did further foster international migration with the help of strong social ties. Most of the studies on Turkish-German migration found a high share of rural populations – particularly towards the end of recruitment -, which are supposed to have stronger community ties as well as larger families and, thus, more effective social capital than urban populations. Moreover, they are
described as being more dependent on their social capital due to limited other resources in terms of economic and cultural capital. That is why, migration through the social networks was a major opportunity regarding strategies of converting this type of capital into economic capital. All these factors led to an exponential growth of the Turkish population in Germany even though permanent immigration was not supported by official policies.

This result, namely that many Turkish immigrants residing in Germany did not migrate as independent individuals, but in connection to and/or dependence on each other, is usually seen as the logical cause for the emergence of so-called ethnic enclaves. Studies seeking to find out which particular circumstances led to problems of immigrant incorporation, thus take an example of an ethnically labelled residential area and elaborate either on the extent of chain migration – mainly in the 1980s – or, today, on the extent to which Turkish persons have only contacts with other Turkish or also with Germans.

From my point of view, there is a major problem regarding these particular research practices – and this problem relates to the concept of social capital. We have seen, that chain migration was mainly driven by the social capital inherent in strong, concrete and transnational social ties. Faist (2000) has demonstrated that support in regard to Turkish migration mainly derives from the strengths of hemşeri ties. As these ties are based on kinship and/or an imagination of common descent, they obviously also have a symbolic dimension. Yet, they do not equal national ties. A Turkish labour migrant in Germany did not help somebody else in Turkey to follow him/her, because he/she is also Turkish. The symbolism of ties which potentially makes out social capital did not come from an imagined national community, but from village, regional or ethnic communities within Turkey, i.e. hemşeri ties. Therefore, I am arguing that the type of social capital that is driving chain migration is different from the type that is attributed to the ethnic enclave in public German discourse. Having established a correlation between social capital and migration which leads to chain migration and having shown that this is likely to be the case in regard to Turkish-German migration is consequently not enough to explain the ethnic enclave. We have emphasised the relevance of social structures as opposed to methodological individualism inherent in classical economic approaches to migration. Yet, the structural reference point of what is perceived as one community apparently changes throughout the migration processes.

That is why, we cannot just look at the dynamics of social capital from a functional perspective, like Coleman and Putnam, but have to focus on the structural approach to social capital and social group membership.
5. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE ETHNICIZATION OF MIGRANT POPULATIONS

Social capital is based on membership in social groups or networks and, up to now, we assumed that social groups exist without questioning what makes for their existence. Yet, this question becomes important if we consider that the reference point of apparently relevant membership changes throughout the migration process. While Turkish-German migration was mainly driven by social capital inherent in hemşeri ties, in the German context ethnic enclaves, understood as agglomerations of social capital, are supposed to consist of national, ethnic, migrant or Turkish ties (which indeed seem to be used as synonyms). Turkish immigrants are thought of as a culturally homogenous community with strong ties of mutual support and assistance.

The aim of this chapter is to challenge the assumptions of culturalism, i.e. essentialised difference – here based on national origin - in order to show the relevance of social structures regarding the making of peoplehood. Ethnic categories of symbolic belonging, whether referred to as hemşeri in Turkey or as Turkish in Germany, are not thought of as cultural facts, but as socially constructed artefacts which do not emerge randomly. In chapter three we concluded that chain migration develops only where historical structures of inequality – theorized by world system theory – have initiated these exponentially growing movements. That is why these structures obviously are also at play regarding the social construction of ethnic groups as well as the labelling of certain residential areas as ethnic areas. Due to the constraints of Bourdieu’s theory which refers solely to the national context, but not to global interdependencies, world system theory is again used as a macro-structural framework. The processes of classifying ethnic groups shall be called ethnicization. This further indicates the tendency to search for explanations to several social problems by referring to ethnic categories.

5.1 DEFINING ETHNICITY

According to Max Weber, “[w]e shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration” (Weber 1968 [1921]: 389) He further continued that “[i]t does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (ibid.). Indeed, one of the main controversies is whether ethnicity is a primordial characteristic or socially constructed. Yet, as Weber’s definition shows, ethnicity can be socially constructed upon the idea of primordial ties. This emphasis on either actual or imagined common ancestry has not been followed up by the mainstream of the sociological discipline which focuses on the aspect of shared culture.
5.1.1 **Culturalism**

While references to shared genetics are commonly associated with notions of race, definitions of ethnicity seem to avoid these connotations by stressing the relevance of shared culture. Farley has, for instance, defined an ethnic group as “a group of people who are generally recognized by themselves and/or by others as a distinct group with such recognition based on socially or culturally characteristics” (Farley 1995: 6). Yet, if beliefs in belonging by shared cultural practices would be the only characteristic that makes up an ethnic group, any soccer club could claim to be one. We will have to acknowledge that our common understanding rather tends to be constructed upon a bio-cultural version of ethnicity. It is largely assumed that people who are thought of – or think of themselves – as sharing cultural similarities such as language and customs can also be distinguished by common ancestry and even physical features. Moreover, associations with a certain territory as so-called homeland are also frequently found in this context. T.K. Oommen has, for instance, argued that ethnicity is usually created through a rupture with territory: “ethnicity implies dislocation from one’s original country, region, or nation, that is, homeland” (Oommen 1990: 33). In this context, shared culture and shared territorial origin are often seen as the complementary basis of ethnicity which tacitly also connotes the one-nation-one-culture model. These examples demonstrate that a concept of ethnicity which is defined as cultural differences always runs the danger of being essentialised. If culture is constructed as a primordial asset, instead of being fluid and multifaceted, ethnicity is nothing else than the notion of race in a new guise.

In consequence, we should not generalize that a reference to blood ties represents the primordial definition whereas culture does always presume the constructivist version. As these diverging ideas of ethnicity have shown, social constructions can build upon the idea of primordial ties, as is the case in Weber’s definition, while culture can also appear fixated as a primordial fact. The latter is, for instance, evident in the assumption that culture is the homogenous basis of a national society and being born in this society makes each of us what we are - and not only us, but also our children and grandchildren who will inherit the cultural characteristics from us. Culturalism as an understanding of ethnicity thus tends to homogenize migrant populations according to the assumed nation-state-culture where they originated from.

5.1.2 **Structuralism**

Whereas most definitions of ethnicity focus on the question which particular features are necessary to make out an ethnic group, such as language, common history, shared values,
symbols, etc., structuralism is more interested in the non-observable factors which have led to the emergence of the phenomenon. As we have seen, most concepts of ethnicity presume that the ethnic group has created itself. Others ascribe additional relevance to external ascriptions, but these mutually reinforcing dynamics largely seem to be subject to arbitrariness. Structuralism strongly doubts that ethnicity is primarily self-defined and a random by-product of social interactions. This becomes evident if we look at the context in which this term is used. Whom do we mean if we speak of ethnic conflict, ethnic food, ethnic minorities? Why do we refer to the Chinese and Indian diaspora, but not to the British diaspora which is – understood as such - likely to be the largest in the world. In this context, Jan Nederveen Pieterse has put forward the argument that “some nationalities are more ethnic than others” (Pieterse 2003: 34). And he further stated that “[e]thnicity is a marker of cultural distance, but not every cultural distance qualifies. A country’s or a people’s location in the hierarchy of power also matters” (ibid.). In accordance with Bourdieu’s theory of the social field, the structural argument adopted here thus is that the making of an ethnic group is the result of inequality, power relations and the exertion of symbolic violence. Ethnic groups would not be relevant without experiences of oppression, discrimination, persecution and displacement – be it due to conquest, colonialism, labour recruitment or other forms of structural violence. If the members of an ethnic group consider themselves as culturally different, this is not an expression of choice, but indicates that symbolic power, defining legitimate knowledge, has been successfully exerted.

In the Marxist tradition of structuralism, the relevance of class maintains historical supremacy over categories of cultural difference. The capitalist classes dominate not only the means of production, but also hold the monopoly over legitimate knowledge, instrumentalise group difference for the sake of exploiting the Other and benefiting their own class position (see Malesevic 2004: 17). In Bourdieu’s framework the relationship between culture and structure is more complicated as he has added the relevance of the dimensions of social and cultural capital ownership. Thus, the structural imbalances do not correspond to symbolic power in a linear fashion. The educated middle-classes, or cultural capitalists, do for instance maintain their own strategies of striving for a better position while, nonetheless, reproducing the existing social order. While for the ethnically labelled groups, the cause of affiliation usually is powerlessness and marginalisation, this does not mean that feelings of belonging cannot become a power in its own right. Solidarity is a form of social capital which can be mobilised as a resource in order to be converted into other forms of capital. This might be the reason why the ethnicization of migrant populations is so closely related to perceptions of agglomerated social capital which expresses itself in the assumption that they only socialise among themselves and form
ethnic enclaves. Thus, structuralism does not assume that ethnic groups are a pure
discursive invention having no impact on the real world. Indeed, ethnicization as well as
racialization are likely to become a self-feeding processes. The structural argument will be
further developed in the following sub-sections.

5.2 Power, Inequality and the Genesis of Ethnic Groups

As pointed out in chapter one, Bourdieu’s structural framework is largely limited by a
methodological nationalism. Even though his approach is convincing in pointing towards
the interrelationship between the structure of inequalities and the reproduction of cultural
difference, these processes are thought to take place within a national container model.
Yet, structures of inequality and ideological struggles do not exist isolated from global
interdependencies which becomes particular evident in the context of migratory processes.
In consequence, the ethnicization of migrant populations has to be examined in a broader
framework. The following sections are an attempt to isolate the factors contributing to the
making of an ethnic group from the structural perspective. It is mainly Wallerstein’s work
on the modern world system as well as his essay on “The Construction of Peoplehood:
Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity” (Wallerstein 1991) which will complement Bourdieu’s
framework presented in chapter one. Yet, due to given constraints and the complexity of
the issue, it is not possible to go into much detail.

5.2.1 Core-Periphery Relations

According to Wallerstein, race, nation and ethnicity are three words which represent all the
construction of peoplehood as a political phenomenon based on inventions of “pastness”
(Wallerstein 1991). Despite constant changes of the content of pastness, it is
conceptualised as inherently stable and thus, serves as a tool for the construction of
identity. Logically, it does not make any difference whether pastness is constructed upon
genetical continuity (race), political continuity (nations) or cultural continuity (ethnicity).
Yet, the historical structures of the capitalist world-economy have led to the emergence of
three different notions which are however, ideologically intertwined.

At the basis of Wallerstein’s conception of the capitalist world economy is the re-
lationship between core and periphery which is characterised by a comparatively stable
axial division of labour. The core is characterised by a high level of technology, the manu-
facturing of complex products and the development of a sophisticated service sector while
the periphery supplies the core with raw material, agricultural products and cheap labour.
Moreover, some zones can be characterized as semi-peripheral as they function as a core
for the periphery and as a periphery for the core zones. This world system is nevertheless not entirely static. Yet, despite eventual changes in the position of cores and peripheries, the hierarchical logic remains the same.

Due to several reasons, core zones and peripheral zones tend to be spatially differentiated (see Wallerstein 1991: 79) which can be traced back to the expansion of Europe-centred capitalism in the 19th century. The invention of race as being constructed upon different sets of physical features, has been a means of the power holders, here the colonialists, to justify this unequal division of labour by referring to the Other as inevitably different and inferior by nature. People’s skin colour became a legitimate criteria of distinction, dominance and the maintenance of the social order. In Wallerstein’s own words: “Race, and therefore racism, is the expression, the promoter and the consequence of the geographical concentrations associated with the axial division of labour” (Wallerstein 1991: 80). Thus, this is what Bourdieu expressed in regard to the exertion of symbolic violence. Stuart Hall has further supported this point – by referring to the work of Jacques Derrida - that binary oppositions, such as race or gender categories, seldom emerge as a neutral form of distinction, but as defined by the rulers. Thus, they embody the structures of domination (Hall 1997: 235, 258). Or, in other words: who has the power to define a discourse, has the power to define what exists, what is good and what is possible (see Therborn 1999: 18), i.e. the constitutive elements of what we perceive as reality.

The racialized polarization originating from core-periphery relations is relevant to the ethnicization of migrant populations if we acknowledge that ethnic and cultural differences are mainly disputed in terms of being a decisive social problem in reference to migrants who originated from peripheral zones.

5.2.2 The interstate system

The modern nation-state is usually seen as the legitimate mode of structuring social space. Its legitimacy is thought to derive from the fact of cultural distinction: nations are conceptualised as having distinct cultures, including language, history, religion, values, etc. which make them different from other nations and thus forms the basis of political and organizational unity. Yet, Wallerstein has challenged the self-evidence of this model by referring to it as a creation of the modern world system. He believes that “in almost every case statehood preceded nation-hood, and not the other way around, despite a widespread myth to the contrary” (Wallerstein 1991: 81). According to him, the nation-state system is the product of the expansion of the liberal ideology in the framework of core-periphery relations. It emerged in 19th century Europe as a result of ideological struggles over the question how to manage social change, and by means of consecutive expansion “[i]ts
beliefs became the geoculture of the world system” (Wallerstein 1999: 147).

Alongside the expansion of the liberal ideology goes the epistemological distinction between the market as the economic sphere, the state as the political sphere, and civil-society as the socio-cultural sphere. That is how the wide-spread illusion was created that culture is something independent from market and state. According to Wallerstein these spheres are so deeply intertwined that it is inadequate to separate them. He has often been criticised for granting primacy to the economic structures, while underestimating the role of culture (see e.g. Kumar & Welz 2001). Yet, culture, according to him, is any set of ideas, any knowledge system, that emerge and evolves in the course of symbolic struggles. The market and the state are thus products of cultural struggles as much as they are producers of cultural struggles. At the heart of this interrelationship is the idea that human history is a history of conflicts.

Once the state-system as been created as the rationalized and sovereign form of political organization, the invention of the nation has been a means to maintain social cohesion where social stratification does indeed not offer much basis for commonalities. Wallerstein has pointed out that sovereign states are frequently threatened by internal disintegration and external aggression. That is why governments as well as several interest groups who benefit from uniform political powers of the state, tend to promote nationalism on the basis of pastness which is the cause of cultural homogeneity: nations are constructed as a people who were always meant to be governed as one. The paradoxes of this invention are obvious if we look at the Europe-led formation of many nation-states all around the world which did neither exist as names nor as organizational units two hundred years ago.

This leads us to the next theme, which is the hierarchy among sovereign states, being “stable but changeable” (Wallerstein 1991: 82). The underlying logic is that states compete with each other and the competing ideologies are called nationalisms. Those states who have difficulties in distinguishing the Self from the Other, usually lack social cohesion which leads to a marginalized position in the system. While the hierarchy of the inter-state system is constantly challenged and contested, it remains a stable ranked order. The relationship between the nationalization and racialization is expressed as follows: … while racial categorization arose primarily as a mode of expressing and sustaining the core-periphery antinomy, national categorizations arose originally as a mode of expressing the competition between states in the slow but regular permutation of the hierarchical order and therefore of the detailed degree of advantage in the system as opposed to the cruder racial classification. In an oversimplified formula, we could say that race and racism unifies intrazonally the core zones and the peripheral zones in their battle with each other, whereas nation and nationalism divides core zones and peripheral zones intrazonally in the more complex intrazonal as well as interzonal competition for detailed rank order. Both categories are claims to the right to possess advantage in the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 1991: 82).
Over the past few decades we witness a newly emerging form of political organization which is again a European expansion driven by the supremacy of the liberal ideology: regionalism. Political scientists have frequently proclaimed that the problem of European integration is the lack of a European *demos*, a people which identifies as Europeans. Consequently, we can observe the modes of constructing peoplehood which follows the creation of a political entity similar to the way Wallerstein has described the formation of the nation-state. Social cohesion must be based on cultural distinction or, to become *one*, we need to know who is the *other one*. Much leaves us to suggest that the Other at this point of time is what is simultaneously labelled as *the Muslims* or *the Arab world*. Paradoxically, it is the same European nation-states which have not long ago been promoting so-called secularism that are now constructing an understanding of European identity as religious uniformity and the supremacy of Christianity. This practice of distinction is particularly obvious regarding debates about Turkey’s possible access to the European Union. Cultural differences and, thus, regional boundaries (and/or political allies) are constructed in reference to apparently homogenous and incompatible religions supposed to be a primordial asset which is linked to territory. As this newly emerging knowledge system correlates with core-periphery relations, it is obviously questionable whether the problem is indeed cultural difference as commonly assumed, or not rather the mentioned inequality and power differences.

As power and inequality does not only persist between core and periphery, but also in an hierarchical order of nation-states within these zones, it is in the logic of symbolic violence that migrants in the core states who originated from peripheral states are labelled as more culturally inferior than migrants who originated from other core states. Racialization, nationalization and ethnicization can thus be seen as part of the same knowledge system.

### 5.2.3 Class Dimensions

Ethnicity is usually used to describe a minority within the borders of a certain nation-state, but Oommen has, for instance, pointed out that ethnicity arises from dislocation with a particular nation or region which is conceptualised as homeland (see 5.1.1). Yet, Wallerstein does not look at ethnicization in the framework of migration, dislocation, or what is called diasporas. He primarily focuses on the construction of ethnic groups within state borders. This is evidently a limitation of his theory which will have to be corrected.

Nevertheless, Wallerstein’s elaborations on ethnicity and class relations within state boundaries remain a useful tool to re-think the ethnicization of migrant populations. According to him, ethnic minorities are minorities not because of quantities, but because of
comparatively limited social power: “Numerical majorities can be social minorities” (Wallerstein 1991: 83). Again this indicates that the construction of race and the construction of ethnicity are more intertwined than we sometimes tend to assume. Wallerstein describes the invention of ethnicity as follows:

Ethnicity is, and has been historically, the mode of organising different strata within states. It’s been imposed from on top and from on bottom, and from on bottom as a mode of resistance and from on top as a mode of socialising people into lower strata roles (Wallerstein in Kumar & Welz 2001: 225).

Hence, the capitalist system is not only based on a hierarchy between capital and labour, where the capital holders label workers as culturally inferior in order to legitimise the exploitation of their workforce. Instead, the labour segment itself is structured by complex forms of stratification and ethnic labels correlate heavily with occupational roles. Wallerstein has stressed that there is a particular rationale for inventing or essentialising ethnicity in order to legitimise the persistence of one or several lower strata workforces. The proclaimed culture of the ethnic group is the way people are supposed to socialise their children, i.e. in accordance to their occupational function in society. This practice would be illegitimate for the state being supposed to enhance equality of opportunities, but as a practice of the ethnicized group it appears in the light of defending cultural identity (Wallerstein 1991).

Thus, Wallerstein has demonstrated that the construction of peoplehood is a necessary element for the operation of historical capitalism. Their invention changes as much as the re-structuring of power relations takes place: “peoplehood for what it is – in no sense a primordial stable social reality, but a complex, clay-like historical product of the capitalist world-economy through which the antagonistic forces struggle with each other” (Wallerstein 1991: 85). Yet, elsewhere, he has explained the ethnicization of particular groups as an entirely arbitrary process (see Wallerstein in Kumar & Welz 2001: 225) In this context, he has ignored that – in his own framework - migrant populations who have originated from peripheral states are always more vulnerable to ethnicization than others, particularly if they migrated in chains which have been initiated by historical imbalances of power. This is likely to apply to labour recruitments, such as in the Turkish-German case, as the people’s workforce has been commodified and imported by the core economies. They had already a particular designated occupational status by the time of their arrival in Germany and thus, it was likely that this status is re-affirmed.

5.3. DISCOURSE AND REPRODUCTION

So far we have been looking at the structures of inequality and how capital holders construct categories of peoplehood for the sake of maintaining their own position. Yet, this
is a quite simplified version in regard to the question how legitimate knowledge emerges. Neither power nor knowledge are static dimensions, but are the object of struggles in the social field. This is Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of struggles over symbolic power. Actors employ different strategies to maintain or improve their hierarchical position. All strategies depend on the respective relative position in the three dimensional social field while the means of struggling consist in language and other practices of distinction. According to Bourdieu, these practices are thus highly linked to the position within the structures of inequality. In consequence, they are not mere (innocent) cultural practices, but tend to reproduce the social order. The following sections point out some of the arenas where symbolic struggles take place, where migrant populations are ethnicized and social inequalities are reproduced.

### 5.3.1 Politics, Media and the Social Sciences

As symbolic power is the power to assert one’s knowledge system as legitimate, it requires influence on public discourses. Even though politics, media and academia are not the only arenas where struggles over symbolic power take place, they are assumed to reflect and fuel the general trends. Nevertheless, the voices we hear are strongly selective and depend on the structure of the social field. Those milieus which are characterised by comparatively high amounts of cultural and economic capital are over-represented while those milieus which are at the bottom of the social hierarchy tend to be under-represented. Nevertheless, the dominant classes do also not speak univocally, but compete with each other. What we observe is struggles over knowledge systems.

In the German context, discourses on Turkish migrant populations are quite polarized. Yet, there seems to be a high level of agreement that they are disintegrated – whatever it is – while the basic difference seems to be whether this is our problem or their problem: do they lack initiative or do we have to support them more? Thus, images of the inferior, disadvantaged Other are constantly reproduced on the basis of an apparent ethnic problem, while only few voices are questioning this perception (e.g. Griese et. al. 2002). While competing political ideologies either picture migrants as infiltrating the national culture or as merits for the formation of a multicultural society, they both essentialize cultural difference on the basis of national origin. In the course of these ideological struggles over legitimate knowledge, the Turkish migrant population becomes not only objectified, but also homogenised and ethnicized. They are financially dependent on us, they lack education and the only thing they do is lumping together with each other.

It remains questionable whether this making and confirmation of a voiceless underclass does happen consciously or unconsciously. I would suggest that the different
actors are too busy in maintaining their social position vis-à-vis the other dominant positions: economic capital holders tend to stress individual effort as basis of integration while cultural capital holders are inclined to argue on moral grounds. Yet, due to the logic of the interstate system (see 5.2.2), they both see social cohesion as necessary achievement - for the functioning of the welfare system as well as to be internationally competitive. In this context, the ethnicization of the Turkish migrant population which is also paralleled by an ethnicization of the Muslim population serves as a means of state/regional cohesion and distinction. In this context, Esma Durugönül has emphasised that the topic foreigners/asylum – and particular in reference to Turkish or Muslim identity – is exploited as a resource for effective political distinction and opposition and thereby, reproduces the construction of a Turkish migrant minority (Durugönül 1999: 144). Moreover, the focus on culture as a major problem of immigrant incorporation, distracts from the need to solve the legal problems and differences in the realm of social policies and social justice.

Yet, I see not only German national discourses as relevant to the ethnicization of the Turkish migrant population, but also the impact of Turkish national ideologies. Apparently, the Turkish strategy to compete with the states occupying a higher rank order in the interstate system is to maintain cohesion and loyalty on the basis of a transnational Turkish identity. This strategy is rational in so far as it is a better base for negotiations regarding prospective access to the European Union, for instance, as well as it grants cooperation in terms of remittances, trade, technology and knowledge transfer. The Turkish media which is being consumed by a certain share of the migrant population is likely to play a decisive role in expressing and promoting this diaspora identity. Yet, for evident reasons these discursive struggles cannot be elaborated in detail here. They are just meant to provide an idea of the forces which are probably maintaining a vested interest in inventing and reproducing a Turkish migrant identity.

The social sciences do not occupy a neutral position either, but are heavily interdependent with these struggles over symbolic power. We do not only feed these public discourses with rationalized knowledge, our research agenda is also driven by them as funds are dependent on the perception that it is a relevant socio-political problem. If we intended to resolve this interrelationship, this would be similar to the chicken and egg debate. As pointed out earlier, the sociology of migration is particularly inclined to study immigrant incorporation. Usually, studies compare ethnic groups: Do the Italians incorporate better than the Turks? Thus, these comparisons are based on an essentialization of cultural distinction on the basis of national origin. Speaking the German language and having German friends are seen as the main indicators for being integrated. As a result, most social scientific practices are complicit in the ethnicization of migrant populations
and the reproduction of the social structure even though their intentions might be different. (see also Durugönül 1999) Using Bourdieu’s framework of symbolic violence, Anja Weiβ (2001) has in this context analysed the unintended racist effects of anti-racist engagement which are not seen as the result of apparently immature individual mindsets, but of the hierarchical structure of the social field. As a consequence, anti-racist activists – usually from the educated middle classes of society – also tend to reproduce structures of inequality by referring to the migrants as people to be supported and protected. This means that strategies of maintaining or improving one’s position in the social field – here the moral fight with economic capitalists – can also shape the reproduction of the social order, even if this is not intended (see Weiβ 2001).

That is why it is necessary to reflect constantly on one’s own position within the objective structure of the social space and, thus, one’s contributions to symbolic power struggles. My own position evidently also runs the danger of reproducing rather than anti-fixating the current state of legitimate knowledge. By framing this paper in reference to the Turkish-German example, I obviously also reproduce the nation-state border and thus national origin as legitimate unit of analysis.

5.3.2 Self-Perceptions of Common Fate

Some scholars have differentiated ethnicity from race by referring to ethnicity as self-defined while race is defined from the outside (e.g. Cornell & Hartmann 1998). The self-defined version of ethnicity has yet been questioned as it inheres the assumption that culture is an essential feature making out clear-cut and primordial differences between people. Nevertheless, this does not mean that many members of the ethnicized group do not self-identify with being an ethnic subject. The reasons become evident if we remember how Bourdieu had defined symbolic violence:

Symbolic violence... is the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity [...] I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1996: 167-168).

Thus, Bourdieu means that the members of an ethnicized group easily perceive themselves as culturally inferior or socially disadvantaged, if symbolic violence has been exerted effectively. In the case of Turkish labour migrants and their descendants the mechanism is obvious: they were seen as hired workers and thus commodified from the beginning. Even after having resided in Germany for many years, they were not granted equal legal rights while their children were even born as native foreigners. This structural cultivation of an ethnicized Other thus fuels feelings of being a fate community. While the social identity is confirmed on the base of stories of discrimination and exclusion, the unequal structure of
the social field is reproduced. Moreover a specific habitus is maintained which also tends to re-affirms the assigned social position.

The ethnicized group becomes a symbolic community as a large proportion of members imagine themselves as belonging to each other. These symbolic ties are potentially social capital which can be accumulated, mobilised and converted. Where this form of capital is the only resource, it is thus likely to play a major role for the individual’s well-being. Yet, again, this does not mean that ethnicized migrant groups are romanticized communities always granting each other reciprocal assistance. In this context, Portes had pointed out that membership in social groups does not only involve benefits, but also constraints (see 2.2.5). In particular, he mentions excessive claims from group members as well as downward levelling norms within ethnicized groups. Where feelings of belonging to each other are based on collective victimization, individual member have a hard time in distancing themselves from the group by searching for upward mobility.

5.3.3 A WORD ON INDIVIDUAL AGENCY

Up to now, there was not much space for the individual as everything seems to be determined by structural forces. Yet, this is surely an overstatement. In accordance with Bourdieu, the individual is regarded as having certain dispositions which does not mean that his or her behaviour is entirely determined by the structure of the social field. In regard to the discussed forces of ethnicization, for example, this does not mean that anybody who has a Turkish background is deemed to be among the lower social strata of society because of the mechanisms of social and symbolic reproduction. Nevertheless, it is likely that he or she is at all times symbolically tied to the ethnicized community. One meaningful example is, for instance, given by the following words by the politician Cem Özdemir whose parents once came to Germany as Turkish labour migrants:

When I was elected to the Bundestag, I was celebrated by the Turkish media as the “Turkish member of the German parliament.” So I had to explain to those of the Turkish migrant community who saw the issue that way that I was of Turkish descent. Not more and not less. Had I been a Turkish member of the parliament, I would have been residing in Ankara and not in Bonn or Ludwigsburg. After a while, this point got accepted. However, the next problem of origin for me was just around the corner. Because my father originated from a Circassian village in Turkey, the Turkish Circassian community in Germany had approached me: “You are Circassian. How come you don’t emphasize that more in public?” […] On my mother’s side, who was born in Turkey and who lived in Istanbul until the migration, there are Greeks to be found. My mother’s grandmother was Greek. In Nazi-German terms then my mother is one quarter Greek. Whoever handles ethnicity in this fashion might as well commit harakiri ( Özdemir 1999: 12).

In his autobiography, Özdemir further describes how he came to politics through an interest in ecology and policies of peace. Yet, soon after joining the Green Party, he was

35 The translated version (German to English) is taken from Argun (2003)
made the expert for migration and integration issues, even though he had lived in Germany all his life. Ironically one could say that his ethnicized identity was even part of his political success because the representatives who are promoting the multicultural society are in need of figureheads. Celebrating him as well as other individuals with Turkish background who appear in Germany’s public life as successful exceptions ought to show that another world is possible, either the multicultural society or the individual effort of assimilation. Nevertheless, defining the individual exception does express the rule at the same time. It classifies the non-successful on the grounds of ethnicity and by doing so re-affirms the structures of inequality and domination.

Hence, even though individuals have potentials to change something and to participate in the symbolic struggles, they can hardly step out of the dominant classification system which ties them symbolically to the construction of legitimate entities of peoplehood.

5.4 ETHNICIZATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: SO WHAT?

This chapter has explained ethnicization as the creation of symbolic ties in the course of struggles over power and legitimate knowledge. In this sense, ethnic migrant populations are not mainly characterised by cultural differences but represent peoplehoods whose identity has been constructed under historical structural conditions. Being related to racialization and nationalization, ethnicity is seen as a symbolic identity based on relative powerlessness and limited access to economic and cultural capital due to the exertion of symbolic violence by the dominant forces of the modern world system, as well as the practices of different capital holders to affirm and improve their position in the social field. Deemed into this position, the ethnicized group largely relies on what we have called social capital. One new dimension of social capital generated in the course of the migratory experiences is thus the symbolic ties which are brought about by the ethnicization of the group. Therefore, the perception of ethnic enclaves is not only an expression of stigmatisation, but might indeed be paralleled by agglomerations of social capital among the ethnicized group.

While ethnicization has here been treated as an effect of chain migration, it would be interesting to question its role as a cause of chain migrations. As we have seen in chapter four, chain migration did mainly move along hemseri ties and the latter can evidently also be seen as an ethnic group. A new hypothesis would thus be that due to high volumes of inherent social capital and limited other resources, ethnicized groups are likely to mobilise their ties quite effectively for chain migration.
6. CONCLUSION

Our theoretical exploration on the question why ethnic enclaves are a quite prominent observation ends here. It did neither attempt to provide an answer whether this phenomenon actually exists, nor whether an ethnic enclave is a problem of immigrant integration. Instead, we sought to offer a new and comprehensive theoretical context for future empirical research on migration and ethnicity which overcomes the limitations associated with both, classical economic and classical cultural theories.

This new theoretical context is offered by Bourdieu’s social capital theory being integrated into his sociology of power and social inequality. It has been argued that Bourdieu’s framework combines economic action with cultural/communicative action by referring to social structures as determining both. In contrast to Coleman and Putnam, he does not refer to social capital solely in terms of its form and function, based on methodological individualism and/or cultural essentialism, but relates membership in social groups to the historical structures of inequality. This is what unites him with Wallerstein whose world system theory has been treated as complementary to Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of social stratification on a national scale.

First, we argued that an ethnic enclave cannot simply be understood as an agglomeration of individual migrants who decided as independent rational actors to migrate to a country where they could potentially be better off. In this context, we analysed the role of social capital as a factor regarding the causes of migration. This brought us to the conclusion that – in cases where historical structures of global inequality have initiated international migration from a peripheral state to a core state – established transnational migrant networks are likely to perpetuate these movements and lead to an exponential growth of migrant populations settling in the receiving country. Some indicators suggested that it is mostly migrants with limited other resources apart from social capital who participate in these transnational migrant networks. Thus, social capital is employed as a strategy to accumulate other types of capital. Social capital operating under the conditions of inner-state, intra-state and intra-zonal inequality is thus seen as the main factor leading to processes of chain migration.

Second, we illustrated this correlation of social capital and chain migration by referring to the example of Turkish-German migration. This was also meant to serve the purpose of establishing an empirical linkage between chain migration and the prominent perception of ethnic enclaves. The causes of West-Germany’s recruitment of Turkish labourers have been described as the historical structural conditions which initiated this
particular migration stream. Then, we revealed the factors which have led to the
development of migrant networks which were consecutively effectively mobilised as social
capital: recruitment mechanisms favouring people from particular areas in Turkey as well
as those who had relatives and friends who were already employed in Germany, the
transmission of success stories making emigration a desire for many, the extended length
of stay and the following reunion with family members, as well as the regional and social
background of the migrants. Studies on the latter aspect did particular reveal that it was
mostly migrants from rural areas who were likely to participate in chains, first, because
they had larger families and stronger community ties at their disposal, second, because –
due to modernization processes in Turkey and large-scale internal migration from rural to
urban areas – people from rural communities were facing more emigration pressures than
urban populations. By the time of the recruitment stop, networks among Turkish labour
migrants had expanded so far that – through channels of family reunification and
marriage migration – immigration from Turkey to Germany continued even though the
German government was undertaking measures to make the Turkish migrant population
return. The literature generally assumes that this large-scale chain migration has caused the
emergence of ethnic enclaves. Yet, we did not want to stick to this linear explanation that
social capital leads to chain migration and chain migration leads to ethnic enclaves. We
rather suggested that social labelling of certain residential areas as migrant or ethnic areas
is a process of cumulative causation accompanying chain migrations. Thus, we argued that
social capital which leads to chain migration is different from the social capital which is
assumed to make out the ethnic enclave. The former is concrete, at most small-scale
symbolic community ties, while the latter refers to the Turkish nation as one symbolic
entity.

Third, we used again the structuralist approach – combining Bourdieu’s view on social
structures with Wallerstein’s world system theory – to counter the argument that it is
cultural differences which make out the ethnic enclave. We argued that symbolic
communities are not a product of random cultural distinctiveness, but have to be seen in
the context of historical power relations. We said that ethnic minorities are better described
as ethnicized minorities as they are made and not born. Factors impacting on the
construction of peoplehood, racialized, nationalized and ethnicized are first of all
considered in the context of historical capitalism and the core-periphery antinomy. The
powerful determine what is the basis of people’s distinction: the Self is conceptualised as
being at the top of the hierarchy, the Other at the bottom. In the context of migrant
populations, racial and national categories seem to impact on the construction of the ethnic
group correlating strongly with class and occupational status. The assumption is that having a certain national origin, being in the periphery, makes somebody more ethnic than others. Cultural distinctiveness of migrant populations being ascribed with socially disadvantaged or inferior positions are re-affirmed and reproduced in national public discourse, which can be characterised as struggles over legitimate knowledge. Notions of the prototypical Other, who either has to put more effort into his integration or has to receive more societal support, are cultivated as strategies of different capital holders to improve or maintain their positions vis-à-vis other capital holders. Ethnicization is further fostered by the state where the migrants originated from, here the Turkish state, due to vested interests in improving one’s position in the world system. As symbolic violence is exerted on an ethnicized migrant population, members are likely to self-identify with the given knowledge system and consider themselves as belonging a community of fate being deprived from access and resources. While this approach left space for individual agency not seeing the individual fate entirely determined by self-reproducing structures, we concluded that the symbolic associations with the ethnicized identity can hardly be stripped off. Therefore, chain migration creates new symbolic ties through the processes of ethnicization and stigmatisation which can potentially be employed as social capital and might thus be perceived as ethnic enclaves.

These three arguments together represent statements about the correlation between social capital, chain migration and the ethnic enclave observation on different levels, but they are inherently intertwined through the employed theory which bridges economism and culturalism by highlighting the structural embeddedness of economic action as well as cultural distinction. Social capital theory, in Coleman’s sense, has been used in migration theory in order to describe the causes of chain migration, but if we do not want to fall into the trap that chain migration leads automatically to ethnic enclaves, we have to consider Bourdieu’s and Wallerstein’s approach. In regard to future empirical research, this theoretical exploration thus suggests to avoid the social scientific reproduction of the ethnic enclave as a problem of essential cultural differences. This means that the focus regarding questions of social capital and migration shall not be whether somebody maintains contacts to the so-called majority population of the respective receiving society. Instead, emphasis should be put on the structural causes of the social inequalities which are likely to be the actual prominent observation, but mistakenly outspoken as *ethnic enclave*. 

63
REFERENCES


ARGUN, BETİGÜL ERCAN (2003): Turkey in Germany. The Transnational Sphere of Deutschkei, New York: Routledge


BOURDIEU, PIERRE (1985): The social space and the genesis of groups, in: Theory & Society, Vol. 14, No. 6, 723-744


Faist, Thomas (2000): The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces, Oxford: Oxford University Press


Gitmez, Ali and Wilpert, Czarina (1987): A Micro-Society or an Ethnic Community?
Social Organization and Ethnicity amongst Turkish Migrants in Berlin, in: John Rex, Daniele Joly and Czarina Wilpert (eds.): *Immigrant Associations in Europe*, Aldershot: Gower


GOLDBERG, ANDREAS, HALL, DIRK and ŞEN, FARUK (2004): *Die Deutschen Türken*, Münster: Lit Verlag


KRITZ, MARY M. and ZLOTNIK, HANIA (1992): Global Interactions: Migration Systems,


SMITH, STEPHEN S. and KULYNCH, JESSICA (2002): It may be social but why is it capital? The social construction of social capital and the politics of language, in: *Politics & Society*, Vol. 30, No.1, 149-186


WEBER, MAX (1968 [1921]): *Economy and Society. 3 Volumes*, Totowa & New Jersey: Bedminster Press


