

**40 YEARS OF ASEAN  
PERFORMANCE, LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES**

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## **Conference Day 1**

### **Opening of the Conference**

#### **Welcome address by Vice Chancellor Wolfgang Jäger**

In the opening ceremony Vice Chancellor Professor Wolfgang Jäger welcomed all the conference participants on behalf of the University of Freiburg. In his address he congratulated the governments and the people of Southeast Asia to the 40th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He emphasized that ASEAN since its inception in 1967 had become one of the world's most renowned and most proactive regional organizations and one of the first interregional cooperation partners of the European Union. Professor Jäger reminded of the crucial role former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher played in footing ASEAN-EU cooperation. Jäger noted that the chairmen of the board of the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt and former federal state secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Jürgen Chrobog was a close collaborator of Minister Mr. Genscher and had also served in Southeast Asia at one stage of his distinguished diplomatic career.

The cooperation between both regions had been an extraordinarily active partnership, which celebrated its 30th anniversary in a ministerial meeting in the German city of Nürnberg in March 2007. Furthermore, the Asia Europe Meeting, another major mechanism of interregional cooperation, had just concluded its first decade of operation in 2006 with the Helsinki summit. Speaking of anniversaries, Jäger continued, ASEAN and Freiburg had something in common as the University currently celebrated its 550<sup>th</sup> anniversary.

Freiburg is proud of offering the whole spectrum of academic disciplines which also includes an inter-disciplinary research teaching network on Southeast Asia figures prominently in this network. Chancellor Jäger added that the number of Southeast Asian graduate students had increased markedly in recent years. He also welcomed DAAD-Visiting Professor Hong Tung Pham from the University of Hanoi who had just arrived in Freiburg

Chancellor Jäger finally expressed his deep gratitude to all those who had contributed to make the conference possible in particular highlighting the generous financial support provided by the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, represented at the conference by its chairmen of the board, former State-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jürgen Chrobog, and Ms. Barbara Müller as the Foundations Asia division head. He furthermore appreciated the important part of

the Department of Political Science in realizing the event. Concluding his address he wished the participants stimulating discussions as well as a pleasant stay in Freiburg.

### **Welcome Address by former State Secretary and Chairmen of the Board of the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, Mr. Jürgen Chrobog**

After welcoming the conference participants and guests to the conference, Jürgen Chrobog noted the established cooperation between the BMW foundation Herbert Quandt and the Political Science Department of the University of Freiburg, which started in 2000. This year's conference special event, recognizing the 550<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the University, its outstanding academic heritage and its future-oriented development. As the BMW foundation Herbert Quandt is an institution fostering the understanding among people in business and politics from different cultures while raising the awareness on political and economical topics of current and future relevance. He welcomed that the conference brought together a group of noted Asian and Western scholars as well as practitioners to discuss the cultural, political and economical dimensions of ASEAN. He gave special reference to the presence of her Excellency the Ambassador of the Philippines, Ms. Delia Domingo-Albert and the Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore, Mr. Selverajah, whose attendance underlined the importance of the conference and the foundation's activities in the field of relations with East Asia.

Commenting briefly on the conference program, Mr. Chrobog stressed that while the conference does not claim to come up with solutions to the challenges to the region, yet it should help to understand better the interregional dynamics and ASEAN's expectations towards the European Union.

Turning to ASEAN as a regional organization, Mr. Chrobog recognized that ASEAN had undergone a remarkable development since its creation. It had been able to manage the great diversity of a growing number of member states and had become a key partner to the EU in Asia. Former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had considerably contributed to this process. Milestones on the way towards an increasingly closer partnership range from the cooperation treaty of 1980 to the 2001 communiqué of the EU Commission identifying ASEAN as a key economic and political partner for Europe and emphasizing its importance for the overall relations between the EU and Asia. The 2003 communiqué reaffirmed the significance of this relationship. As Germany had always been a driving force in fostering the interregional

cooperation Jürgen Chrobog considered it to be a meaningful and pleasant coincidence that it was under the German EU presidency that the foreign ministers at the recent ministerial meeting at Nürnberg could celebrate three anniversaries: The 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties, the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of ASEAN and the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the ASEAN – EU dialogue. Concluding his opening address Mr. Chrobog extended a special welcome to the honorable former Secretary General of ASEAN Rodolfo Severino, who was invited to the conference as a special guest.

### **Welcome Address by the Head of the Political Science Department of the University of Freiburg, Professor Jürgen Rüländ**

Professor Jürgen Rüländ extended a warm welcome to the conference participants on behalf of the Department of Political Science of the University of Freiburg. The department was proud of the presence of numerous eminent scholars and renowned practitioners, such as the former Secretary General of ASEAN Rodolfo Severino and the ambassadors of Singapore and the Philippines. Rüländ expressed his hope that the high-powered expertise assembled at this conference would produce stimulating discussions and new insights into ASEAN.

Rüländ reminded the participants that 8 years ago, the department and the Foundation had organized a similar conference on APEC. Conferences like these highlight the department's interest in international institutions and collective action as a way of managing the border-crossing pathologies of globalization. He referred to the fact that different world regions pursue different approaches of cooperation and it is these cultures of cooperation which constitute a major research interest pursued by the department. Rüländ noted that the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asian regional cooperation have become standard themes of the seminars and classes offered by the department. A sizeable number of Master's theses have addressed Southeast Asian topics in recent years. The department is well integrated into the aforementioned teaching and research network of the Faculty of Philosophy, promoting interdisciplinary debate and common research approaches. In line with these activities the department has also persistently strengthened its relations to partner institutions in Southeast Asia.

Rüländ closed his welcome address with a word of gratitude to the department's co-operation partners.

## **Session 1: Introduction**

### **40 Years of ASEAN – The evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism**

The first panel saw Shaun Narine, Professor at the Department of Political Science, St. Thomas University (Fredericton), introduce to the conference theme by providing a general overview on the history, developmental stages, functions and role concepts of ASEAN. The leading questions he was asked to address in his presentation were: What are the benchmarks against which ASEAN's performance can be measured? To what extent has ASEAN achieved its self-defined objectives?

Shaun Narine set off by limiting the scope of his task: while providing an overview of 40 years of ASEAN he did not want to draw definite conclusions. According to him, the answers to these questions depended on the definition of the benchmarks. He introduced "power" as the leading benchmark for the performance of organizations like ASEAN. Referring to a recent article written by Richard Stubbs (participant in the conference) Narine distinguished two concepts of power related to different theories of international relations. In a neorealist understanding, power would mean the capacity to compel different actors to do what the organization (ASEAN) wants them to do. Contrarily, from a constructivist point of view a powerful ASEAN would empower its member states by promoting their ability to do what they want to do.

Narine argued that empirically ASEAN was characterized by a contrast between its aspirations, claims and objectives and the actual outcome. According to him, this contrast was most obvious in case of the realm of economics. From the very beginning in 1967, ASEAN pursued the goal of economic cooperation between its member states. However, until relatively recently ASEAN as an organization had not really promoted this cooperation. Narine concluded that the undeniable success of the ASEAN member states in the 1980s had been due to other factors. ASEAN as an organization itself had not contributed too much to this success but presumably only helped to establish the political environment that made the economic progress possible.

Narine framed his presentation with a comment on theories. Generally, he identified three fundamental theories orientating this conference, namely neorealism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. From his point of view, neorealism with its focus on power politics had not much to say about ASEAN. According to him the reasons why it appeared to work in Southeast Asia, did not have much to do with the reasons neorealists themselves would claim it seems to be

working in the region. He diagnosed, that although ASEAN particularly in its earliest days had clearly been a political institution and consequently had not provided much obvious security to its member states, it evidently had mattered enough to keep the organization go on for the past 40 years. Narine then depicted liberal Institutionalism as a more functional approach that might have more relevance in reference to ASEAN today. This would be particularly true given the emergence of economic institutions within ASEAN. Moving on, Narine qualified constructivism as the most useful approach to understand ASEAN, even though most constructivist analysis would tend to exaggerate the difficulties of normative consensus between states and the role of a common identity within ASEAN.

According to Narine, sovereignty remains the paramount virtue and value that ASEAN promotes. ASEAN's norms were essentially Westphalian Norms, extensions and elaborations of the norm of sovereignty and not unique at all but rather very common international norms. What made these norms unique was the emphasis that ASEAN states placed upon them and the structures they created around them. Narine briefly mentioned the English School Approach as another theoretical current that could help to explain ASEAN's development.

In the following historical overview, Prof. Narine distinguished five periods in the development of ASEAN: an early history (1967-1975/76), the "Vietnam period" (1975/76-1991), the post-Cold War Period (1991-1992), the Asian Crisis (1997-1998) and the aftermath of the Asian Crisis (1998- ).

ASEAN essentially evolved as a non-aggression pact between its member states. After the end of the confrontation between Indonesia and some of its neighbors, the non-communist countries of the region needed to reassure themselves that they could work together cooperatively. The member countries wanted to achieve regional peace and stability through the pursuit of socio-economic goals. Another major concern was to manage Southeast Asian security relations themselves. Almost immediately after its creation, ASEAN ran into problems for example in the diplomatic spat between Malaysia and Indonesia over territorial disputes in the "Corregidor affair" (1968). Narine then argued that in this era of ASEAN's early history the establishment of the controversial Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) had been ASEAN's major obvious accomplishment. The processes of consultation and consensus building began to take shape with its establishment. One of the side effects of ZOPFAN was that it set into stone the idea that no single ASEAN country would act on behalf of the region without consulting other member states.



According to Narine, in the “Vietnam period” the ASEAN countries were concerned with the emergence of a communist Vietnam. The Bali Conference of 1976, which was the first meeting of ASEAN's heads of states, led to a couple of major initiatives: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that lays out the fundamental norms of ASEAN as well as the ASEAN declaration of concord. Vietnam’s invasion to Cambodia in 1978 defined ASEAN's activities for the next twelve years. Narine explained that ASEAN was most preoccupied in organizing the international community against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. During this period on the surface ASEAN appeared to be highly unified and it became a very prominent actor within the international community. At the same time, there were significant differences of interest between different member states. Narine concluded that the resulting image of a united ASEAN was the impression that considerably influenced how the rest of the world came to understand the organization. By 1991, the Vietnamese Invasion has ended, but for Narine the issues involved remain present under the surface also today.

In the next step, Narine described the initiatives that ASEAN countries proposed in the Post Cold-War Era looking for new ways to engage their resources and activities in the future. As one consequence, the ARF (Asian Regional Forum), a security oriented institution, was created and first met in 1994 with ASEAN at the core of the process. For Narine, the ARF is an example of significant differences in cultural approaches to institution building in western countries and Asian countries. On the one hand, Narine observed that building social ties and alleviating tensions is the main goal of such an institution from an Asian point of view. On the other hand, from a western point of view the ARF could be criticized as a “talk shop” and too little institutionalized approach to dealing with regional security issues.

Narine then mentioned AFTA, ASEAN’s engagement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and the expansion of ASEAN as further initiatives of the grouping at that time. Thailand introduced the ASEAN Free trade Area (AFTA) in 1991 as a response to other economic blocks emerging in the post Cold War era (NAFTA, EU). To retain its prominence ASEAN also insisted that it would be given a primary role in APEC and it also expands to include in its membership Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). Narine regarded this step as a major mistake because bringing in Cambodia and Myanmar led to considerable problems for ASEAN through to the present day.

In the next steps of his historical overview, Narine characterized the Asian Economic Crisis that occurs from 1997 to 1999 as a seminal event in the evolution of Southeast Asia more recent

history. Although some of the member states (Singapore) got out of the crisis very well, because of increased interdependence all the countries were affected severely and the crisis even spread all over the world. ASEAN in the following was widely condemned in the international community for its ineffectiveness and inability to coordinate any organized response to the crisis. However, Narine made clear that ASEAN did not have the institutional and economic resources to face the situation. According to him, the expectation that it could have done anything about the crisis was an indication of the extent to which the rest of the international community's misunderstanding of ASEAN.

In the following Narine described the initiatives that ASEAN carried out as a response to the crisis. He mentioned the ASEAN Vision 2020 document (1997), as being a sort of an assertion during the height of the crisis that ASEAN is still there, then the Hanoi Action Plan as an effort to liberalize economic connections and the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) as an effort to enable the ASEAN countries to monitor each other's economic policies. In general, Narine characterized these initiatives as being relatively limited in their scope. The same would be true for the ASEAN Troika that was to be built up by three ASEAN members who would be able to deal with crises more quickly and effectively than the organization as a whole. Concerning the concept of "Flexible Engagement" (introduced by Thailand by that time) Narine explained, that it had been turned into something called "Enhanced Interaction" which allowed individual ASEAN states to criticize one another if a problem emerged. According to Narine, the problems resulting from this project are rooted in the fact that if at its heart ASEAN was about a non-aggression pact between its members, allowing them to criticize each other invites the possibility of animosity and anger and a worsening of tensions between member states.

To finish his historical overview Shaun Narine detailed on the recent developments of ASEAN. In 2003 BALI II ended up with the "second declaration of ASEAN concord" including the project of an ASEAN security, economic and socio-cultural community. The introduction of the idea of an ASEAN charter in 2005 (to be finished by the end of 2007) supported this project. The document is meant to give legal character to ASEAN and to lay out the fundamental principles of the organization. Narine assumed that the creation of other major regional institutions has become a major concern in the region as well. The ASEAN+three (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) functions as coordinator of cooperation between these countries and has led to the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market initiative. The Chiang Mai Initiative

originally was a currency swap agreement but is to be made into a genuine multilateral organization that now has around 80bn dollars at its disposal.

Finally, Narine mentioned the ASEAN-China free trade area, which is supposed to become reality by 2010, and the Asian Summit as being influential developments in the greater region.

In his summary, Prof. Narine stated that the question of what ASEAN was going to be in the future, seemed to revolve around the issue of non-intervention and the question whether this principle needed to be modified in order to allow the creation of a more effective organization.

He concluded that the political and economical interest of ASEAN and its member countries required the organization becoming something other than what it has been to this point.

Contrariwise, one could also argue that non-intervention remains crucial to the survival and stability of ASEAN going back to the experience of what happened with "flexible engagement" and taking into account the fact that most of the ASEAN countries are still very much involved in the process of state building.

The following discussion was initiated by some comments of the former ASEAN secretary general RODOLFO SEVERINO. Concerning the differing approaches to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia within ASEAN, he added that one could also look at it as an example of the ability of ASEAN to overcome inevitable differences in foreign policy approaches. According to Ambassador Severino, one of the Achievements of ASEAN in this period was to be able to get a consensus behind one resistance and to reach a settlement of the problem. With reference to the characterization of the ARF as a "talk shop", he stated that there was nothing wrong with a talk shop, but in fact that it was necessary in order to build confidence and clarify positions. He then remarked that it was also in the ARF context that countries cooperated in very practical matters. As for the expansion of ASEAN, he emphasized that this development was not a mistake in his opinion because ASEAN chose not to divide Southeast Asia into ASEAN and non-ASEAN members. On the subject of the ASEAN Troika, he commented that it could have been effective if its terms of reference had not been defined. Finally, he pointed out that the ASEAN-China FTA was not a unique but only the first arrangement of that kind. The reason why the agreement with China had been achieved faster was the benevolent diplomacy of China. AMPALAVANAR SELVERAJAH, the Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to Germany, joined the discussion and posed the question whether Prof. Narine was aware of two forces at work that could make ASEAN more relevant in the future. Firstly, the internal trend, that ASEAN

developed a sense of a common destiny that it had to stay together to face the competition not to be left behind after China and India. Secondly, the external role imposed by the major powers active in the region. SHAUN NARINE countered that certainly it was very advantageous for ASEAN to be politically acceptable to all the major powers, which allowed for example the ARF to be meaningful because of its mediating role. However, he doubted to which extent that kind of role worked to the advantage of ASEAN. Regarding the sense of a common destiny of ASEAN, he was more sceptical about the actual ability of ASEAN to unify. In the following HERIBERT DIETER (SWP Berlin) stepped in with two brief comments. He suggested using the term “common vulnerability” instead of “interdependence” to characterize the countries situation in the Asian Crisis. He pointed out that the ASEAN countries actually tried to increase the level of interdependency by pooling financial resources but within the region. Concerning the rise of China, he extended Narine's argument by mentioning the simultaneous decline of the U.S. in the region, who was not even permitted as an observer in the East Asian Summit. SHAUN NARINE agreed with this observation of a relative decline of the influence of the U.S. However, he argued it might be that the “security pie” was getting bigger and only the Chinese role was expanding. Related to the enlargement of ASEAN, JÜRGEN RÜLAND (University of Freiburg) asked what the cost-benefit calculations had been beyond the community argument. The benefit of more bargaining power might be outweighed by disadvantages like fragmentation and economic diversity. The established non-interference principle could also impede a community managed solution of the problematic situation in Myanmar. He named major motivations such as to avoid China becoming more influential in some of the non-member states or internal balancing game within ASEAN that could also explain ASEAN's enlargement. SHAUN NARINE shared Jürgen Rüländ's opinion on these issues and added the argument that both Mahathir and Suharto had seen the enlargement as a major part of their own standing in history. Therefore, for Narine the enlargement had not been a hard-core calculation alone but with a lot of sentiment involved too. While joining the dominant opinion that the changing power context in the region unfolded very much in ASEAN's favour RICHARD STUBBS asked what the best theory through which to read ASEAN's history was. SHAUN NARINE responded that from an English School point of view the cooperation of ASEAN was very easy explainable because they cooperate out of self-interest. To answer the final question of MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY whether ASEAN had or had not achieved its self-defined objectives, SHAUN NARINE concluded that the ASEAN countries were self-interested countries that have learned to cooperate very effectively

within specific limits. From his point of view, trying to push developments like the Asian Charter that would run against their established practices too far and too soon was counterproductive.

## **Session 2: Cooperation Cultures**

### **Cultural origins and change of the ASEAN way**

After this general overview the second panel saw Jürgen Rüländ and Anja Jetschke examine the Cultural Origins of the norms embedded in the ASEAN Way. In their presentation, they addressed two major questions: What are the cultural legacies of the ASEAN Way? And how do these norms respond to major challenges?

Jürgen Rüländ in a first step defined the ASEAN Way as set of shared norms, a toolkit facilitating regional cooperation in South-East Asia. The core values of this interaction are reflected in the norms laid down in the treaty of amity and cooperation signed by all the ASEAN states. They include a number of core values such as non-interference into each other's internal affairs, peaceful dispute settlement, respect for territorial integrity, sovereign equality, mutual respect, tolerance, consensual consultation and a number of secondary norms such as informality, pragmatism, flexibility and personalism. According to Rüländ the scholarly views about the ASEAN Way are quiet divided: Liberal institutionalists and to an even greater extent social constructivists tended to regard the ASEAN Way as a set of norms increasingly strengthening the cohesion and hence the collective identity of the member states, while the so called realists remained more sceptical.

Rüländ and Jetschke took this debate as their point of departure. They then argued that much of the liberal institutionalist and social constructivist literature on the ASEAN way and ASEAN as a whole was quite deterministic and characterized by a normative and a teleological bias. To Rüländ this was less surprising for liberal institutionalism but puzzling for social constructivist approaches because they claim to be sensitive to cultural and cognitive factors. Rüländ made clear that most constructivists in some way or other argue that ASEAN norms are in a process of change that eventually brings them closer to a European type of contractualism, pooling of sovereignty and governance.

In their presentation, Rüländ and Jetschke challenged this view and argued that the ASEAN way reflected many traces of what could be called political realism. Rüländ continued to argue that mainstream constructivist argumentation was strongly influenced by a discursive rationalism, which overestimated the scope for the change of norms and ideas and consequently downplayed the resilience of the cultural legacies that determine the ASEAN way.

Before Rüländ and Jetschke elaborated on the issue of the cultural legacies shaping the norms of the ASEAN way and their response to major challenges they briefly outlined with five theoretical prepositions. First, they argued that state behaviour and state interest did not only respond to changes in the international of distribution of power and other material factors like economics, but were also guided by ideational factors as culture, identities and norms. These cultural variables in their opinion specify what states and decision makers deem appropriate behaviour. State behaviour was not only guided by cost-benefit-calculations and utility maximation but by ideational factors, as certain norms that are sanctioned by tradition. Their second assumption was that culture and the underlying norms were path-dependent and usually subject to only slow and incremental change. With a discursive and hence dynamic concept of culture, defined as the intersubjective negotiation of meaning, they expected to avoid the essentialism trap. To analyze and identify what constitutes appropriateness for ASEAN governments would then mean to identify certain ideational constants that form some sort of cultural sediment that influences the behaviour of actors and decision makers until the present day. These ideational sediments in the “collective memory” (J. Assmann) include ethnocentric tradition, nationalism, and certain components of the domestic political culture like pragmatism, flexibility, personalism. The third analytical step was then to examine to what extent these cultural sediments are amenable to change. Rüländ pointed out that there were catalysts for norm change. They consider crises and external shocks, changes triggered in the international distribution of power, domestic political changes or regional demonstration effects as the most powerful catalysts of norm change. Consequently, Rüländ and Jetschke looked into two of the most dramatic external shocks that ASEAN has experienced in the last twenty years, the end of the Cold War and the Asian Crisis. Fourth, to explain the impact of these crises, following J. Legro, they argued that ideas normally carry with them certain expectations about the results of collective behaviour. Ideas and norms change, when the consequences of external shock question their ability to interpret the political reality. If such misfits occur, it stimulates a critical evaluation and boosts the demands for a reassessment of the prevailing ideas and norms. The last assumption was that challenges of norms emanating from such crises provoke diverse reactions. They assumed, referring to Amichav Acharya’s work, that such responses could be either inertia (resistance), a process of localization (bridging misfits but maintain the identity) or a process of transformation (fundamental change).

Before Rüländ and Jetschke looked at how ASEAN responded to these major shocks, Rüländ briefly elaborated on some of the cultural sediments that according to them have a bearing on present day thinking of ASEAN cohesion and coherence. First, he mentioned the ethnocentric tradition in Southeast Asia that to a varying degree still had a bearing on the collective memory of decision makers and impeded trends to transcend the concept of national sovereignty. Rüländ claimed it was self-evident that the tradition of the Mandala system strongly supported a worldview shaped by the norms of political realism. The critical instability of this system elevated survival to a key interest of rulers, to whom political prudence also suggested to maintain a precarious equilibrium by alliances and balancing exercises. To answer the question why and to what extent the norms of political realism are preserved and guide political behaviour today, Rüländ argued that throughout the Southeast Asian political history of the last century the theme of state survival had been replicated and reconfirmed. This was the case mainly with the experiences of colonialism, the suffering of World War II, tensions of the Cold War and volatile processes of nation building. Rüländ and Jetschke admitted that they were not able to provide a carefully conducted discourse analysis to prove that ethnocentrism still affects contemporary political thinking. Yet they found many indications that these ideas persist even if in a trivialized form in everyday life and in random comments by policy makers. Jürgen Rüländ indicated, that pre-colonial ethnocentric worldviews maybe considered also as precursors of nationalism that became a major force in the region from the 19th century on. Considering the fact that nation building is still ongoing in some countries, Rüländ argued that it was comprehensible why Southeast Asian governments are reluctant to sacrifice this recently gained independence on the altar of supranational integration schemes. Finally, he described flexibility, pragmatism, personalism and familism as major elements of the local political cultures. They constitute personalized institutions of social interaction that are characterized by fluidity, uncertainty and flexibility and hence distrust. Therefore, Rüländ concluded that this type of policy-making in the domestic arena too, was very strongly influenced by notions of political realism.

After Jürgen Rüländ had outlined the cultural path dependencies explaining the centrality of the norms of political realism in Southeast Asian cooperation culture, Anja Jetschke continued and analyzed whether the two major external shocks had promoted norm change or not.

The first case, the end of the Cold War markedly changed the international distribution of power. According to Jetschke, ASEAN members had lost their strategic importance for the West and had faced strong democratizing pressures from the US and the EU. Political liberalization (Indonesia)



and changing domestic politics (Thailand) had nurtured hopes that ASEAN's central norms of non-interference would be challenged. Yet, Jetschke concluded, despite major changes in the international order, ASEAN norms of cooperation had not changed, but were even strengthened. First, she argued that the continuing economic success of ASEAN member states had consolidated ASEAN's image as one of the most successful regional organizations and had persuaded decision-makers that their norms of cooperation are appropriate. Second, Jetschke contended that ASEAN successfully had countered the human rights and democracy offensive of Western states with so-called Asian values. Convincing alternative values, economic success and the lack of support from civil society in many ASEAN states had lessened international pressures for change. Third, the "critical mass" of democratizing ASEAN states had been diminished when Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma joined the organization. And finally, Jetschke explained that those ASEAN member states that had been demanding the transformation of ASEAN's core principles developed a manifest self-interest in preserving the non-interference principle. Jetschke said, this could be exemplified with the Aceh conflict in Indonesia that made other governments acutely aware of their own vulnerability with regard to their territorial integrity.

Anja Jetschke then concluded for the first case that because central normative challenges were either suppressed or managed, inertia of ASEAN's central principles had been the outcome and that the central norms had not been challenged.

For the second case, the Asian financial crisis, she depicted a different picture. According to Jetschke, the crisis had struck the region at the height of its economic miracle and had developed the potential to threaten the ASEAN way fundamentally. It had left the region at the mercy of international financial institutions, thereby invalidated the principle of non-interference and challenged a main tenet of political legitimacy in ASEAN states.

Rüland and Jetschke believe that this was the case because the expectations placed by critics of the ASEAN Way on the new orthodoxy were not met. The IMF had discredited itself in the eyes of Asian governments with the controversial impact of IMF-driven reforms. Jetschke added that the surprisingly swift recovery from the crisis (with the exception of Indonesia) had been attributed to the effect of domestic policies contradicting IMF norms. She argued further that new ideas had not promised to be more effective compared to expectations in the ASEAN Way. As a result, a discursive process had set in that might be characterized as localization. Localization entailed a conservation of the ASEAN Ways ideational core, including the norm of non-interference, although the latter had been somewhat softened and ASEAN had adopted new

policies which appear to point into the direction of change (ASEAN's People's Assembly, ASEAN Interparliamentary Organization, ASEAN Community Plan of Action, ASEAN High Council, ASEAN Troika).

Jetschke finally emphasized that she did not argue that ASEAN norms were completely resilient to change but that the events had not sufficiently invalidated societal expectations in a way that would have had led to a fundamental change of ASEAN principles. She summarized that there were cultural sediments that continued to favour the norms of political realism embodied in the ASEAN Way even in the light of major challenges. Localization of new and essentially alien ideas would only take place in issue areas where costs might be controlled and as far as they served to relax external pressures of norm change and strengthen domestic legitimacy. According to Rüländ and Jetschkes the ideational frame of political realism was thus be likely to determine and shape ASEAN norms of cooperation.

In the following discussion ALFREDO ROBLES put forward the question how Rüländ/Jetschke would consider the recent practice of ASEAN members to sign a series of binding agreements (with the U.S., China, Japan, Korea and negotiations for an FTA with the EU). KATJA FREISTEIN noticed a slight contradiction between Rüländ and Jetschkes discursive, process-like definition of culture on the one hand and the path-dependency on the other. She also missed the institutional perspective in their paper and presentation. HERIBERT DIETER first argued that it was farfetched to say that the countries did not react to the end of the Cold War. In his opinion, the economic policies of the individual countries were definitely an answer to this situation. He also wanted to suggest a differing theoretical explanation. Using regime theory as a basis of the analysis one could clearly see that the two exogenously induced crises had a different dimension. To him, the end of the Cold War was not a big crisis for the region. Consequently, he argued that it was explainable that there was not much change in the early nineties but after 1997. RICHARD STUBBS came in on support of the speakers. In his opinion, the end of the Cold War was in fact a crisis point. If one took the Tilly-Argument seriously ("Wars make states"), then end of Wars had also a consequences for states. The changing international situation undermined the legitimacy of the state as a major intervener in economics and political affairs. Answering Robles question JÜRGEN RÜLÄND said that they had been only looking at ASEAN cooperation and not at the global institutional arena. If one looked at this process of institutionalization of domestic politics of course one could see change but this was not reflected

in the region's repository of cooperation norms. Concerning Freistein's notice of a theoretical contradiction, Rüländ argued that they were aware of the fact that with cultural explanations one was always treading a very thin line. According to him, Jan Assman's research on cultural memories helped them out of the predicament and showed that there is stability but at the same time incremental change. He agreed that they had left out the institutional perspective but here too, Rüländ would argue in the same way: institutionalization processes had not gone beyond a certain threshold that would suggest that there was a major change from previous ideas of cooperation. With reference to Dieter's objection related to the dimension of the crises, Rüländ countered that they would still argue it was an external shock because it had dramatically changed the power equation in the region and had led to a re-assessment of policies of the West vis-a-vis ASEAN. He assumed that the individual economic policies were answers to pressures of globalization not to the end of the Cold War. ANJA JETSCHKE agreed that they should expand the institutionalization perspective. She continued to state that their argument was not that culture was deterministic. She would rather say that these cultural traits are a kind of reservoir from which Asian governments draw sometimes their rationalizations for actions. WERNER PFENNIG's question then was – in addition to the Mandala system, Hinduism, sinic influence – what in the opinion of Rüländ and Jetschke the unique or core elements of political culture among ASEAN member states were.

Mme Domingo-Albert, the Ambassador of the Philippines, highly appreciated that Rüländ and Jetschke had stressed the dynamics of cultures so much in the presentation. Nevertheless, she suggested to add a broader framework of methods and to consider – beyond official statements – everyday practises of ordinary people. Further, she presented her definition of culture as intercultural or even trans-cultural management of meaning. In her opinion, it would be better to stress the use and the instrumentalization of cultural norms instead of trying to define and reduce them to certain items.

Concerning the question of ASEAN's core values JÜRGEN RÜLAND characterized pragmatism as the crucial aspect of the ASEAN Way and cooperation practices. In his opinion pragmatism would include statecraft, political prudence, balancing and on top of that – based in these norms – a feeling of we-ness as a norm based argumentation of cooperation. As for a required broader framework of methods he answered that it was not possible to apply the whole arsenal of social science methodology. Their point of departure was the assumption that when talking about norms cooperation and cultural norms related to the ASEAN way, they considered

in the first place elite-norms. Without having analyzed it systematically, Rüland would argue that you would find many clues also in popular culture that tally very well with the elite norms. He further added that the definition of culture as the "transcultural management of meaning" was somehow captured by the concept of localization.

### **Session 3: ASEAN as a Security Regime**

The third session traced ASEAN's record of peaceful conflict resolution between member states and explored the grouping's contribution to the present Asian security architecture. What changes had ASEAN's security concept undergone, how had ASEAN's vision of a security community affected the stability in the region, and what was ASEAN's contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)?

First, Herman Joseph S. Kraft, Assistant Professor at the University of the Philippines and Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies elaborated on ASEAN as a security community and its impact on regional security. He was followed by Jürgen Haacke, Professor at the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Politics, commenting on the topic ASEAN and the Great Powers: Navigating between China and the United States.

#### **ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and Conflict Resolution in East Asia.**

The two leading questions of Herman Kraft's presentation were firstly, to what extent ASEAN had been able to manage security in the region in the sense that it had mitigated the prospect of conflict between its members and was able to extend this ability throughout the region. Secondly, what changes had emerged in the way ASEAN perceives security, may these be implicit or explicit, and how these changes had affected ASEAN's role in regional security.

He reminded of the original intention behind the establishment of ASEAN, which was constructed as an organization that should primarily undertake cooperation in economic and social-cultural aspects. Nevertheless, from today's perspective there had always been an underlying security aspect as well, even though its members did not explicitly claim it in the beginning. According to Kraft it was during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia that the security dimension of ASEAN became more apparent. As one of the consequences, a dialogue on these matters developed within ASEAN, which eventually integrated the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences. Kraft stressed that despite the missing mandate for ASEAN to get involved in security matters, these were nonetheless addressed albeit in a rather informal, if not unconscious way. He emphasized that this underlying notion of security traditionally adhered to a framework of comprehensive security in the region. As the founding principles of ASEAN have been closely

related to state formation and nation building, its members agreed that regional security relied on the survival of the state. Regional security was, according to Kraft, secured by ensuring that there were strong states. However, in its early years cooperative mechanisms as far as security was concerned, did not exist within ASEAN. Over time, member states came to realize that the stability of the state was not exclusively threatened by military issues but rather non-traditional security matters.

When in the aftermath of the Cambodian conflict the idea of making ASEAN look into regional security grew stronger, the question arose what would be the right forum to address the issue. As Kraft elaborated, it was the Post-ministerial Conference (PMC) that was regarded as being a potential place to discuss the subject and tackle joint security issues. There were however two problems with the PMC. Since it involved exclusively ASEAN countries, other major regional powers, such as China and Russia, would have been excluded from the dialogue. In addition, the PMC was more of a bilateral dialogue process rather than one, which involved all partners talking to each other. As a result of this development, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created in 1994.

In Kraft's perception, one of the most important questions deriving from this process of security becoming a concern of the organization, was to what extent ASEAN had been in the driver's seat. He argues that in the face of its longevity and the extent in which ASEAN had been able to ensure that states in the region were not using force in their relations to each other it deserved this privilege. Citing Amitav Acharya he elaborated that ASEAN would be a security community in the sense that conflict and the use of violence against one another had become unlikely to occur in the relations between ASEAN states.

Kraft identified the ARF as a central forum to address these issues. However, it had been founded with the idea to be primarily a transmitter of ASEAN norms towards its dialogue partners, which was seen as a way of socializing them towards how ASEAN approaches security issues.

Therefore, the ARF was a dialogue forum, not a mechanism where material cooperation would be a concern. This soon caused criticism of those asking what ASEAN and the ARF were actually aiming for. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, these voices grew stronger. ASEAN seemed to have a crisis of its own, since its members returned to a more inward looking perspective while their interest in regional cooperation temporarily diminished.

In Kraft's view, the 1997 crisis had been a breaking point in ASEAN's approach towards regional security as it showed the inadequacy of the existing comprehensive security network and

supported those arguing for a stronger emphasis on non-traditional security aspects. He further stressed that even though ASEAN was not originally constructed for these matters, its member states came to realize that the effects of the crisis needed to be addressed through a more cooperative approach. The security threats identified by ASEAN at this time carried a number of common characteristics. Most of them dealt with aspects of human security, were transboundary phenomena and did not fit into the comprehensive security concept. In order to address them appropriately collective capacity ought to be developed step by step. According to Kraft, this process could be seen in form of small incremental changes, such as the kind of security issues that were addressed in Bali II or in the Vientiane Action Program (VAP).

He pointed out that the way ASEAN approached security had increasingly shifted over time from comprehensive security to one, which was very implicitly and maybe even unconsciously a human security frame. Recent discussions within the ARF or at the East Asian summit had addressed numerous aspects of human security, such as poverty eradication, energy security, influenza or natural disaster mitigation. However, Kraft remained skeptical about the current ability of ASEAN to act collectively on these matters since the existing framework is characterized through a low level of institutionalization. ASEAN therefore would have to undertake extraordinary measures in order to put itself in a better position and act effectively and collectively in the context of human security issues. Concluding his presentation Kraft referred to the ASEAN Charter, which could be the next important step towards a more coherent security approach depending on to what extent the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) would actually be included in the document.

## **ASEAN and the Great Powers: Navigating between China and the United States**

During his presentation Dr. Jürgen Haacke took a closer look at the relationship between ASEAN the United States and China and addressed various strategies of the Association to enhance cooperation. In the very beginning he pointed out that in order to better understand the way ASEAN approached each of the major powers, it would be necessary to look in significant detail on the foreign policies and security practices of its individual member states, which would be mediated through ASEAN. After a descriptive account of ASEAN relations towards the major

powers Haacke critically examined the theoretically informed literature on the topic and addressed the debate about hedging.

With regard to ASEAN's relationship to the U.S., Haacke noted that there had been significant changes taking place over the last years. Milestones were the 2002 U.S. – ASEAN cooperation plan, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative and the 2005 Joint Visions Statement that led to the signing of the framework document for a plan of action to implement the so-called ASEAN - U.S. enhanced partnership. Remarkably enough, the U.S. had been very positive in its response to move beyond the bilateral relationships and focus more on the multilateral level. Nevertheless, all the agreements focus almost exclusively on economic matters while security played only a lesser role and where it is named, it addressed non-traditional challenges.

The relationship between ASEAN and China underwent significant transformation on the multilateral level a few years earlier. Haacke pointed out that this had to be understood partly as a reaction to the growing importance of China and its attempt to demonstrate that its rise is going to be peaceful. Whereas in the 1990s there were significant disagreements and concerns particularly in relation towards Chinese claims in the South China Sea, by 2007 the picture had fundamentally changed with ASEAN and China moving towards a FTA by 2010 involving at least six of the member states. China had been very keen to develop cooperation in all fields even in security beyond the nontraditional security issues. Steps along the way included the Asian financial crisis and China's interest to prevent a devaluation of its currency, the following framework on comprehensive economic cooperation and the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea, which had helped that conflict to be shoved. Haacke furthermore mentioned Beijing's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 that from ASEAN's perspective had been extremely important since China was the first major power to do so; the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and the memorandums of understanding and declarations on nontraditional security.

As two substantial differences of China's relation with ASEAN in comparison with the U.S. Haacke identified China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and its progress towards a FTA, whereas the United States did not join the agreement and instead of an FTA established a trade and investment framework accord last year. He furthermore contended that the U.S. had been coaxed in some measure to actually engage ASEAN more on the multilateral level, whereas in the Chinese case many of the initiatives came from Beijing.



Against these empirical findings Haacke raised the question whether this would already satisfactorily answer the question how ASEAN navigates between America and China. From the cases mentioned, he drew a number of conclusions to approach the issue. Accordingly, ASEAN clearly wanted all great powers to have a stake in ASEAN cooperation, to have them contribute to the region. Furthermore, it was the multilateral dimension, which had been emphasized beyond the bilateral level. Nonetheless, in his eyes these findings provided only a limited explanation. Since ASEAN has no Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it would be necessary to look below the level of multilateral relationships to make sense of what actually was happening. Haacke referred to explanations from literature to analytically approach how Southeast Asian states have developed their basic strategic stances in relation to both the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Consequently, there would be four different stances that could be taken: Balancing, whether hard or soft, would involve internal as well as external balancing and might be intensive or not. Authors would regard this strategy as a possible way to conceptualize the relationship between ASEAN and the PRC. Another model would be bandwagoning that suggested that ASEAN states might try to make as much profit out of the relationship with the major powers as possible and which would prevail in regional order building over the longer term. Other ideas were binding and engagement or deference. The latter suggested the possibility of a situation where Southeast Asian states agreed to hierarchical relations of an informal nature as regards China. According to Haacke the literature suggested that ASEAN would pursue more than one of these stance simultaneously, a behavior which was encapsulated in the term hedging. It was defined as a strategy against hegemonic domination. Hedging is multidimensional and is adopted because of uncertainties about the success of existing policies. It therefore would cultivate a middle position between engagement and balancing. But while the literature looked at triangular relationships between ASEAN, China and the U.S., the usage of the concept had always been with reference towards relations between China and ASEAN.

In his presentation Haacke hinted at a number of problems with this approach. As hedging would suggest that ASEAN avoids making a definitive commitment, the question would have to be asked how the Association acted in event of a major crisis between the two major powers. However, this was not what the literature addressed, as it almost exclusively focused on ASEAN's policies and strategies towards China. The key to the hedging concept was the uncertainty about future moves of the major powers towards Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there were several reasons to doubt the explanatory strength of the hedging concept. As Haacke

elaborated, the comfort levels between Southeast Asia and China are rising, while there was considerable uncertainty about the strategic position of the United States in the longer run. If the literature would be as good as it claimed, it remained to be asked why it did not look at double hedging. Furthermore, the difference between hedging and balancing was somewhat unclear. Hedging was about addressing a future threat, whilst balancing addressed a present threat. Haacke criticized this distinction with the argument that if a state or regional organization had certain core values at a particular time and defined a future threat against this background, it would actually not look at a future but a present threat. Last but not least, he argued that the key exponents of the hedging approach would arrive at very different conclusions as to how individual ASEAN member states would behave. Some scholars would claim that only two of the ten ASEAN member states are actually hedging, namely Thailand and Myanmar while all others are balancing. Others would differentiate between Singapore and the Philippines as the two countries, which were closest to the U.S., look at Indonesia and Malaysia as trying to steer the middle road and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam that would have to deal with China in a different way because of the geographical proximity that existed between them.

Haacke expressed his dissatisfaction with these approaches and added that apparently scholars would have to allow for a lot of variation for the ways in which individual Southeast Asian states relate to China and maybe even towards the U.S.. Instead, a more complex approach adopting different kinds of theories from security studies and foreign policy analysis would be necessary. It could help to explain the significance of factors like regime security considerations, the particular development needs individual ASEAN states might have and the various domestic constraints, which tended to be quite different across the region. Further aspects like the influence of leadership changes in relation to policies or different historical memories might provide additional explanations of ASEAN's relation towards the two major powers.

Haacke concluded that ASEAN in many ways mediated perspectives of individual members but at the same time often failed to address those issues that were of relevance for the region as a whole. These were rather put forward on a bilateral level between individual member states and the U.S. or China. How ASEAN then as a group would relate to these major powers could only be one aspect of how Southeast Asia deals with the two powers. Conceiving ASEAN as a diplomatic community without examining the underlying developments within its individual states would, according to Haacke, provide only an incomplete account of how the region really related to the two powers. From the evidence about ASEAN's relations to the United States and

the PRC, Haacke suggested that ASEAN's collective approach, as a diplomatic community would be one of engagement rather than anything beyond that. Furthermore, ASEAN countries should not be understood from an analytical point of view as being engaged in hedging vis a vis China or the U.S.. This term would suggest that they were not committed to develop a relation with these powers. Alternatively, Haacke argued that there would be sufficient evidence to the fact that there is much interest in deepening and broadening these relationships. With regards to the interpretation of the existing security and defense cooperation between the U.S. and individual ASEAN member states, Haacke urged scholars to explore the motivations behind these agreements as they really exist and not to draw early conclusions on the ground of the balancing paradigm, which easily could provide explanations that often fail to provide in-depth analysis about real backgrounds. Finally, ASEAN as a whole and its members had benefited greatly from cooperation with the major powers and there would be a potential for the Association to manage these ties to the extent this is possible. However, as Haacke stressed, much of the effort would be undertaken not necessarily at the regional but at the bilateral level. In the end ASEAN did not have and did not want to pursue a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

With these concluding remarks, Jürgen Haacke closed his presentation and the floor opened for discussion. One participant commented on the aspect of actorness of ASEAN and pointed out that the Association represented a strategically and economically highly important region. Therefore, many powers besides the United States and China would approach ASEAN with their own demands. He suggested that the organization might not actively pursue a strategy of its own, but instead just responded to initiatives of other powers and then would try to get the best of all worlds. Jürgen Haacke agreed with the fact that ASEAN would be an interesting regional partner. Concerning the hypothesis that ASEAN might just react on demands imposed from the outside he responded that even though many of the issues addressed by ASEAN might have not originated within the association itself, this would not mean that it is purely reacting. Instead, he suggested thinking of ASEAN as a diplomatic community, which would increase the bargaining power of its members and therefore could claim actorness to a certain degree albeit within limitations defined by the member states.

Ambassador AMPALAVANAR SELVERAJAH acknowledged that the presenters had rightfully understood how ASEAN was approaching the security question. He explained that

ASEAN would try to engage all powers, in an open and inclusive architecture giving them a stake in the prospect of the region. Furthermore, he pointed out that a recent event remained unmentioned in both presentations referring to the first ASEAN defense ministers meeting last year. Jürgen Haacke agreed that the meeting in fact had been an interesting step in the development of a security structure in the region but at the same time warned to overestimate it. As a key objective of the Vientiane Plan of Action (VAP) it complemented meetings on formal and informal levels, but what it really signified would be hard to tell at the current moment.

JÜRGEN RÜLAND challenged Herman Kraft's idea of a transformation of the security concept from comprehensive security, which is state centric, to what increasingly resembles like a human security concept. The latter should be understood as rather a concept of individual security which entailed a sacrifice of sovereignty as it subjected non-complying countries to foreign intervention. This means that if there are threats to human security in one ASEAN member country, ASEAN would have to resort to collective action. This is definitely not the case.

In his eyes it remained therefore questionable whether the human security concept was a correct description of what was taking place within ASEAN especially as there seemed to be considerable differences in the semantics. In his response KRAFT pointed out that the way he had framed the shift in the perception of security was implicit and mostly unconscious. ASEAN never acknowledged human security as a framework per se and the only time it had been really recognized as part of its agenda was in the context of the East Asian Study Group. From the topics presented by ASEAN in the context of the VAP it however became apparent that the association would increasingly put forward concerns that affected the human individual much more than state security. In the VAP was reference made to human rights even though in general ASEAN would tend to address specific topics like women's and children's rights rather than following an explicit human rights approach. Another indicator for the increasing awareness of human rights would be the Eminent Person Group (EPG) recommendations, which actually addressed the possibility of an ASEAN Commission of Human Rights. Kraft concluded that even though it might be a step-by-step process, the fact that human rights were actually implicitly addressed would support the idea of a shift from the traditional comprehensive approach towards a concept of human security.

The PANEL MODERATOR raised the question whether, with regards to the aspect of human rights, the introduction of a value-orientated strategy of regionalization could be helpful to enhance regional cooperation and maybe even advance mechanisms on a multilateral or

supranational level. In his reply HAACKE remained skeptical about the potential of a value-based strategy. Even though multiple groups and non-governmental organizations were increasingly pushing the issue, it needed to be asked to what extent human rights could really be the front incentive of transformation within ASEAN. It might as well prove to be counterproductive in the sense that it would lead to great debates that could only delay the process of integration. Finding spaces to address human rights more implicitly would therefore really be a strategy of advancing things little by little and in the end getting ASEAN to acknowledge human rights issues as a central concern.

Concluding the discussion the PANEL MODERATOR suggested that a more detailed debate about the nature of ASEAN would eventually have to emerge. Among the topics to be addressed, the question whether it should be a value or interest based community would be one of the most interesting. Besides, he encouraged scholars to make more use of the systematic results of peace and security research in order to come up with a suitable definition of security and engage in comparative regional research to enhance the debate on regionalization and regionalism.

## **Session 4: The rise of non-traditional security challenges – can the ASEAN Way cope?**

The panel first saw Associate Prof. Dr. Ralf Emmers from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He elaborated on the fact that non-traditional security issues had increasingly replaced conventional inter-state conflicts as major threats. Terrorism, separatism and piracy had achieved a lot of attention within ASEAN as a result. Was the Association capable of dealing with these challenges and if so, what were the strategies to address the matter?

The second speaker was Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, also from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. She stressed that the management of pandemics and infectious diseases was another though less frequently studied example of non-traditional security issues. However, in a globalized world pandemics and infectious diseases might have lethal consequences for the Southeast Asian region as well as other parts of the world. In her presentation she assessed ASEAN's approach towards the topic.

### **Fighting Organized Crime**

In his presentation Ralf Emmers talked about ASEAN's response to the threat of terrorism and sea piracy. As a key momentum in the way the Association responded to both, he identified a consensual approach to security based on comprehensive security and the principle of resilience. The emphasis however, would lie on the domestic and bilateral, in some cases trilateral cooperation with ASEAN taking the role of an umbrella organization. In his view this bottom up approach was causing a variety of unsatisfying results, as the national base sometimes tended to be weak, undermining the measures adopted at the multilateral level. Emmers elaborated on the role of ASEAN as a forum for consultations and an instrument of its members to reinforce the political will among them to address certain issues. It furthermore served a representative function with regard to the PCR, EU and U.S.. Against this background some scholars would tend to draw the conclusion that ASEAN had de facto no practical relevance when trying to address security problems while others overestimated its role in managing transnational threats. Emmers said that he would try to find some kind of a middle ground between both positions. Comprehensive security and the principle of resilience would be the two concepts to clinch his analysis. Both ideas had been endorsed by ASEAN in 1976 through the ASEAN Concord

Document, which specifically referred to national resilience and regional resilience as an ASEAN doctrine to security. Once national resilience would be reached the Association could move on to the attainment of regional resilience. As this understanding was formulated in the context of the fight against insurgency movements, it however remained questionable whether these notions could be applied to terrorism and sea piracy. Both phenomena were primarily a threat to domestic security that challenged national governments and political regimes first. Individual member states however had reached very different levels of national resilience when seeking to address these problems, hindering a strong cooperative approach.

Emmers analysis first focused on sea piracy. The states being most affected by the threat were Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. From a comparative perspective it became visible that the three had reached very different levels of national resilience. Indonesia had extended its policy operations to address the problem but success was limited as constraints in terms of missing equipment and insufficient funding as well as an ongoing rivalry between its navy and police concerning the authority of arrest blocked progress. According to Emmers, Singapore and Malaysia had adopted a much more aggressive approach. Both had been eager to provide naval security in their territorial waters through successful domestic capacity building. Besides the different levels of national resilience Emmers noted that there were elements of bilateral and trilateral cooperation as well, referring to the 2005 “Eyes in the Sky” operation that introduced cooperative air surveillance in the Malacca Street. However, it remained to be asked, which role ASEAN played in this context. He argued that the Association did not seek to complement on the domestic efforts by its member states but would rather be of significance in providing a rhetorical and political position that reinforced the engagement of the individual states and fostered collaboration with other major powers. Emmers listed different reasons for ASEAN’s weak multilateral profile in the case of sea piracy. Most importantly there would be disagreement among its member states concerning the way the issue should be treated. Singapore had a tendency to address it as a security question because of the possible link to maritime terrorism. Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand considered it as a law enforcement issue, primarily because they were concerned about their sovereignty and feared interference by the great powers if the issue would be securitized. At the same time one should be careful with early judgments about the relevance of ASEAN in this context as Emmers provided examples for successful ASEAN led arrangements concerning sea piracy as well. The ASEAN plus three process had been dealing with the topic since its 1990 summit. The group arranged a government experts

meeting on piracy that eventually led to the creation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), which was not joined by Indonesia and Malaysia because of sovereignty concerns.

In the case of terrorism ASEAN had produced numerous declarations. Despite their irrelevance regarding the operational level of counter terrorism, Emmers stressed the symbolic and political value of such measures. With the ASEAN ministerial meeting on transnational crime the Association would have furthermore adopted a specific mechanism to tackle the threat of terrorism. Emmers referred to further proposals to set up a center for counter terrorism studies and emphasized that even though plans were not yet realized it would still be important to acknowledge that they exist. In addition to the bilateral collaboration between individual countries and the U.S. in this specific area, ASEAN had established a direct link with the United States through a joint declaration for cooperation to combat terrorism in 2002.

Towards the end of his presentation Emmers concluded that albeit the predominant agreements at a national and sub-regional level the multilateral dimension nevertheless had a significant role to play. It however was primarily symbolic, tried to set up structures for cooperation and finally served as a tool to engage directly with dialogue partners from outside the region. ASEAN itself was not in the business of tackling either one of the both security threats Emmers discussed in his presentation. But this would not mean that ASEAN was insignificant. It did offer some kind of institutional capacity to cooperate on transnational issues and an avenue for political and diplomatic agreement. Putting his findings in perspective, Emmers reminded the conference participants that counterterrorism activities were not something international institutions were normally actively involved in. Even in the EU with a much higher level of institutionalization, counterterrorism would be rarely dealt with at the supranational level but rather addressed through bilateral cooperation.

## **Managing Pandemics and Infectious Diseases**

The presentation of Mely Caballero-Anthony addressed the concept of non-traditional security and analyzed the threat through infectious diseases in Southeast Asia as an example for an issue that transcended not only national borders but also regional entities.

With regard to the preceding discussions she acknowledged a growing interest in the idea of non-traditional security but remained skeptical whether there was consensus about what the concept really meant. As a minimum definition she proposed that it would include any threat, which



would be non-military in nature. With regards to her panel she put forward that the security threats addressed in the previous presentation both had been state-centric and therefore could be categorized as traditional security concerns. Looking at the nature of the actor however would support the argument that they were not actually traditional but nontraditional as well. In the case of infectious diseases the categorization would be easier. Since the topic had usually been addressed as a health issue, it was due to the increasing securitization of numerous fields that it became a non-traditional security concern as well. Caballero-Anthony identified three reasons for this shift in categorization. The outbreaks of SARS and the Avian Flu had led to an increasing concern about a next pandemic. There was a collective awareness that it would not be a question whether but rather when the next pandemic broke out. Furthermore, the increased global mobility of people greatly enhanced the danger of a fast spreading of new infectious diseases while factors like the overuse of antibiotics, overcrowded urban areas with poor sanitation and global warming added to the likelihood of an outbreak.

SARS as well as the Avian Flu had caught Southeast Asia off guard. According to Caballero-Anthony none of the affected countries was prepared for the case. In the context of ASEAN institutions she noted that there had been no institutionalized form of public health cooperation at all. This changed significantly. Both pandemics generated an unprecedented type of collaboration between ASEAN member states. As a key to success Caballero-Anthony identified the fact that there was a common way of framing the subject as a security issue. Accordingly a variety of cooperative measures were established. ASEAN founded a taskforce on infectious diseases, provided funds for collective response and agreed on the exchange of information. Furthermore, the Association created common protocols about what measures to take in case of an outbreak. As Caballero-Anthony pointed out preventive actions were disregarded for the most part. Even more important was the fact that due to the nature of the threat effective counteractive actions would have to go beyond national and even beyond regional response. Infectious diseases could only be tackled on a global level. According to the presenter, the different levels of developments and policies in the affected Southeast Asian countries would negatively determine this transition from the regional to the global stage. In order to address infectious diseases effectively, countries had to establish a surveillance system. But only a limited number of countries would actually be able to create and maintain such a mechanism. Furthermore, in some countries the defense budget would largely outweigh the resources available to deal with health issues further limiting the ability to cooperate effectively on a global level. Besides the aspect of limited resources, certain

policies were likely to jeopardize collective action on the global level as well. Caballero-Anthony reminded the audience that Indonesia had actually refused to send samples of the avian flue to the WHO. She pointed out that while the country was badly criticized for its behavior there were very rational reasons for Indonesia to act this way. According to Caballero-Anthony it feared exploitation once the virus would be handed over to medical companies, which would then develop an antivirus for the developed world. In order to tackle these difficulties she proposed a global public goods approach that was further developed in her paper.

Concluding her presentation, Caballero-Anthony summarized that the non-traditional security threat of infectious diseases had led to a rethinking within ASEAN about the kinds of security issues that could be included in the security agenda of the Association. Additionally she emphasized the need to build capacity in the region with regard to the different levels of development in ASEAN's member states. Finally, a regional solution by itself would be insufficient. ASEAN therefore would have to reinforce an open regionalism reaching out towards other powers to make a global response possible. Caballero-Anthony stressed that there was a certain momentum to tackle the topic, as the shock, which SARS and the Avian Flue had caused, was still apparent. Nevertheless, issues of sovereignty would have to be addressed in the context of surveillance systems, which was bound to raise tensions.

HEINER HÄNGGI opened the discussion by raising the question whether ASEAN governments acknowledged that their classic security sectors were dysfunctional or lacked capacity in view of the new challenges and if they did how they addressed the issue.

In his reply RALF EMMERS referred to the problem of transnational crime, which in fact was a law enforcement issue. He pointed out that most countries were well aware of their individual lacks in capacity. Cooperative mechanisms to tackle the issue were partly in place and included besides others the ASEAN Chief of National Police (APOL) process.

Former ASEAN Secretary General RODOLFO SEVERINO commented on both presentations. He agreed with Ralf Emmers positive assessment about the importance of ASEAN declarations and went even further with his own assessment. Accordingly, these statements were not only politically significant but also sent strong signals to the international community as to where ASEAN would position itself. An important document that remained unmentioned in Emmers presentation was the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism adopted in January this year. In Severino's opinion it deserved special attention since it contained a definition of terrorism,

outlined the obligations of ASEAN member states and described steps that the Association planned to take in countering terrorism. Concerning the threat through infectious diseases Severino raised the question why it would matter whether or not it was considered as a security issue or not. The more important question would be whether ASEAN cooperation was effective or not. In this context the anti-SARS campaign was one of the successes of ASEAN cooperation. Since everybody recognized it as a threat consensus on collective measures was easy to achieve. Severino emphasized the aspect of pragmatism on the part of ASEAN, which made it possible to closely cooperate with China and Australia on the issue.

SHAUN NARINE asked Ralf Emmers to elaborate on the role the U.S. had played in pushing the terrorism agenda within ASEAN. EMMERS explained that with the exception of some countries in Southeast Asia the threat of terrorism was only fully accepted after the Bali bombings had taken place. Eventually numerous agreements and joint declarations on the issue were put forward by both actors. As an interesting aspect of the cooperation, Emmers noted that there was much concern in Southeast Asia about the risk of U.S. interference in the region, which was directly addressed in the 2002 declaration. It stated that ASEAN countries were in charge of their own to fight against terrorism. In another section the declaration stated that the presence of American military in the region would be a source of concern. This notion, which was introduced by Vietnam and Indonesia, created considerable tensions with the Philippines that had already approved presence of U.S. troops in the south.

The next question addressed Mely Caballero-Anthony. The PARTICIPANT wanted to know whether ASEAN countries would be able to even theoretically develop a capacity to deal with a large-scale epidemic on their own. He suggested that the Association might inevitably have to turn towards support from the outside. In her response CABALLERO-ANTHONY explained that in the face of a threat like SARS or the Avian Flu all international actors would have to work together to enhance the different levels of domestic capacity.

JÖRN DOSCH drew attention to the factor of external pressure as a possible cause for ASEAN to take cooperative action on non-traditional threats. He then referred to the idea of regional resilience and asked Ralf Emmers whether the concept was still in the repertoire of ASEAN or not. Concerning the external pressure EMMERS related to the case of piracy. In his opinion there would not be an “Eyes in the Sky” program if outside powers had not pushed for it. The concerned countries themselves were fully occupied with other problems that overlaid the issue. When some powers started to push for a solution, countries like Indonesia felt threatened in their

sovereignty and all the sudden displayed a certain willingness to cooperate on a bilateral and trilateral ground. Furthermore, Emmers explained that the concept of national resilience would remain a major idea within ASEAN member states. He pointed out that there had always been a strong notion of national resilience to the debate on terrorism. It remained a very popular term, which strongly resonated in Southeast Asia because many of the problems occurring would still root primarily in domestic conditions.

## **Special lecture: Why ASEAN matters for Europe. An agenda for a closer relationship**

The special lecture by the former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino now at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore was one of the highlights of the conference.

*A full transcript of the lecture can be downloaded at our website. In the following we present only some thoughts of his presentation and the adjacent discussion.*

In the first part of his speech, Ambassador Severino introduced the audience to the achievements and failures of ASEAN in the past 40 years. He strongly emphasized the successes of ASEAN and ASEAN countries that contributed to keep Southeast Asia stable and at peace since its foundation, and placed it at a political environment for economic progress and peace.

The Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in ASEAN, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN+3, the Asian Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit, these were only a few of the developments that Severino mentioned in this regard. Concerning the difficulties of ASEAN, he talked about the challenge of globalization and some of the critics ASEAN was facing. He reflected on the question why ASEAN was not strengthening its institutions enough and concluded that the ASEAN member states need to develop a deeper sense of common shared regional interests. According to him, one possibility to overcome this situation was the ASEAN Charter.

In the second part of his speech related to the ASEAN-EU relations, Severino made clear that no one in Asia expected or wanted the ASEAN regional organization to become a clone of the EU. However, ASEAN could learn a lot from the EU, mainly in practical measures as product standards, customs coordination, environmental regulations etc, but more generally in the creation and evolution of its institutions and processes. Severino finally mentioned two critical points in the ASEAN-EU relations that could be changed to reach a closer partnership. First, according to him, the case of Myanmar held the EU-ASEAN relations hostage for a long time. He pointed out, that the EU-policy of embargos would not lead to any progress in this situation. Second he commented on the attendance of higher ranked European politicians in important

meetings with ASEAN countries or the organization itself. He suggested reaching a similar level of attendance in these meetings.

In the following discussion, JÜRGEN CHROBOG commented on the Myanmar issue and said, that because of the public opinion in the European Countries, it was very difficult for the government in Germany and other governments to ignore what is going on in Myanmar. He agreed with Ambassador Severino on the observation of an asymmetry of attendance but explained that the commitments of each government in Europe have reached a point where it was not feasible anymore to attend all the meetings. Therefore, he was wondering whether these meetings really made so much sense. He suggested focussing more on the issues where fields of practical cooperation could be identified and asked for Ambassador Severino's ideas on these common issues and interests. RODOLFO SEVERINO responded that he had neglected to stress, that the EU should not stop raising the questions of human rights. This was not only being true to the values of Europe but also necessary for the improvement of people's lives in Myanmar itself - as well as ASEAN-EU relations. Nevertheless, what he thinks is counterproductive is the policy of embargoes and boycotts. On the question of meetings, he agreed that ASEAN-EU meetings at a lower level than leaders and on specific practical issues of cooperation made eminent sense. However, the Asia-Europe-Meetings were conceived as symbolic gatherings that may not produce immediate results in terms of practical cooperation but would send the message that Europe and ASEAN are working together. SHAUN NARINE mentioned the comparatively small intra-regional trade and asked how important economic interaction was to build up such sense of regional identity that RODOLF SEVERINO confirmed that Intra-ASEAN trade made up only for about 25 percent of ASEANs trade. However, the normally considered advantage of integrating the regional economy was the regional market that helped to attract investments. He added that ASEAN should not so much learn from Europe in achieving a regional identity a la Europe but in institution building on the basis of common interests. JÜRGEN RÜLAND proposed to let meetings of Troikas overcome the attendance issue. RODOLFO SEVERINO considered this to be feasible but pointed out that the ASEAN Troika would have to be revitalized to do this. HERIBERT DIETER enquired on the consequences of individual ASEAN members negotiating FTAs with other countries and the possible outcome of a weakening of ASEAN. RODOLFO SEVERINO made clear that all the FTAs ASEAN was negotiating as a group, had to be signed by the members individually, because ASEAN has no legal entity. In his

opinion, depending on the contents, bilateral FTAs did not weaken ASEAN. For example, the FTA with China was of trade in goods, and basically was an agreement to eliminate tariffs. The bilateral agreement of Singapore with the United States encompassed not only trade but also investment, intellectual property and environmental considerations. Heading to a completely different topic Another participant asked for Severino's personal view regarding the present status of the ASEAN secretariat, its size, efficiency and its future prospects. RODOLF SEVERINO responded that it certainly had not reached its optimum size. After the ASEAN's decision in 1992 to set up a proper secretariat, currently the professional staff counts 45 persons, recruited from the member states, and about 135 local employees. According to Severino, if one compared this figures with the 30000 employees of the European Commission it would become clear that the secretariat had to be reinforced. As for the areas of the institutional strengthening, Severino mentioned the secretariat's capacity for research, public information and statistics. However, aside from manpower, finance and physical facilities, the secretariat also needed more authority to speak for the Association.

Finally, JOHN RAVENHILL asked a question on the proposed ASEAN-EU FTA: Supposing the EU attempts to insist on clauses on human rights and labour standards - how should ASEAN respond? Rodolfo Severino responded that ASEAN always had regarded labour standards as a disguised protectionist policy. Relating to human rights, he was not sure how the position was now, but some years ago, from ASEAN's point of view human rights and labour rights were not supposed to be part of trade agreements, but should be discussed in other fora. Certainly, the acceptance of such clauses would depend on how they were formulated.

## **Conference Day 2**

The second day of the Conference was opened by the fifth session turning to economic aspects of ASEAN's development.

### **Session 5: ASEAN as an economic regime**

The goal of this session was to assess ASEAN's progress towards an "economic community" and explored as to what extent this goal was compromised by the recent trend towards bilateral and minilateral free trade areas. This implied the question as to what extent the rush towards bilateral Free Trade Agreements was conditioned by security concerns and balancing games. First, John Ravenhill, Professor at the Department of International Relation, Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies, Australian National University talked about the integration of the ASEAN economies towards a common market. Second, Heribert Dieter, head of the Global issues section, SWP German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, talked about ASEAN's contribution to the emerging East Asian monetary regionalism.

### **Integrating ASEAN Economies: Towards a Common Market?**

John Ravenhill first analyzed the events in the last decade related to ASEAN's economic integration and then to look forward to the efforts to realize an ASEAN economic community with the deadline of 2015. As one could get from the title of his presentation, he was not persuaded that ASEAN's efforts have been all that successful. To evaluate ASEAN's record he proposed not using the European yardstick but judging its performance by meeting the objectives that ASEAN has set for itself. To foreshadow his presentation he added that he did not want to go much beyond a materialist explanation for the relative lack of progress in economic integration. In his opinion one of the striking points about most of the sessions until then was how statist they were in their approach and how non-state actors rarely figured. Therefore, one focus was in particular on private sector actors.

Ten years ago, ASEAN and the region suffered from the financial crisis. However, ASEAN surprisingly emerged strengthened from the crisis and from that experience. John Ravenhill proposed two primary reasons for this. First, ASEAN had placed itself at the centre of the new pan-Asian regionalism that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis: ASEAN+3. Secondly,



China and Japan's competition in signing FTAs with ASEAN as a whole had reinforced ASEAN as a institution in this process. However, ASEAN also took its own initiatives in response to the crisis. According to Ravenhill, the most important ones were the Proclamation of the ASEAN vision 2020 in 1997 where the members pledged to fully implement the free trade agreement. Secondly, the Hanoi Summit in the next year decided the acceleration of the implementation of the FTA and the putting into place of the framework for the realization of this vision 2020. Ravenhill then gave details about the increasing challenges that ASEAN faced in this context: First, growing competition from China, in particular as it entered the final stages of its negotiations for accession to the WTO. Second, India appearing on the horizon and finally the proliferation of bilateral preferential trade agreements with Singapore being the pioneer. At the present time, as maintained by Ravenhill, around fifty unilateral preferential trade agreements involving ASEAN as a whole and individual ASEAN members are being implemented, negotiated or under study. John Ravenhill pointed out that in this context, the FTA negotiations had exposed the weaknesses of ASEAN as an international actor because ASEAN had no legal personality so it was difficult for partners to know what they are exactly negotiating with. In the absence of any common external tariff, trade partners face different negotiations that they have to enter with individual ASEAN states. Ravenhill expounded, that perhaps equally important, these bilateral preferential trade agreements especially the one that Singapore signed with the United States proposed a much deeper and a more rapid integration than ASEAN states had actually signed up for within ASEAN itself. According to him, this was entirely contrary to the ASEAN principle of ASEAN first when it comes to economic collaboration. These developments reinforced a sense of frustration that existed within the region at the pace of integration. After this overview, John Ravenhill tried an assessment of ASEAN's economic integration: despite substantial reduction in overall tariffs, the grouping had fallen behind schedule moving to zero-tariffs. He forecasted that it would not be until 2010 that tariffs would be completely removed. According to him, this was not a very impressive pace of progress by international standards. This situation was aggravated by the fact that non-tariff-barriers were far more significant as impediments to international trade. Similarly, the pace in liberalization of services had been very slow

To understand the slow progress, Ravenhill suggested looking at the institutional weaknesses underlying this process. He characterized the ASEAN member's approach complete as completely unwilling to make binding treaty commitments. Although most ASEAN members

were in the WTO and had accepted legally binding obligations there, they had not been going to sign up to similar obligations within ASEAN itself. In this line, Ravenhill argued that this was compounded by an under-resourced secretariat, ineffective dispute settlement mechanisms and by a failure to utilize the mechanisms that existed. In the following, he elaborated on the question whether the proposed ASEAN economic community (EAC) could fix the problems. With the EAC ASEAN has committed itself to build up a single market and production base. However, Ravenhill explained that the precondition of a customs union was going to cause problems for ASEANs given Singapore's status as a free port and zero-tariffs. The same was true for the necessity to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers, build up some sort of monetary cooperation and a change in institutions and in institutional culture. John Ravenhill suggested establishing some form of majority voting as the primary decision making process within ASEAN in order to get ahead of a lowest common denominator approach. He argued that the economic reality of ASEAN was that quite a few of its members really did not count for very much at all but could impede the groupings progress.

To explain the slow pace of liberalization and the failure to move beyond shallow liberalization, Ravenhill suggested that one might find the explanation for this in domestic interests, which was in particular a lack of enthusiasm from business for intra-ASEAN integration. One of the reasons for this was the very small difference between the external tariff, the most-favoured nation tariff, and ASEAN's preferential tariff is for most of ASEANs major economies. Given ASEAN's increasingly flexible exchange rates this means that any tariff advantage could disappear with a five per cent move in exchange rates over a short period. According to Ravenhill, for the most part the private sector (with the exception of Japanese automobile companies setting up construction networks in the region) had not been very enthusiastic simply because intra-ASEAN trade made up only for a very small part of the overall trade. He concluded that the consequence of this was a protectionist run within these countries of clientelist networks that were interested in maintaining barriers to intra-ASEAN trade.

To sum up, Ravenhill stated that although economically there was a relatively impressive development in ASEAN, overall there was the problem that ASEAN is making slower progress than other regional integration schemes. In the economic sector, ASEAN had to go beyond rhetoric to commitment or else its credibility was going to be severely undermined.

## **ASEAN's contribution to the emerging East Asian monetary regionalism**

In his presentation, Heribert Dieter looked at financial cooperation and monetary regionalism, which is a relatively recent phenomenon in the region. Prior to 1997, he said, there had been hardly any cooperation in the financial and monetary field. Even the ASEAN finance ministers had never met. In his first steps, Dieter analyzed the challenges that the countries of the region are confronted with. First, he pointed out, that Europe was one of the challenges for Southeast Asia and East Asia. Europe had demonstrated that one can create a common currency not just in theory, which led to the current bipolar monetary regime at the global level (Dollar, Euro). A situation, which in the long run would be a problem for the economically prospering Asian region. East Asia would be one of the important centres of the global economy without having an important reserve currency.

The next point Dieter mentioned was on the probability of financial crises. To Dieter, the important question was not whether there would be another crisis, but how that financial turbulence would be managed, by whom and who would provide liquidity.

Assessing the current state of affairs, Dieter said, in Asia one could see relatively steady but at the same time relatively limited progress in the sphere of financial cooperation. According to Dieter, the countries in the region were pursuing a two-track-strategy. First, they have build up gigantic unprecedented foreign reserves to assure themselves against financial crises and have their own liquidity available. The second development that one could witness in the region was a novel concert to strengthen monetary and financial cooperation: the Chiang-Mai-Initiative (CMI). It had been discussed in one of the former sessions that the CMI just had been turned from a bilateral swap agreement into a regional liquidity pool.

In the following Dieter was looking at five issues: 1. The rationale and sequencing of monetary regionalism, 2. The CMI and the pooling of reserves, 3. Monitoring and surveillance, 4. Current initiatives for the development of regional bond markets, 5. And finally the potential for a greater Chinese currency union. Before turning to these points, Dieter made clear what kind of role ASEAN played in these processes. He argued that the ASEAN economies on their own were not sufficiently large to be significant in the process of monetary cooperation although ASEAN participated in all the mentioned initiatives.

### **1. Rationale, Sequencing.**

Dieter argued that countries engaging in monetary regionalism seek to protect themselves from financial crises. Asia countries did that partly because of their experience with the IMF and

because there was no progress in global financial governance. Concerning the sequence, Dieter put forward the question, whether there could be a different kind of approach – taking into consideration that trade mattered, but tariffs did not matter all that much anymore. Dieter had been proposing a different typology than the Balassa type of sequencing: It starts with the pooling of reserves at the first level, has a regional exchange rate mechanism at the second level, an economic and monetary union at the third level and a political union at the fourth level.

## 2. Chiang-Mai-Initiative (CMI)

Dieter first described the developments that led to the CMI: It started in May 2000 soon after the financial crisis. The countries that participate in the CMI are the ASEAN states plus three countries. Initially they decided to introduce a series of bilateral swap arrangements, which was a rather modest endeavour. Now the CMI has been expanded and multilateralized into a regional liquidity pool, which is available for all the members of the initiative. The volume available is around 80bn USD. Despite these developments, Dieter said one major obstacle still was that the Initiative was far too small. To him, the most problematic aspect of the CMI was that there was no clear statement on the purpose of the CMI. Nobody knew whether it was meant to be just a liquidity pool or as the starting point of an integration process that would lead to something more substantial.

## 3. Surveillance and monitoring

Relating to the popular topic of surveillance, Dieter argued that surveillance and monitoring could not prevent the emergence of a financial crisis. One should keep in mind that there were no models available that permit us to forecast when a financial crisis was coming up. The irrationality that characterized financial markets in times of crisis was an a major obstacle to good forecasting. Thus Dieter stated, monitoring and surveillance were more useful for the creation of intra-regional policy networks than for the actual prevention of crisis.

## 4. Regional bond markets

According to Dieter, the goal of these initiatives was to enable Asians to borrow and save in domestic currency, hence avoiding "original sin" borrowing in foreign currency). In this field, Dieter listed among other initiatives the Asian bond fund and the Asian bond market initiative. In his opinion, these were very useful initiatives , however they could not substitute for the reform of financial markets.

## 5. Greater China currency union

Concerning the possibility of a greater China currency union, Dieter first pointed out that it was the rivalry between China and Japan that overshadowed any monetary cooperation in the region and had made ASEAN so important. The main question for Dieter was: Can China alone pursue a monetary integration project? Dieter would argue that they could not do it now but in a relatively distant prospect. This could include other countries that are like-minded.

To sum up his findings HD contended that we saw processes at various levels in the region that could lead to monetary cooperation and to an Asian currency in the long run. At the moment policy makers tended to be cautious but curious. From his point of view, there were a number of initiatives that contributed to greater stability in the region, mainly the CMI and the Bond Market Initiative – but we did not know exactly where this all was taking us.

In the following discussion RODOLFO SEVERINO totally agreed with the analysis of John Ravenhill but wanted to add some further information to illuminate some of the issues.

Concerning the possible achievements of the EAC in 2015 he said, that ASEAN did not give a clear answer in concrete terms because if the answer had to be given it would just have been the commitment of achievements already made in 1998. He further said that the dispute settlement mechanism was strengthened as part of the Bali-Declaration of ASEAN concord in 2003. The added appeals panel was similar to the WTO's but its decision was not final. According to Ambassador Severino, this is the reason why the mechanism has not been resorted to. To the question of binding commitments, Severino had no certain answer but suspected that because of the strength of the rule of law in countries like the USA or Japan, ASEAN countries had more faith in the compliance with agreements by these extra-regional partners. Turning to the question of the lack of enthusiasm of business for regional economic integration, Severino would distinguish between the business sectors of ASEAN and the business sectors of non-ASEAN. There was enthusiasm on the part of the latter. Relating to Heribert Dieters presentation, he mentioned that the ASEAN finance ministers did meet in March 1997 before the financial crisis. However, the managing director of the IMF and the ministers concluded that the fundamentals of ASEAN were sound and that the outlook was good. As for the CMI he explained that actually the multilateralization did not yet have legal effect and that the total amount was indeed too small. Concerning the usefulness of the surveillance mechanisms, he agreed that they were no substitute for reform of the financial markets. Ambassador AMPALAVANAR SELVERAJAH commented on the Singapore approach to FTAs. He did not recall any explicit or implicit

"ASEAN-first" agreement that would impede separate FTAs from individual member states. He stated that Singapore's signing of bilateral trade agreements done in terms of signing bilateral trade agreements had in no way obstructed the larger objective of ASEAN. This was the case, because their agreements were preferably not less than the WTO rules but WTO+. The FTA's had also the added value and were constructed out of the strategic interest of engaging the major trading partners in the region. Concerning Dieters argument about the surveillance mechanism JÜRGEN RÜLAND added that the problem was not only the reluctance on the part of at least some ASEAN governments to open up their information pools but also the question whether the governments did know enough about the state of their economy. Rüländ on the other hand, would not down tone so much the importance of surveillance because economic crises had something to do with trust in an economic system. Surveillance could be seen an important confidence building mechanism. ALFREDO ROBLES commented on Ravenhill's statement that ASEAN was probably making less progress than other regional organizations. He argued that if regional integration should be a means of integration of the world economy, ASEAN was ahead of other regions. The situation was not rosy in ASEAN but it was probably worse elsewhere.

Another Participant asked Ravenhill why he used the term "Preferential Trade Agreement" when he was referring to an FTA. Adding to the comments of Rüländ and Selverajah HERIBERT DIETER said that there had been no lack of data before the crisis but it had just developed in an irrational manner. He also put forward the question of how to handle surveillance. Should warning be managed by private or government agencies? He argued that the topic of how to sanction and what the appropriate means in such a scheme were was very difficult. In commenting on Ambassador Selverajahs appraisal of Singapore's trade policy, Dieter said, he was not sure whether the spirit for deeper integration continued to be maintainable in such kind of environment. JOHN RAVENHILL stressed that he preferred the term PTA or Discriminatory Trade Agreement, because most of the negotiated agreements were actually not "Free"-Trade agreements. He agreed that from Singapore's perspective the pursuit of bilateral trade agreements was eminently sensible. Nevertheless, the agreements were discriminatory arrangements against its ASEAN partners and therefore inevitably damaged the credibility of the regional organization. Ravenhill finally said that he was not sure whether ASEAN made more progress on removing barriers to intra-regional trade than other regional organization. One had to be careful in using the criteria to evaluate intra-regional progress on liberalization.

## **Session 7: ASEAN's Place in the World**

The seventh panel first saw Richard Stubbs, Professor at the Department of Political Science, MacMaster University, Hamilton, analyzing ASEAN's interaction with other regional and global dialogue forums and multilateral institutions. Then Alfredo Robles, Professor at the Department of Political Science, De la Salle University, Manila, contextualized ASEAN's interregional relationships in the emerging multi-layered system of global governance and, in particular, discussed the prospects for a future ASEAN-EU Free Trade Area.

### **ASEAN in the Emerging System of Global Governance**

According to Richard Stubbs, ASEAN's influence on the emerging system of Global Governance could be attacked from a number of different angles. He was going to focus on two angles. First, he was going to look at the institutional aspects of governance at the global level. Second, he wanted to look at regional organizations. In the second part of the presentation, he looked at the idea of global governance in ideational terms, emphasising implicit principles, norms and expectations that have the possibility of providing a coherent vision of how global affairs are ordered. Theoretically, his paper and presentation were based on an historical institutional approach, but he was trying to bring in the notion of sociological institutionalism.

In terms of ASEAN's influence on the formal global institutions, Richard Stubbs mentioned three factors that had to be kept in mind. First of all, concerning the timing and sequence of events, ASEAN had come on the scene when most of the key global institutions had been already in place, well developed, and generally dominated by the major powers. Second, the larger context within which ASEAN attempted to influence global institutions. And third, ASEAN's internal coherence clearly made a difference in terms of its ability to exert any influence at the global level. Stubbs argued that these three factors had been aligned on very few occasions. He mentioned two examples where ASEAN had been influential: The Cambodian crisis (as it was discussed in Shaun Narine's session) and during the late 1980s and early 1990s when ASEAN played a leading role in launching and promoting the Uruguay round of GATT. Stubbs argued that ASEAN's influence on the major regional organizations was more significant. He mentioned APEC, ARF, the Asia-Europe meetings and coming from this the ASEAN+3 as significant contributions to the promotion of a kind of loose but discernable system of regional global governance. He put forth that ASEAN in these institutions in a sense virtually defined Asia for the purposes of these talks and in many ways in a sense defined Asia in terms of the way in

which the world has started to look at Asia. Stubbs stated that because of the economic dynamism of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN members attracted attention and other regional organizations as well as the major powers had wooed the association and its members as a way of linking into the regions prosperity. As a result of these ties ASEAN was very much part of the region-based-global governance structure that had emerged since the End of the Cold War.

Richard Stubbs then turned to the more controversial part of his presentation. What he wanted to do was to look at the way in which ASEAN has promoted an ideational paradigm that is starting to have an impact at the global level. To do this he looked back at the way in which ASEAN had come to embody a specific set of norms and goals and had perpetuated their use. According to Stubbs, ideas about the way of conducting international relations could be said to come out of three specific sources. First, from local cultures within countries and regions. Second, from past experiences that regional members have had in terms of their conduct of international and regional relations. And thirdly, from the the way in which domestic coalitions advance different ideas. His argument here was that the idea that has been embodied in ASEAN over the last forty years, had slowly emerged as a relatively coherent paradigm, which offered an alternative paradigm to what Stubbs would see as the predominant liberal paradigm at the global governance level. According to him, at the core of the liberal paradigm stood: democratization, respect for individual human rights, humanitarian intervention, open markets, respect for property rights and an emphasis on the rule of law. Stubbs argued that ASEAN came to embody, ideas, norms, goals that were already to be found within the Southeast Asian region and which were being discussed in conferences after war the second world war (e.g. Bandung 1959). The ideas at the heart of what has come to be seen as the ASEAN paradigm, and which came out of these discussions were neutrality (embodied in ZOPFAN and the SEA-Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone), the set of ideas that incorporates sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, equality of nations, (incorporated in the TAC). Also in the TAC was the notion of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-confrontational negotiations, an emphasis on domestic stability and social harmony and an emphasis on state intervention to promote economic development. At the core, Richard Stubbs would see ASEAN states being concerned with autonomy and stability. He argued that ASEAN perhaps could be seen as a guardian of these values and norms.

In the following he raised the question whether the ASEAN paradigm could be sustained, standing against an exceedingly persuasive liberal paradigm. He argued in the following that it could.



First, he mentioned the emerging ASEAN-China relations, which had become a key linkage within East Asian regionalism. Crucially, China's ideas about the region and about the way in which international relations should be conducted paralleled the consensus ASEAN view in a number of ways (neutrality, emphasis on sovereignty, non-intervention, state-intervention). Interestingly, Stubbs argued that there were now twelve countries that represented more than half of the world population had signed on to the TAC. To Stubbs, one of the most interesting signatories was Australia. The way in which Australia actually signed on to the TAC could be seen as Acharya's localization argument in reverse. They signed the agreement but essentially eviscerated it by an exchange of letters, where they limited the scope of the treaty. What they did, according to Stubbs was to localize the ASEAN set of norms. He emphasized that he does not see these norms as static. There had been an influence by the Asian financial crisis, by the democratization in Indonesia, the up-and-down democratization in Thailand, by the increasing role of non-state-actors, and the acceptance of some forms of intervention in domestic affairs. Yet, Stubbs would argue, that these norms are not moving closer to the liberal paradigm. Finally, Richard Stubbs made it clear that he did not argue that the ASEAN paradigm was better or worse than the western liberal paradigm, but just different. His point then overall was that over the last 40 years ASEAN has developed a distinct set of norms/goals that has the potential to offer an alternative paradigm that in the medium to long term will have an impact on the emerging system of global governance.

### **ASEAN-EU Relations: The Prospects for a ASEAN-EU Free Trade Area**

Exactly a week before the conference, the ASEAN economic ministers had met the EU-trade commissioner in Brunei and the two sides agreed to launch FTA-negotiations with the deadline of two years. Alfredo Robles put forward practical and theoretical reasons for attempting a preliminary analysis. First, the EU decision would be seen as success of ASEAN diplomacy and for the individual ASEAN members' strategy of concluding FTAs with extra-regional partners. A preliminary analysis would allow to go beyond the tendency to self-congratulation. Second, if such an FTA was actually implemented it would create opportunities for action as well as constraints and thus might actually lead to the emergence of a new level of analysis: the intra-regional-level whose existence Robles had doubted in his earlier work on ASEAN-EU relations.

In the following Robles first regarded the gradual and reluctant evolution of EU policy from dialogue to bargaining with Southeast Asia (what appears to be ASEANs triumph). Second, he described and argued that ASEAN member states would be confronted with the dilemma of reconciling access to the European Market and industrial development.

The distinction that Robles made between dialogue and bargaining, was one borrowed from Jürgen Habermas. Robles explained that bargaining was the prototype of instrumental action orientated towards success and involved concessions and threats. Dialogue was oriented towards understanding and was the basis for further action. Robles argued that until 2006 the EU had wished to avoid bargaining with Southeast Asia and had preferred dialogue through ASEM. According to Robles, the EU's goals had been market access, to obtain the support of ASEAN for the launching of a new round of WTO-negotiations and support for the EU position on the four Singapore issues. The EU had not wished to provide concessions in exchange, obviously because there had been a huge trade deficit between ASEAN and the European Union.

Robles put forth, that by 2002/2003 dialogue between Europe and Asia within ASEM had been slowing down because the EU could not convince Southeast Asia to adapt European positions on the WTO. To Singapore's proposal of an FTA the EU responded with a substitute (TREATI and "Partnership and Cooperation Agreements"). According to the Commission, the purpose of TREATI was to inform each other of their regulatory systems which might end up in approximation and convergence of regulatory systems. Robles criticised these substitutes in several ways. First, the EU had not specified, that convergence of regulations meant convergence along European lines. Second, the EU also said, the dialogue could be started when at least two member states of ASEAN agree. From the ASEAN perspective, this could appear as a divide and rule strategy. According to the Commission, the prerequisites of an FTA were mutual trust and understanding. In fact, the Commission said, there would be several conditions for an ASEAN-EU FTA: First, the WTO negotiations had to be concluded. Second, there had to be progress in the regulatory dialogue and progress under TREATI. The EU also had offered a carrot by proposing at ASEM 4 in Hanoi the negotiation of partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs) which might have been the precursor to an FTA. However, even before the suspension of the WTO negotiations in July 2006, individual ASEAN member states had also started to negotiate FTAs (with Japan, U.S., South Korea). The private sector in the EU started to be concerned about the possibility of trade diversion. Robles argument was that because by 2005, several of these agreements had been successfully negotiated, a process started, that led to the

adaption of the idea of negotiations: the ASEAN-EU-vision group and the commissioning of quantitative and qualitative impact studies. Although Robles believes that the suspension of the WTO negotiations was crucial, it was much more the practice of ASEAN of negotiating the FTAs that changed the EU's mind.

In the following Robles elaborated on ASEAN's hopes that access to the European markets would solve a whole range of problems. First, there was a tendency of ASEAN-EU trade to grow less slowly. Second, ASEAN companies felt the force of non-tariff-barriers. Third, ASEAN members were targets of anti-dumping and countervailing measures by the EU, even more frequent than the PRC. Fifth, the reform of the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) graduated Singapore totally from the GSP and then individual ASEAN countries from a number of sectors. Sixth, ASEAN faced competition with other developing countries that were also negotiating FTAs.

Robles strongly questioned whether the FTA would in fact bring these benefits. The commission prospected increasing exports indeed, but had a very poor record of predicting the results of FTA agreements. Robles here mentioned Mexico's growing deficit after the conclusion of an FTA with the EU. Robles argued that ASEAN should be worried about that because they could not get out of a possible FTA. A major shortcoming of the impact studies was that they did not estimate the loss of tariff-revenues that the ASEAN member states would have to compensate for. He was also doubtful about the solution of increased ODA that the EU would provide in the framework of an FTA agreement. First, the assistance would only be given to least-developed countries. Second, the assistance would be given for the purposes of negotiations. Robles reaction to this was: when the ASEAN states are not ready to negotiate, then why negotiate? Third, the ODA that would be forthcoming in any FTA would be very little. Fourth, much of the money would go to the consultants.

Robles argued that the advantage of an FTA would be is that it was not unilateral like the GSP. However, an FTA did not mean that the EU would give up the use of anti-dumping instruments. There would be no relaxation in terms of technical standards. The benefits were going to be doubtful and in addition to that, the ASEAN member states had to give up many of the traditional instruments of industrial policy. He mentioned especially two: further liberalization of tariffs (for example in the automobile sector) and the EU's interest in abolishing the duty-exemptions with a priority of agricultural liberalization. Robles predicted a future similar to the experience of Mexico and Chile who had not been able to diversify their exports.

Concerning the required liberalization of FDI, Robles remarked that ASEAN countries had already provided a whole range of investment incentives. No effort was made to justify that the liberalization would be beneficial.

Robles concluded that the process that led to the decision to launch FTA negotiations had exposed ASEAN's financial and technical weaknesses. The EU had paid for the cost of the quantitative and the impact studies and the ASEAN Secretariat had played no role in the formulation of the report. The whole process had been opaque, which was difficult to reconcile with the EU's aim of promoting democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law. For ASEAN the implications of the negotiations were that it probably was compelled to negotiate an FTA when it did not really want to. Robles expected the EU to adopt a very tough attitude in the negotiations.

In the following discussion, HERIBERT DIETER commented on what Robles had called the constructive role of ASEAN during the Uruguay round negotiations. To his understanding, the cooperation of ASEAN countries had all but broken down. He said further that from an economic perspective bilateral trade deficits or surpluses should not matter. On the private sector in the EU he argued that there had been support for an FTA by big business but small and medium size enterprises at least in Germany had criticized this development. Regarding the FTA studies emphasizing the benefits he claimed that one should see them rather as providing legitimacy for the process. In his last point he mentioned that usually FTAs were not irreversible contracts. ALFREDO ROBLES replied that he was aware that deficits did not matter but he would request Dieter to relay this message to the commission because the commission wanted an FTA with ASEAN precisely because of the deficit. Concerning the private sector, he agreed with Dieter's observation, but within the Commission, it was the big business striving for the process. He also agreed with Dieter's explanation of the studies as a means of providing legitimacy. However, the reality of the concluded FTAs was not very comforting. RICHARD STUBBS agreed that the ASEAN consensus was starting to fall apart at the very end of the Uruguay round. Perhaps the issues had changed slightly - but in his understanding, there was a consensus that ASEAN is not speaking with one voice. JÜRGEN RÜLAND commented on Richards Stubbs' argumentation when he said, that China was even reinforcing the autonomy that ASEAN is striving for. One could go even one step further and argue that ASEAN had even more allies in this debate. This debate was essentially a debate about power and rules, over issues of membership, decision-

making procedures in international institutions like the WTO, the UN and the IMF. Rüländ agreed with Andrew Hurrell who forecasted in a recent article that the waterline of sovereignty would be rising. RICHARD STUBBS agreed with Rüländ and said that the series of principles set out at the Bandung conference was echoed in what we now considered the ASEAN norms. KAJTA FREISTEIN argued as well that in the discussion of global governance there seemed to be a almost teleological line of argumentation saying that the world is becoming a world democracy. Her point in this regard was to emphasise that ASEAN could be a kind of a norm entrepreneur in this regard. RICHARD STUBBS added that the notion of autonomy in the face of globalization had gained importance. He thinks that ASEAN's views of the world and the way that they have expressed them have resonance for many other global south countries. SHAUN NARINE also tended to agreed with the speakers' analysis. However, he was not sure about what would happen to a country's approach to values if its country's position in the world changed significantly or when these countries become more a part of the world economic system by entering institutions like the WTO. ALFREDO ROBLES agreed and added that the question would be whether China in particular would change its views. In terms of the ASEAN states being willing to sign on to liberalization he referred to work being done by Eric Coliner on nationalism. His argument was that Nationalism should not be thought of as automatically producing protectionist policies. States could use the globalization selectively in order to enhance their domestic prosperity and welfare. Another participant raised the final question whether the shift from dialogue to bargaining was something extremely decisive that would last forever or whether it was a somehow dialectical process. Responding to this question, ALFREDO ROBLES argued that it was striking that ASEAN was able to convince the EU to change its strategy through behaviour that was a mixture of coordination and individual countries' actions. From the outside, it seemed as if they had been acting in the same way, which was important for the EU. Robles argued that from the very beginning, the ASEAN members, although they realized that they are weak states, wanted something for something and were not interested in dialogue as such. This was the danger of dialogue for weaker actors - as pointed out by all of the commentators of Habermas. Robles would argue that bargaining was dangerous for them because they are faced with a stronger partner. However, dialogue in which they get nothing for something was even worse. RICHARD STUBBS finally pointed out that negotiating and bargaining both were a kind of social learning educational processes. It seemed to him theoretically possible that the two paradigms that he had set out would come closer together. The

question was how strong the two sets of norms were and how difficult it would be to shift them. Personally, Richard Stubbs thought that that the two sets of norms were so reasonably well entrenched that in the near or medium term future it was not very probable that they would come closer to reach some kind of consensus.

## **Session 8: ASEAN and the Change of Values**

The eighth panel saw Prof. Dr. Jörn Dosch from the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Leeds. He analyzed the consequences of domestic political change in Southeast Asia for ASEAN's approach to controversial concepts, such as human rights and democracy. While in other regions of the world regional organizations would explicitly support democratic change, ASEAN had avoided to push normative issues. He raised the question whether Southeast Asian regionalism itself now might have a direct or indirect, intended or unintended impact on domestic political change.

Second speaker was Maria Gabriela Manea (M.A.) from the Department of Political Science of the University of Freiburg. She examined to what extent interaction with the EU had hardened or changed ASEAN's position in human rights questions and traced ASEAN's position in conceptualizing the matter addressing the question how ASEAN as a regional organization had handled human rights issues in members states.

### **Southeast Asian Regionalism: Promoting or Impairing Democracy?**

In his presentation, Jörn Dosch assessed ASEAN's perception on democratization and the dynamics in this subject area within the organization.

From a perspective of comparative regionalism, he claimed that the promotion of democracy or at least liberal political norms and values was either explicitly or at least implicitly mentioned in the mission statements of various regional organizations. Even though ASEAN itself had no explicit policy on the matter, there were hints in recent documents that pointed to the direction of a growing engagement. From a historical point of view, he noted that during the cold war ASEAN was labeled as an anti-communist organization. This bias had never been an explicit part of the official agenda but worked as glue for the ASEAN-5 and ASEAN-6 agreements. After the end of the cold war however, the question remained whether this anti-communist label had been replaced. Finally, it had been ASEAN itself that in its 2003 Bali Concord II had made a commitment on the promotion of a "democratic and harmonious environment." According to Dosch this was the first time the organization explicitly referred to democracy.

Against this background, the outside impression that the ASEAN way of dealing with regional challenges had remained the same over the past decade and that there had been only very little change as far as the institutional framework was concerned, needed further investigation. Dosch argued that his own observations from inside the region, where he attended numerous official

meetings, suggested that change was actually happening. According to him, there could be no doubt about the fact that the discourse within the various levels of ASEAN had moved on quite dramatically.

He put forward that in order to address the question as to whether ASEAN promoted democracy it would be necessary to look first at the way that the organization itself had become more democratic in its outlook. He therefore referred to the national changes within ASEAN member states over the last years and concluded that with the exception of Myanmar and Brunei all states in the region had seen some degree of transformation. Since the way foreign policy decision-making took place was quite different under the condition of democracy or at least limited liberalization, Dosch was convinced that these changes in domestic politics eventually influenced the ASEAN approach to the topic.

His first observation therefore was that decision making within ASEAN had moved on from being rather elite-centric, one-dimensional and security interest orientated to a more pluralistic, less centralistic and multidimensional model that was characterized by a growing number of political actors. This process had fostered tendencies towards dispersed decision-making and interconnectedness of global, regional and national dynamics. Dosch concluded that foreign policy was no longer the exclusive domain of small groups of state elites.

Instead, there were parliaments that actively participated in the making of foreign policy. As a prominent example, he referred to the Indonesian House of Representatives. Another aspect would be the declining role of the armed forces in political decision making in general and a growing involvement of civil society organizations that tried to influence the outcome of political processes. These multiple reasons had helped to mediate the national debates on democracy and human rights to the official ASEAN discourse. On the regional level, non-state actors were involved in shaping the EPG report, which recognized numerous central inputs from civil society groups on matters, such as democracy and non-traditional security in the final report.

However, Dosch warned to overestimate the current state of the process. He emphasized that while there was declaratory commitment to the promotion of political liberalism and democracy in ASEAN this rhetoric had failed to produce real policy outcomes due to ASEAN's reluctance to reconsider the non-interference norm, as it did in the case of Myanmar.

Against this record, Dosch raised the question to what extent the increased role of parliaments and the involvement of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) could help to shape the role of ASEAN as a promoter of democracy. Again, the case of Myanmar would provide a good



example to answer this question. National parliaments in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia had tried to push their governments to address the issue on a regional level. Furthermore, the ASEAN Parliamentarian Conference and the Interparliamentary Myanmar Caucus of ASEAN had urged the Association to bring Myanmar before the UN Security Council. In Dosch's view, this pressure had led ASEAN at least at a rhetorical level to abandon its soft approach to Myanmar. At the 2003 Bali Summit, as well as in the years 2004 and 2005 ASEAN had indicated that it would ask the regime in Myanmar harsh and painful questions, but none of the closing documents mentioned the issue. ASEAN had missed opportunities to pressure Myanmar despite the well sounding pro-democracy announcements. On an individual state level the voting behavior of Indonesia as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in January this year was quite insightful. It abstained when a resolution in response to human rights abuses committed by Burmese Junta was put in front of the body.

However, according to Dosch one should be careful with early judgments. Even though ASEAN had always demonstrated solidarity vis-a-vis Myanmar it would be worth to look at the reasons for that behavior. As Jürgen Haacke had proven with great empirical detail, the membership of Myanmar was of crucial strategic importance to ASEAN given the fact that the China factor was involved and that Myanmar's accession to the Association was supposed to lessen its dependence on this dominant regional power. An active role of ASEAN as a promoter of democracy would also be blocked by the fact that the organization brings together a great diversity of political systems. There was no agreement on even a very reduced core of common political norms and values, which would be a precondition to enable the organization to promote democracy within their regional context. Finally, states like Laos or Vietnam were concerned that a softer interpretation on the non-intervention principle today, could put them on ASEAN's democratization agenda for tomorrow.

Jörn Dosch concluded that ASEAN did not impair democracy but rather promoted it at the rhetoric level. This would be already an important step forward within the ASEAN context but had not yet led to a situation where the organization would be able to actively promote democracy given the aforementioned constraints.

## **ASEAN and Human Rights**

Maria-Gabriela Manea opened her presentation with a critical assessment of the coherence between the rhetoric of ASEAN leaders concerning improvements of the organizations position on human rights and the change that actually took place. In her eyes, there was a major gap that needed to be addressed. Nevertheless, discursive processes on the matter would take place within ASEAN and should be examined to determine their impact on the inner-organizational dynamics. As she noted, rhetorics did not necessarily imply a pragmatic and practical shift to democratization and human rights but might open up the space for various none state actors to step in and drive this rhetorical shift into a more practical approach towards the topic.

Manea put forward that in order to describe the dynamics of this transition process it would be useful to turn towards the question how human rights were a factor in the development of a collective identity within ASEAN. She approached the matter from a social constructivist perspective that regarded interaction as a central mechanism by which preferences, interests and in the long run identities of international actors were constructed and eventually eroded. She argued that the inter- and intra-regional debates and interactions over human rights were just another arena of the process of ASEAN regional identity formation. ASEAN's position on human rights then would be the result of the interaction with external actors as well as intra-regional partners. In her opinion, this interactive approach to human rights in ASEAN had the advantage that it gave agency to the association itself. Manea stressed that ASEAN's collective identity formation should be understood as a process where the Association developed a capacity of its own, in relation to other actors. In the course of this process, it would eventually have to develop an internal position on human rights, not as an already existing identity based on Asian values, but created through the process itself. As interaction did not take place in a vacuum but was embedded in an instructional context that might determine a certain configuration of dispositions towards human rights, it would be necessary to pay close attention towards the political settings of dialogues.

Manea's analysis of the interaction processes was based on two approaches from theories of international relations explaining action in the international sphere. Accordingly, states would follow either a rhetorical or communicative course of action. While both types to a certain degree would be characterized through a rather symbolic discourse, motivations of actors were very different. Rhetorical actors were guided by a logic of consequentialism, would argue strategically and therefore reduce the likelihood of reaching an agreement on a normative issues. However, the

importance of this kind of interaction was that it could improve conditions under which interaction took place eventually creating a context in which a more communicative approach would be possible. Manea explained that communicative actors would argue based on convictions. They were persuaded not only by arguments of others but also through processes of internalization of new dispositions, which actors might develop.

With regard to the instructional context of this discursive process within ASEAN, she emphasized the importance of the end of the cold war, as it confronted ASEAN with numerous new challenges. The association had to transform its type of regionalism from a strong focus on national sovereignty to more flexible forms of cooperation. Furthermore, questions of boundaries had to be addressed, which were answered by ASEAN in two ways: By enlargement to the Indochinese states and by establishing different kinds of regional frames creating Southeast Asian regionalism. There was also a change in self-perception. ASEAN states and other regional non-state actors realized their collective interdependence and vulnerability in an economic, financial and security sense, which was a reason for the emergence of regional or transregional civil society dynamics.

To link her theoretical assumptions and categories to the empirical discussion Manea argued in two directions. Accordingly, ASEAN had interacted with the European Union on human rights within the rhetorical mode of interaction during two periods namely between 1990 to 1990 and 1997 to 2000. Both phases were characterized by conflict and controversy on the issue. The effect on ASEAN had been a differentiation and definition of itself with regards to human rights in opposition to the EU and the west in general. For the time periods in between 1994 to 1997 and from 2000 on, she identified a novel pattern of interaction also based on rhetorical action but showing a kind of strategic adaptation between the two partners. This was not for the sake of human rights as such but for the sake of saving their interregional relations for economic reasons. The controversial interaction with the EU in between 1990 and 1993 confronted ASEAN with the need to define a strategy in order to respond to the pressure. ASEAN's opposition to demands from the EU was reflected in the rejection of the new Cooperational Agreement in 1992 in Manila and the refusal to discuss questions related to East Timor and Burma within the interregional framework. A more conceptional disagreement about the definition of human rights became apparent at the UN Vienna Conference in 1993. However, the opposition to the western approach towards human rights and the event of the Vienna conference had three kinds of impacts on ASEAN in dealing with the issue. Firstly, it legitimized to a certain extent the right of

developing a non-western perception of human rights. Secondly, it put human rights on ASEAN's regional agenda, which could be seen in the Singapore Declaration of 1993. Thirdly, it opened up a discursive interactive process on human rights within ASEAN.

Manea argued that this discourse led to patterns of interaction at the intraregional level, which progressively evolved from a rhetoric and strategic mode of discussion on human rights, in which the ASEAN values debate had the monopoly, towards a more communicative framework, which was to come about after the Asian financial crisis. Correspondingly, conditions under which ASEAN internally dealt with human rights improved for two reasons. There was an increase in the number of institutional settings where discussions over human rights could take place e.g. the ASEAN ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights, the ASEAN Informal Seminar on Human Rights and the Asia-Europe Peoples Forum, which came to life in 1994, 1996 and 1997. This framework again was an incentive for the development or strengthening of transnational advocacy networks on human rights and related issues like social justice. In the same period of time the Regional Working Group for Human Rights mechanism was created, which would eventually become one of the important actors in lobbying for human rights within ASEAN governments.

Manea stressed that there was a certain momentum for this development to take place. There was a fundamental political change in Indonesia, which transformed the country in a very enthusiastic promoter for democracy and human rights. This had been instrumental for drafting documents like the Bali Concord or the Vientiane Action Program where human rights and democratization were mentioned as a core dimension of ASEAN's approach to regional integration. She emphasized also the experience of the 1997 crisis as such. The increasing awareness of vulnerability brought up in a substantial way the theme of regional integration. Within this theme there was a new space for human rights activism because of how regional integration had been framed in the two aforementioned agreements.

Towards the end of her presentation, Maria-Gabriela Manea concluded that there was hope within ASEAN that an intergovernmental human rights institution was to be included into the ASEAN charter creating a setting even more beneficial for a strong communicative discourse on human rights to continue and develop.

The former ASEAN Secretary General RODOLFO SEVERINO opened the following discussion by addressing Jörn Dosch's presentation. He criticized that the growing power of parliaments in foreign policy making had been presented as something that was exclusively

positive. With regard to the reality, the rise of parliaments as a countercheck to the executive in foreign policy making would be at the very least a mixed blessing. To support his point Severino referred to the refusal of the Indonesian parliament to ratify the haze agreement. By doing so the legislative branch was not only ignoring Indonesia's national interest since the country was heavily effected by the lost of big woodlands but also opened new possibilities for corruption. JÖRN DOSCH agreed with Mr. Severino that the complete picture of the involvement of parliaments in foreign policy making, particularly in young democracies was much more complex than his very condensed version of the whole story suggested. Arguing from an institutional point of view he nevertheless stressed the importance of these checks and balances. In many young democracies the relationship between legislative and executive branch was characterized by a general power struggle where the parliament tried to define its turf vis a vis the administration. He pointed out that the situation in Indonesia was not the most typical because the parliament had repeatedly played a destructive role in foreign policy not at least because of the vested interests involved. But he emphasized that in other cases, such as Thailand, Malaysia or the Philippines parliaments had delivered very constructive inputs as far as regional integration and cooperation was concerned. Even though some might argue that in the case of Thailand's foreign policy towards Myanmar, it had almost resulted in a parallel policy.

ANJA JETSCHKE commented that there seemed to be a lot of agreement on behalf of individual ASEAN member states to commit themselves to the promotion of human rights. At the same time however all these attempts remained at a rhetorical level, as there were no attempts to hold each other accountable to the promises. In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN's reaction had been basically a response to international pressures. She suggested that ASEAN's strategy on these matters looked more like a reflexive process in which its member states had internalized that they would have to respond to international pressure. She then addressed both panelists, asking whether they believed that the changes that took place would have been possible without international interference.

Manea replied that while outside pressure in many cases of change had been an important factor it could only be the first step. According to her theoretical approach to the topic, it would give ASEAN the incentive to form a response, which would eventually create a rhetoric inviting other actors inside ASEAN to compete for alternative rhetoric's. Without the second component, international pressure alone could not achieve much.

In his response JÖRN DOSCH agreed that international pressure to some extent played a very important role. In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN was partly forced to address the issue due to pressure from the U.S. and the European Union, but not exclusively. With regard to the ASEAN agenda on democracy and human rights, it would not be possible to explain the dynamics exclusively as a response to pressure from the outside. The importance of domestic political change for developments on the regional level was an important factor, often underestimated in the analysis of ASEAN approaches to human rights. Dosch urged that this had to be brought to the research agenda since most of the literature looked at ASEAN from an international relations perspective without taking domestic dynamics of policy making into consideration. There would still be a tendency of treating states as black boxes based on the assumption that there is a well-defined national interest that determines state behaviors on the international stage. Dosch suggested that it would be extremely interesting to open this black box and look at how these interests actually emerged.

ANJA JETSCHKE's second question addressed Manea's distinction between rhetorical and communicative action. According to her model, ASEAN states had first reacted in a rhetorical manner to international pressures, which then set in a process that eventually resulted in a shift towards communicative action. Ms. Jetschke wanted to know under which conditions the switch would take place and how ASEAN countries could promote human rights on their own terms, when their perception towards the matter was primarily a response to demands from the outside. In her response MANEA identified three issues that determined the switch from rhetorical to communicative action. Firstly, to what extent institutional settings and arenas where these discourses could compete were in place. Secondly, the level of participation and the variety of actors that could participate and had the capacity to contribute to the process. And thirdly, the degree to which the arguments were really internalized by those making them.

Former state secretary JÜRGEN CHROBOG commented on the notion of non-interference into the sovereign rights of neighboring countries. In his opinion this was a philosophy mostly overcome in Europe nowadays. He reminded of the extremely right wing politician Mr. Haider who got elected to the government of Austria leading to strong rhetorical interference by other European countries. With regard to the military coup in Thailand and an unacceptable situation of human rights in Myanmar, Chrobog was wondering why the voice of ASEAN remained silent on these issues. In his opinion, just not to spoil the friendly atmosphere in the neighborhood would not be enough. There were universal human rights. Even though their universality sometimes

might be put into doubt, this would not negate some of the fundamental principles behind them and these would suggest that there were events where non-interference could not be an option. Concerning the aspect of non-interference, DOSCH referred to a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in 2004. In their closing statement they agreed, “not to condone unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government.” But he warned not to judge too early on the matter. It was not only ASEAN whose voice remained silent on the coup in Thailand. Almost no one condemned the unconstitutional change. Even though it might not have been the ideal scenario for a regime change, the international community did not mind the unpopular Thaksin government to be removed from power. Nevertheless ASEAN’s public statements increasingly became a double-edged sword, as they created expectations to which ASEAN ultimately would have to live up. The problem was that the Association had often created new, bigger and even better visions for the future but only occasionally had taken the necessary steps to implement them. According to Dosch there was an increasing gap between political vision and political reality. If a regional organization agreed to deal with the internal affairs of its member states it would eventually touch upon national sovereignty and this concept still ruled the ASEAN region. Dosch closed his response by pointing out that it would be necessary to reach agreements on core values and norms, to define regional and domestic orders and determine how the political structure should look like before ASEAN countries could agree on external intervention and means to achieve this political order.

WERNER PFENNIG had an observation on what he identified as double standards in politics towards Myanmar. When a military junta ran Greece, it was not suspended from NATO even though the organization was supposed to protect and bring freedom and democracy to its member countries. The same applied for Portugal under Salazar. If ASEAN today claimed that it did not want to push Myanmar to the limit, the international community should know how this limit was defined in order to come up with a more intelligent politic *vis-à-vis* Myanmar.

DOSCH agreed that Myanmar was a good example to show the double standards in politics. Due to a very limited strategic and economic interest in the country it was an easy topic to push for the west. For ASEAN on the other side Myanmar had high strategic relevance putting the Association in an uneasy position, as it had to find some kind of middle ground. The limits as to which ASEAN could urge Myanmar to cooperate were defined by the perception of individual member states as well as ASEAN as a whole. The greatest fear was that Myanmar could be tempted to leave the organization, which in Dosch’s view could in fact happen.

## Summary and Concluding Remarks

In his concluding remarks Professor JÜRGEN RÜLAND identified a crucial question reflected in most of the presentations. They all addressed the matter of organizational continuity and change within ASEAN. Even though assessments varied, which due to the differences in theoretical approaches would not be surprising, he stressed that none of the speakers had argued that there was no change. Organizations had only two choices: They either adjusted and changed in the face of new configurations of power, new economic opportunities and new security risks or would eventually fall into oblivion. With regard to the possible stances ASEAN could take in this process of change, Rüländ summarized that the papers would suggest that organizations like ASEAN not only acted as utility maximizers but also defined their strategies along the lines of appropriateness.

In his opinion the ambivalence between an instrumental strategic logic and an appropriate culturally guided behavior raised four major sets of questions, which in the future would deserve further attention. The first addressed the relationship between instrumental and appropriate behavior. Referring to Richard Stubbs idea that analysts should look at ASEAN within a spectrum, Rüländ argued that it would have to range from levels of appropriateness – looking at culturally based normative ways of interaction, to a utility maximizing perspective – identifying cost-benefit behavior. He concluded that the key question would be whether ASEAN operated more along the lines of consequentialism or more along the lines of appropriateness. Answers to this problem could help to understand when ASEAN choose to follow the one or the other strategy and if there were patterns to its behavior.

If ASEAN acted along cultural lines it needed to be asked whether an appropriate culturally sanctioned behavior would be effective to solve the set of new challenges, which in many cases included border crossing problems and involved elements of interdependence – or, as Jürgen Rüländ framed it, to what extent ASEAN norms were adequate for the management of complex interdependence.

Attention also needed to be drawn towards the direction of transformation within ASEAN. Was the Association aiming for change on a vertical level, deepening existing institutional structures, or was it a lateral change creating new forums and perhaps new institutional shells? Rüländ added that it might also be interpreted as rhetorical change giving new names to established procedures and to adopt existing norms that were derived from global norms but filled with local content, as some would argue with regard to the concepts of human security or governance.



Finally, Rüländ referred to the numerous ASEAN declarations of which many were discussed in the course of the different panels. He suggested that researchers would have to apply longer time frames in order to analyze what kind of output these declarations really produced and as to what extent member states had implemented them. Even though, there was much criticism of the unsatisfying degree of execution of certain commitments, Rüländ argued that a comparative look at ASEAN and the EU suggested that ASEAN might pursue an ex-ante approach of norm creation whereas the EU approach would adopt norms ex-post, when all members had already accepted them. Closing his question catalogue, Rüländ asked whether a discourse about new values and concepts, such as sovereignty, democracy and human rights could already be considered as an indicator for change per se and how the translation into real ideational change could be assessed.

Accordingly, the multitude of research questions, which remained to be addressed, would show that there was a need for further and more intensified study of ASEAN.

Rüländ expressed his thanks to all speakers for their excellent and well prepared contributions, the delivery in time and towards the participants for attaining the conference and enriching the debates. He emphasized the successful partnership with the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt and appreciated once more the financial as well as the organizational support. Special thanks went to its Chairmen Jürgen Chrobog for enriching the conference with his presence and to Barbara Müller who is heading the Asia division within the Foundation. Professor Rüländ also extended his gratitude towards the staff of the Political Science Department.

In his closing statement, JÜRGEN CHROBOG stated his deep satisfaction with the conference and admitted that he had always followed the development of ASEAN with great personal interest. He started his diplomatic career in Singapore and worked together with the aforementioned German foreign minister and promoter of EU-ASEAN cooperation Hans-Dietrich Genscher for more than 12 years. Chrobog thanked speakers and participants for their stimulating and highly intellectual discussions, gave special regard to the role of Professor Rüländ in setting up the conference and thanked his collaborator Barbara Müller for her preparatory work before wishing everyone a safe trip home.

At the end the floor was given to her Excellency Ms. DOMINGO-ALBERT, Ambassador of the Philippines who thanked everybody involved in the conference on behalf of the Association for

Southeast Asian Nations for organizing this “birthday party.” She invited scholars to engage in a direct exchange of ideas with the ASEAN third country committees, which existed in most capitals where ASEAN member countries were represented. With regard to the conference she acknowledged the balanced approaches of the papers presented, which had shown that ASEAN had come a long way. Ms. Domingo-Albert closed her speech with an anecdote: About 40 years ago she was preparing documents for the foreign minister who was on his way to Bangkok to sign the declaration, which should establish ASEAN. On her question why the region would be in need of yet another organization he answered that this one would succeed because it was different from all its predecessors, it belonged to the region. With this in mind, she would already look forward to the next 10 years of ASEAN cooperation.